State v. Woodall, 1999-KA-01654-SCT.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1999-KA-01654-SCT.,1999-KA-01654-SCT.
• Citation: 801 So.2d 678
• Parties: STATE of Mississippi v. Roger Wayne WOODALL.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

801 So.2d 678

STATE of Mississippi v. Roger Wayne WOODALL.

No. 1999-KA-01654-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 29, 2001.

Cono A. Caranna, II, Biloxi, Lisa Dodson, Attorneys for Appellant.

Joe Sam Owen, Gulfport, Attorney for Appellee.

EN BANC.

SMITH, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Roger Wayne Woodall was arrested on February 24, 1997, and charged with committing fourteen acts of unlawfully acquiring a controlled substance by passing a forged prescription to a practitioner. The Grand Jury of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, returned a five-count indictment against him on February 28, 1998. The trial court granted Woodall's Motion to Dismiss for Violation of the Accused's Constitutional Rights to a Speedy Trial and Due Process of Law, and the State brought this appeal. Woodall's failure to timely assert his right to a speedy trial and the absence of actual prejudice substantially outweigh any presumptive prejudice Woodall may have suffered as a result of the one-year delay between arrest and indictment. The trial court was manifestly erroneous in dismissing the charges against him. Accordingly, this Court reverses the dismissal, reinstates the indictment, and remands the case for trial.

FACTS

¶ 2. The Mississippi Board of Medical Licensures ("Board"), which completed an investigation of the activities of Dr. Ron Woodall, the brother of appellee Woodall, in March 1996, contacted the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics ("MBN") with information regarding possible criminal activity by Woodall. The MBN's subsequent investigation of Woodall led to his February 1997 arrest. Woodall posted bond on the day of his arrest and has remained out on bond since that time.

¶ 3. In March of 1997, as part of its investigatory efforts, the MBN obtained handwriting exemplars from Woodall which were sent to an independent laboratory in Louisiana for analysis.¹ The Louisiana expert reported his findings some two to three months later and, at the request of the MBN, filed a supplemental report several months afterward. Neither of these reports specifically found that Woodall had forged any of the prescriptions. During its investigation, the MBN also obtained a tape-recorded statement of Dr. Woodall. Sometime around February of 1997, this statement was lost. As Dr. Woodall had legal counsel representing him, the MBN attempted to contact his attorney to set up another meeting with him. These efforts failed, and eventually the MBN contacted Dr. Woodall directly and obtained a second statement in December 1997.

¶ 4. In January 1998, John C. "Sonny" Johnson, whom Woodall claimed to be a key defense witness, died. Woodall's counsel stated that Johnson had witnessed a transaction that was the subject of the allegations. Johnson, however, had not been listed by Woodall as a potential witness in discovery, nor had Johnson come forward with any exculpatory information prior to his death. The State also indicated that Johnson and Woodall shared cases and office space and that they may have been law partners.

¶ 5. After Woodall was indicted in February 1998, he filed a motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations, arguing that the action was barred because the indictment had been filed over two years after the crimes were allegedly committed.² State v. Woodall, 744 So.2d 747, 748 (Miss.1999). The trial court granted dismissal before Woodall's trial began. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded, while reinstating the indictment. See id. at 750. At that time, we declined to address whether Woodall's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been denied. Id. We found that the issue was being raised for the first time on appeal and thus directed the trial court to evaluate that issue on remand. Id.

¶ 6. On remand, Woodall raised the speedy trial issue, and after a hearing, the trial court again dismissed the matter, finding that the one-year lapse between arrest and indictment was presumptively prejudicial, that the State had offered no valid explanation for the delay, that Woodall's failure to raise the issue earlier did not prevent him from arguing it now, and that Woodall had suffered actual prejudice. The State appealed this dismissal.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7. The only issue presented in this appeal is whether Woodall's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. This Court has stated that speedy trial claims necessarily entail questions of fact regarding "whether the trial delay rose from good cause." DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 516 (Miss.1998). Therefore, this Court will uphold the trial court's findings on the issue of speedy trial where supported by "substantial, credible evidence; [but] if no probative evidence supports the trial court's finding[s] ..., this Court will ordinarily reverse." Ross v. State, 605 So.2d 17, 21 (Miss.1992). As in other cases in which the trial court must make factual determinations, this Court will review those findings using the "clearly erroneous" standard. Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 122 (Miss.1989).

(1) DOES THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL APPLY TO THE TIME BETWEEN WOODALL'S ARREST AND INDICTMENT?

¶ 8. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI.³ That right has been deemed a fundamental right. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). This Court has consistently held that this fundamental right arises at the "time of a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to a criminal charge." Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 874 (Miss.1994) (quoting Lightsey v. State, 493 So.2d 375, 378 (Miss.1986)) (emphasis added).

¶ 9. In the case at bar, the trial court found that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial came into consideration on February 24, 1997, the date of Woodall's arrest. Under Mississippi case law, the trial court properly ruled that the Sixth Amendment applied.

(2) WAS WOODALL'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATED UNDER THE GUIDELINES OF BARKER v. WINGO?

¶ 10. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), stands as the seminal case on the issue of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. This Court has consistently followed the approach set forth in Barker since its inception. Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 198 (Miss.1982); Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860, 862-63 (Miss.1974). In Barker, the United States Supreme Court stated that courts should consider the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his [speedy trial] right, and prejudice to the defendant" when faced with a Sixth Amendment speedy trial issue. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. In regard to these four factors, the Court admonished that they "are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

(A) LENGTH OF DELAY

¶ 11. The State admits that the one-year delay between Woodall's arrest and indictment is presumptively prejudicial. However, the State argues that the existence of that presumption merely requires this Court to analyze the remaining three factors. In Barker, the Court characterized the "length of delay" factor as a "triggering mechanism," stating that the other three factors should be considered only if the trial court found a "presumptively prejudicial" period of delay. 407 U.S. at 530,92 S.Ct. 2182. The Court explained that, absent some period of excessive delay, there could be no speedy trial violation, and, therefore, no need to explore the other three factors. Id. The Court, however, declined to set specific guidelines as to what would constitute a "presumptively prejudicial" delay, indicating that the decision would hinge upon the facts of each particular case. Id.

¶ 12. In setting those guidelines in Mississippi, this Court has held that a delay of eight months or more would constitute a "presumptively prejudicial" delay. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989). Nonetheless, this Court has denied dismissal in cases even where the delay far exceeded that presumptive period. See Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1258-59 (Miss.1996)

(denying dismissal despite 1027-day delay); Hurns v. State, 616 So.2d 313, 317 (Miss.1993) (denying dismissal despite 334-day delay); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1063 (Miss.1985) (denying dismissal despite 298-day delay). Thus, the existence of this presumption, alone, cannot serve as the basis for dismissal of charges against a defendant. Birkley v. State, 750 So.2d 1245, 1250 (Miss.1999).

¶ 13. In the case sub judice, Woodall was arrested on February 24, 1997, and indicted on February 25, 1998. Obviously, such a delay is deemed "presumptively prejudicial" in Mississippi. Since that presumption existed, the trial court properly held that the remaining three Barker factors should be analyzed to determine whether the State violated Woodall's right to speedy trial.

(B) REASON FOR DELAY

¶ 14. The State argues that it delayed indicting Woodall in order to fully investigate the charges against him. The State suggests that this explanation is a valid one; therefore, the trial court improperly weighed this factor against the State. The Barker Court noted that "different weights should be assigned to different reasons [for delay]," commenting that:

A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.

407 U.S. at 531, 407 U.S. 514.

¶ 15. The United States Supreme Court has...