State v. Woodard

• Decision Date: 01 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2-09-052-CR.,2-09-052-CR.
• Citation: 314 S.W.3d 86
• Parties: The STATE of Texas, State, v. David Wayne WOODARD, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

314 S.W.3d 86

The STATE of Texas, State, v. David Wayne WOODARD, Appellee.

No. 2-09-052-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

April 1, 2010.

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Barry L. Macha, Criminal District Attorney, John W. Brasher and Dusti Hebert, Assistant District Attorneys for Wichita County, Wichita Fall, TX, for State.

Greg J. King, Wichita Falls, TX, for Appellee.

Panel: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

OPINION

ANNE GARDNER, Justice.

I. Introduction

Appellee David Wayne Woodard was charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. The State appeals the trial court's order granting Appellee's motion to suppress evidence. In one issue, the State argues the trial court erred by not recognizing the community caretaking function of a police officer in responding to a reported automobile accident and by failing to recognize a police officer may pose questions to a fellow citizen without justification. We reverse and remand.

II. Background

Shortly after 10 p.m. on May 17, 2008, Burkburnett police officers John Warner, Jr. and Donald Morgan responded to a dispatch call regarding a car in a ditch at the Y-shaped convergence of Berry Street and the Oklahoma Cut-Off. An anonymous phone call prompted the dispatch, but the caller provided no additional details regarding the accident, the vehicle, the location, or the car's passengers.

Officer Warner received a second dispatch call as he drove to the accident scene. The dispatch reported the anonymous caller's observation of the vehicle's driver, wearing a dark T-shirt and jeans and walking approximately six blocks north of the accident scene. The second dispatch provided no other details regarding the driver's attire, physical features, or direction.

More than a quarter mile from the wrecked car, and more than six blocks west of the last reported location of the driver, Officer Warner saw Appellee wearing a dark T-shirt and jeans walking on the public sidewalk. Officer Warner did not initially observe Appellee breaching the peace, walking illegally, or behaving in a manner that endangered himself or others. Officer Warner testified he did not believe Appellee was publicly intoxicated when he first saw him, nor did he have reason to make a "community caretaking stop" of Appellee. Officer Warner stated that he just stopped to ask Appellee a few questions and admitted he had a "hunch" that Appellee was the driver of the wrecked vehicle because his attire matched the vague description provided by the anonymous caller.

Immediately upon encountering Appellee, Officer Warner inquired whether Appellee was involved in a collision at Oklahoma Cut-Off and North Berry. Appellee admitted that he had been driving the wrecked vehicle. Officer Warner described Appellee's response of "Yes" as "freely volunteered." During the encounter, Appellee stated he was drunk and should not have been driving. Officer Warner said that based on his knowledge, training, and experience, Appellee appeared to be intoxicated.

About the time Officer Warner encountered Appellee, Officer Morgan found a vehicle nosedown in a drainage ditch near the location provided in the dispatch. Officer Morgan looked in the car's windows and saw no passengers. Upon noticing damage to the front of the vehicle, and believing the accident may have caused injuries, Officer Morgan followed the police department's standard procedure for identifying the driver of a wrecked, unoccupied vehicle by opening the driver's door to locate a driver's license, insurance card, or other form of identification. Officer Morgan's intent was not to investigate for criminal activity, but to determine the identity of the car's owner so the driver might be located and treated for any possible injuries. During the vehicle search, Officer Morgan found an insurance card and two beer cans-one empty and one that was cold and three-quarters empty. Officer Morgan informed Officer Warner of his findings and remained with the vehicle until it was towed. Officer Morgan admitted he did not know when the beer was consumed, who drove the vehicle, the number of passengers in the vehicle, or when the accident occurred.

After receiving Officer Morgan's report and observing Appellee, Officer Warner asked Appellee to perform standardized field sobriety testing and, based on Appellee's performance, determined Appellee was intoxicated. Appellee consented to take a breath test, and Officer Warner placed Appellee in custody. Officer Warner testified that, based on the totality of the circumstances, he believed Appellee drove the vehicle Officer Morgan found in the ditch. Officer Warner admitted he did not possess personal knowledge that Appellee drove the car, drove while intoxicated, or consumed the beers before the wreck.

The State indicted Appellee for the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming a lack of probable cause, consent, and that "the scope of the seizure and search exceeded that authorized by law." Following an evidentiary hearing, at which only Officers Warner and Morgan testified, the trial court granted Appellee's motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.¹

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex.Crim. App.2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim. App.2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.

Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). When the trial court grants a motion to suppress and files accompanying findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer, the only question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. See State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 467, 469 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 86-87, 89. We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974, 124 S.Ct. 1883, 158 L.Ed.2d 469 (2004).

IV. Suppression of Evidence Arguments

On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because it failed to recognize (1) a police officer's community caretaking function of responding to a reported automobile accident and (2) that a police officer is just as free as any other citizen to stop and ask questions of a fellow citizen without the need for any justification. Appellee contends the trial court's decision to suppress evidence is correct because the investigative detention of Appellee was based on Officer Warner's hunch after he received a dispatch relaying information provided by an anonymous tipster.

A. Community Caretaker Exception Inapplicable

The community caretaking exception allows police officers, as part of their duty to "serve and protect," to stop or temporarily detain an individual whom a reasonable person would believe is in need of help, given the totality of circumstances. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim.App.1999); see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). The community caretaking exception is to be narrowly applied. Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 152. To invoke the exception, an officer's primary motive must be concern for the individual's well-being. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Determining whether an officer has properly invoked his community caretaking function is a two-step process. Id. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community caretaking purpose. Id. Second, the court must determine whether the officer's belief that his assistance was required was reasonable. Id.

Here, the record reflects that at the time he approached Appellee, Officer Warner (1) was unsure if a wreck existed at the alleged location, (2) possessed no personal knowledge that Appellee had operated the vehicle, (3) admitted the driver's description was extremely vague, and (4) was not concerned for Appellee's safety. Moreover, the record reflects Officer Warner did not initially observe that Appellee was endangering himself or others.

We...