State v. Woodburn

• Docket Number: 2021-0360
• Decision Date: 23 March 2023
• Citation: 175 N.H. 645,300 A.3d 931
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Jeffrey WOODBURN
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

175 N.H. 645

300 A.3d 931

The STATE of New Hampshire

v.Jeffrey WOODBURN

No. 2021-0360

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: October 18, 2022

Opinion Issued: March 23, 2023

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Joshua L. Speicher, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Jeffrey Woodburn, self-represented party, on the brief and orally.

BASSETT, J.

The defendant, Jeffrey Woodburn, was convicted on one count of domestic violence, RSA 631:2-b, I(b)(2016), one count of simple assault, RSA 631:2-a, I(b)(2016), and two counts of criminal mischief, RSA 634:2, I, III (2016)(amended 2020), following a jury trial in the Superior Court(Bornstein, J.).On appeal, he has adequately developed challenges to only the domestic violence and simple assault convictions.¹He argues that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense.He also asserts that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the complainant's alleged prior acts of aggression against him, arguing that the evidence was admissible under either New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) or the verbal completeness and opening-the-door doctrines.Because we agree with the defendant that the court's failure to give a self-defense instruction was error, we reverse his convictions for domestic violence and simple assault, affirm his criminal mischief convictions, and remand.

The jury could have found the following facts.The defendant and the complainant were in a romantic relationship from approximately August 2015 to July 2018.The final year of their relationship was marked by frequent conflict.As relevant to this appeal, on December 15, 2017, the defendant and the complainant had an argument while driving to Jefferson from a holiday party in Lancaster.The complainant was driving.At some point during the disagreement, the defendant stated that he wanted to get out of the car.The complainant pulled the car over on a dirt road, and the defendant stated that he was getting out and that he was going to call his friend to come pick him up.In response, the complainant reached for the defendant's cell phone and a "tug of war" ensued.The defendant then bit the complainant on her left hand, which caused her to release the phone.

The defendant was charged with one count of simple assault and one count of domestic violence as alternative charges arising from this incident.Prior to trial, the defendant filed a notice of defense, which stated that he intended to rely on the defense of self-defense pursuant to RSA 627:4(2016).In the notice, the defendant asserted:

The evidence at trial will show that the [complainant] repeatedly tried to block and/or restrain [the defendant] from leaving her ... and that any force that [the defendant] used against [the complainant] was necessary for him to use in order to either leave or attempt to leave a volatile situation created by [the complainant].

At trial, the complainant, the defendant, and several other witnesses testified.On several occasions, the court excluded evidence of the complainant's alleged prior aggressive conduct towards the defendant, including evidence that she had tried to block or restrain him from leaving her during previous conflicts.The defendant argued that this evidence was relevant to his theory of self-defense.

After the defendant's testimony, but before the close of evidence, the trial court heard arguments on the defendant's request for a jury instruction on self-defense.The court denied the request, concluding that there was "no evidence that would support a rational finding ... that the Defendant was acting in self-defense."It reasoned: "[T]here's no evidence that implicates the mental processes and actions that are necessary to entitle somebody to an instruction on self-defense.There's no evidence as to what his state of mind was when he committed those acts. ...He doesn't even remember doing these things."The jury convicted the defendant of the simple assault and domestic violence charges stemming from the December 15, 2017 incident.This appeal followed.

The defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a self-defense jury instruction.The State raises two threshold arguments in response.It first asserts that the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because his request for the instruction was based upon his "theory of the case," not a "theory of defense."A "theory of the case" is simply the defendant's position on how the evidence should be evaluated and interpreted.State v. Cavanaugh, 174 N.H. 1, 11, 259 A.3d 805(2020).By contrast, a "theory of defense" is akin to a civil plea of confession and avoidance, by which the defendant admits the substance of the allegation but points to facts that excuse, exonerate, or justify his actions such that he thereby escapes liability.Id.A trial court must instruct a jury on a theory of defense, but need not instruct a jury on a defendant's theory of the case.Id.The State contends that, because the defendant asserted only a "theory of the case,"the trial court did not err in denying his requested instruction.We disagree.

The defendant asserted a true theory of defense: he admitted to the charged conduct — biting the complainant — and sought to justify his behavior by demonstrating that he was defending himself against the complainant's efforts to confine him.See, e.g., State v. Noucas, 165 N.H. 146, 156, 70 A.3d 476(2013)(defendant not entitled to defense of another instruction because he"did not admit to any of the facts alleged in the indictment").The State argues that this was a mere "theory of the case" because the defendant presented a different version of events than the complainant.Although it is true that a defendant may not be entitled to a jury instruction on a specific defense when the defendant"present[s] an entirely different factual scenario for the jury to evaluate,"State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 272, 274, 821 A.2d 979(2003), that was not the case here.The defendant's and the complainant's accounts, although differing in some details, were consistent with respect to the charged conduct.

The State also argues, as a threshold matter, that the defendant did not preserve the specific argument that he raises on appeal regarding his entitlement to a self-defense instruction.On appeal, the defendant posits a confinement theory of self-defense: Due to the location and weather, it would have been dangerous for him to leave the car without his phone, and, therefore, the complainant's attempts to take his phone constituted attempted confinement.Accordingly, he argues that his efforts to retrieve his phone, including biting the complainant, were done to defend himself.The State asserts that the defendant did not raise this "dangerous conditions" argument in the trial court, nor did he present evidence of the dangerous conditions that night.

The defendant, as the appealing party, bears the burden of demonstrating that he specifically raised the arguments articulated in his appellate brief before the trial court.State v. McInnis, 169 N.H. 565, 573, 153 A.3d 921(2017).The purpose of this preservation rule "is to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any error it may have made."Id. at 574, 153 A.3d 921(quotation omitted).Therefore, we will find an argument preserved only if the trial court had "the opportunity to consider that legal issue or the development of facts that might or might not have supported" the specific argument raised on appeal.State v. Brum, 155 N.H. 408, 417, 923 A.2d 1068(2007)(quotation omitted).

We are satisfied that the defendant raised the specific argument that he now advances on appeal: that, given the circumstances, it was too dangerous for him to leave the car without his phone.Before trial, the defendant raised his "confinement" theory of self-defense in his notice of defense — that the force he used was necessary to escape a "volatile situation" created by the complainant.Defense counsel raised this theory at multiple points during trial, including by arguing to the trial court that, "what's going [on] in [the defendant's] mind [was] ....How do I get out of the car without hurting me, without hurting her, and getting away from her on the side of the road in the winter and try to keep my phone at least?"Moreover, the trial court heard evidence in support of this argument: The defendant testified that the incident occurred in December in northern New Hampshire and that it would have been "a long walk to anything" from the dirt road where the complainant stopped the car.He also testified that he"needed" his phone so that he could call someone to pick him up "to get out of that situation."Based on the notice of defense, defense counsel's arguments at trial, and the defendant's testimony, we conclude that the trial court had the opportunity to consider the specific self-defense argument the defendant now raises.SeeBrum, 155 N.H. at 417, 923 A.2d 1068.

We now turn to the merits of the defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it failed to give a self-defense instruction.The parties disagree as to the proper standard of review.The State argues that we should apply our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.SeeCavanaugh, 174 N.H. at 7, 259 A.3d 805.The defendant, relying on State v. McMinn, 141 N.H. 636, 690 A.2d 1017(1997), asserts that the court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense is "reversible error."SeeMcMinn, 141 N.H. at 644-45, 690 A.2d 1017(concluding that trial court erred when it refused to instruct jury on self-defense theory and reversing conviction without considering whether the trial court's failure to give the instruction was untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant's case);State v. Hast, 133 N.H. 747, 749-50, 584 A.2d 175(1990)(same).We need...