State v. Woodland
| Decision Date | 19 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 940390,940390 |
| Citation | 945 P.2d 665 |
| Parties | 326 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Eugene Nate WOODLAND, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Marian Decker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Randall T. Gaither, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Defendant Eugene Nate Woodland appeals his 1994 conviction for murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree felony. Woodland challenges the trial court's failure to find him incompetent to stand trial, to ensure that he knowingly waived his right to a mental illness-based defense, and to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds. Woodland also argues that the trial court should have reduced the degree of his offense at sentencing. We have jurisdiction to hear these claims pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code. We affirm.
Around 1986, defendant entered into a contract with the firm of Peacock and Larsen for construction of the Woodland Dinner Theater Garden Complex in Salt Lake City. After a significant period of work, Woodland fell behind in his payments to Peacock and Larsen and was eventually forced into bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Peacock and Larsen filed a lien on Woodland's property to protect its interests. Following Woodland's bankruptcy, Peacock and Larsen bid on and eventually purchased Woodland's property. In September 1989, Woodland contacted Harry Peacock by telephone to discuss the status of his former property. During their conversation, Woodland expressed his frustration over the fact that Peacock and Bruce Larsen had purchased the property. Woodland indicated that if Peacock and Larsen refused to settle with him, he would "settle it with other means." Woodland then demanded to speak with Bruce Larsen; Peacock referred him instead to their lawyer.
On March 28, 1990, Woodland entered his former dinner theater and shot and killed Bruce Larsen. After the shooting, two Woodland was arrested and charged with murder in the second degree and aggravated assault. He successfully challenged his competency to stand trial, and the court eventually dismissed the original charges without prejudice on April 30, 1993. New charges were filed in October 1993, and Woodland again challenged his competency to proceed. At the resultant competency hearing held February 1, 1994, the court reviewed the evaluations of three court-appointed physicians and found Woodland competent to proceed to trial. Another petition regarding competency was filed with the court on April 8, 1994, which led to two additional hearings in April and May 1994. The court again determined that Woodland was competent to stand trial.
workers who had witnessed the event followed Woodland to a nearby apartment complex. They tackled Woodland in an attempt to detain him until police could arrive, and in the struggle, Woodland shot one of them in the hand.
In addition to the competency challenge, Woodland filed two pretrial motions with the court. The first was a motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. The court rejected this motion, finding that the delay had been caused by "issues of [d]efendant's competency" and was not attributable to the State. The second was a "Motion to Inquire Into a Plea of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity." In reviewing Woodland's ability to waive his defenses based on mental illness, the court conducted a lengthy in-court interview and concluded that Woodland's waiver was both voluntary and knowing.
At the conclusion of a four-day trial, Woodland was convicted of murder and aggravated assault. Prior to the sentencing hearing, he moved to reduce his conviction and sentence one degree. The court denied Woodland's motion and imposed a five-to-life term for the murder of Bruce Larsen, with an additional zero-to-five-year firearm enhancement. The court also imposed a zero-to-five-year term for the crime of aggravated assault, with an additional one-year firearm enhancement, to be served consecutively.
Woodland claims that the trial court erred in (1) failing to find him incompetent to stand trial; (2) refusing to grant his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds; (3) failing to ensure that he knowingly waived his right to a mental illness defense; and (4) failing to reduce the degree of the offense at sentencing.
Section 77-15-2 of the Utah Code defines competence for purposes of trial: Persons are incompetent to proceed when they are unable to have a rational and factual understanding of the charges and when they cannot reasonably consult with their counsel and participate in the proceedings against them. Woodland challenges the trial court's finding that he had the capability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 1
The determination of whether a defendant is competent to proceed to trial is a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Utah 1988). Woodland's challenge centers on the trial court's factual findings regarding his competency, not on the legal interpretation of statutory competence. Thus, the court's findings on Woodland's ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997); Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1243- As noted earlier, Woodland, initially charged in March of 1990, immediately filed a petition concerning his competency to proceed. The court ordered an evaluation. In view of the evaluations of the medical experts, the court initially found Woodland incompetent to proceed to trial. The trial court dismissed these charges in April 1993 because it determined that Woodland would probably never meet the competency requirements. The charges were refiled in October 1993 after changes in the law and in Woodland's condition.
44. In accordance with this standard, Woodland must marshal the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the trial court and show that evidence to be insufficient. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)
At the first competency hearing after the refiling, the court and two of the three reviewing doctors recognized an improvement in Woodland's mental health and competence. 2 Regarding Woodland's ability to consult with counsel, one of the doctors testified that Woodland and his attorney seemed to "collaborat[e] O.K." In addition to this change in Woodland's functioning, the statutory definition of legal competence found in section 77-15-2 of the Utah Code changed. Effective May 3, 1993, subsection (2) was changed from "assist his counsel" to the less demanding "consult with his counsel." According to the new law, the subject of a competency inquiry need only display an ability to consult with counsel. He or she is not required to help or assist. Under the new statutory standard, and with the change in Woodland's condition, the trial court ruled that he was then competent to proceed.
The statutory changes in question are consistent with this court's determination that competency is established when a defendant can, but not necessarily will, assist or consult with counsel. See Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1243; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). Woodland's improved mental condition and the statute's lowered standard for competency appropriately influenced the trial court's February 1994 reversal of its earlier finding of incompetence.
In addition to the foregoing basis for the trial court's ruling, the trial court's regular and consistent exposure to and contact with defendant throughout the case reassures us. For example, the trial judge indicated during sentencing that The trial court is in a unique position as the trier of fact; we will not overturn its determination of a factual issue so long as the record fairly supports it. See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240-41 (Utah 1993); see also Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1549 (10th Cir.1991); Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199-200.
Woodland's counsel, however, maintains that this case is unique. Woodland has consistently asked his attorneys to forgo any defense based on insanity or diminished capacity, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the consequent unavailability of any other effective defense. Woodland's attorneys argue that his refusal to heed their sound legal advice is convincing proof of his inability to consult with counsel and, thus, his incompetence. We disagree.
That the accused has the right to control the nature of his or her defense is well established. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982); see also Utah Const. art. I, § 12; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540-41, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ();
State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195, 199 (1954) (recognizing defendant's right under Utah Constitution to control his defense and represent himself). In Wood, for example, this court held that "an attorney acts as an assistant for his client, and not as a master." Wood, 648 P.2d at 91. According to the factual findings of the trial court, Woodland understood the charges against him and chose to assist and consult with his attorneys by...To continue reading
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