State v. Woodrome

Decision Date10 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. WD 75460.,WD 75460.
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Clinton Eugene WOODROME, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Chris Koster, Attorney General, Jessica P. Meredith, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Erika R. Eliason, Assistant Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for appellant.

Before Division Three Judges: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, Presiding Judge, and MARK D. PFEIFFER and CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Judges.

MARK D. PFEIFFER, Judge.

This is a case addressing the reasonableness—or unreasonableness as it were—of one's expectation of privacy in stolen property. Clinton Woodrome (Woodrome) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Bates County, Missouri (trial court), convicting him, after a jury trial, of three counts of receiving stolen property, § 570.080. On appeal, Woodrome claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and then admitting evidence obtained in what Woodrome argues was an unlawful search conducted without a search warrant and absent exigent circumstances. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 13, 2009, several law enforcement officers, including Detective Joseph Botta and Sergeant Mike Mullaney, went to the Arrowhead RV and Trailer Park to execute arrest warrants for two men: Woodrome and Scott Shankle (Shankle). When the officers entered the RV park, the park's owner, Jack Kimlin, approached the officers to determine why they were there. The officers showed Mr. Kimlin the mugshots of both Woodrome and Shankle and asked whether Mr. Kimlin knew the men. Mr. Kimlin confirmed that Woodrome rented a lot from him at the RV park, but that Mr. Kimlin knew Woodrome by a false name Woodrome had provided Mr. Kimlin. Mr. Kimlin also told the officers that Shankle, whom he knew as “Scooter,” stayed with Woodrome in the park, as did Woodrome's girlfriend. Mr. Kimlin told the officers that he did not believe Woodrome and Shankle were currently present on the premises. However, Mr. Kimlin showed the officers to Woodrome's lot, which could be seen from the highway adjacent to the RV park.

On Woodrome's rented lot were a fifth-wheel RV trailer and several other vehicles, including a blue panel-type construction truck, a black Dodge “dually” pickup truck, and a white Pace trailer, which was hitched to the Dodge pickup. The officers approached the RV to attempt to execute the arrest warrant; one officer knocked on the door to the RV while another “covered” the front end of the trailer. No one answered the officers' knocks. Detective Botta, who was covering the front end of the RV trailer, saw the panel with the VIN number for the trailer. He ran the VIN number over his police radio and learned that the RV had been reported as having been stolen. The officers then looked around the RV. The officers noticed that all of the locks on the construction truck had been drilled out, which was an indication that the vehicle had been stolen. A look through the window of the construction truck revealed that the ignition had also been drilled out. The officers then proceeded to run the VIN number for the black Dodge pickup, which had also been reported stolen. Finally, the officers noticed that the VIN panel for the Pace trailer had been removed, which indicated to the officers that it had also likely been stolen.

At about this time, Shankle returned to the RV park. The police officers approached Shankle, who was riding a stolen motorcycle, and arrested him. Shortly thereafter, Woodrome returned to the RV park on a motorcycle, accompanied by his girlfriend. The officers, who were in uniform, attempted to stop Woodrome to arrest him; but Woodrome refused to stop the motorcycle, sped off to the back of the RV park where he abandoned the motorcycle, and Woodrome and his girlfriend escaped on foot. Woodrome was not apprehended until days or weeks later.

The stolen vehicles at the RV park were seized by the officers and were taken to two different tow lots where they were searched. The search of the vehicles produced incriminating evidence. The vehicles were ultimately released either to their owners or to insurance companies who had paid the owners for the loss of the stolen property.

Woodrome was charged with four counts of receiving stolen property, § 570.080, for having been in possession of the fifth-wheel RV trailer, the black Dodge dually truck, the blue construction truck, and the Pace pull-behind trailer. Woodrome's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police on August 13, 2009, arguing that the officers did not have the lawful authority to search the vehicles on his RV lot leased from the RV park. The trial court denied Woodrome's motion to suppress, and the evidence seized was admitted at trial. Woodrome was found guilty on three counts and acquitted on the count relating to the black Dodge pickup. Woodrome appeals.

Standard of Review

Appellate courts review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and defer to the trial court's determinations of credibility. State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Mo. banc 2011). Review is limited to determining if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Analysis of whether law enforcement conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a legal issue that is reviewed de novo. Id.

“In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and at trial to determine whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's ruling.” State v. Nelson, 334 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Mo.App. W.D.2011). The facts and inferences therefrom are reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and all contrary inferences are disregarded. Id. “Our review is limited to a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings.” Id. We defer to the trial court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression motion hearing.” Id.

“Ordinarily, appellate courts will reverse a ruling on a motion to suppress only if it is clearly erroneous and will reverse admission of testimony only if the trial court abused its discretion.” Foster v. State, 348 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Mo.App. E.D.2011).

Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A person who seeks to have evidence against him suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds “has the burden of establishing that his ... rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). The person arguing for suppression meets his initial burden of proving he is aggrieved by the search and seizure through showing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or item that was searched or seized. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 63, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). This standard has two parts: (1) “whether the individual by his conduct has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) “whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (internal quotations omitted).

Expectation of Privacy in Curtilage Surrounding Dwelling

Woodrome's argument on appeal shifts the focus of his reasonable expectation of privacy from his “dwelling” to the “RV lot.” In light of the fact that Woodrome's “dwelling” was stolen, we find it no coincidence.

Woodrome argues in his appellate brief:

Officer Botta and the other officers were told by Mr. Kimlin that Mr. Woodrome was not on the property prior to enteringthe lot. The officers' business ended when Mr. Kimlin informed them that Mr. Woodrome and Mr. Shankle were not currently on the property.

This argument borders on frivolity.

The officers possessed an arrest warrant for Woodrome and Shankle. In speaking with the owner of the RV park, the officers confirmed the “dwelling” in which both resided. Though the RV park owner commented that he did not believe Woodrome and Shankle were currently present at the RV located on Woodrome's rented lot in the RV park, there is no RV-park-owner-thinks-I'm-not-there exception to the lawful attempted execution of an arrest warrant. Instead, upon confirming that Woodrome and Shankle resided in the RV on one of the RV park lots, the officers had the authority to determine for themselves whether Woodrome and Shankle were present in the RV and, if so, to effect their arrest pursuant to the authority of the warrant for their arrests. [F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). See also United States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 359, 362 (8th Cir.2002) (citations omitted) (finding that since the suspect “was living at the trailer property, the warrant for his arrest permitted officers to execute the warrant at that location.”). When law enforcement officers have legitimate business on property ( i.e., executing an arrest warrant), they may properly enter areas of curtilage open to the public. State v. Edwards, 36 S.W.3d 22, 26 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). Here, to attempt to execute the arrest warrant, the officers did not enter the RV trailer; instead, they knocked and, in plain view of the outside of the dwelling, discovered a VIN number that produced...

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