State v. Woodruff

• Decision Date: 12 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 3315.,3315.
• Citation: 344 S.C. 537,544 S.E.2d 290
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Ronald L. WOODRUFF, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

344 S.C. 537

544 S.E.2d 290

The STATE, Respondent, v. Ronald L. WOODRUFF, Appellant.

No. 3315.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard January 9, 2001.

Decided March 12, 2001.

Rehearing Denied April 23, 2001.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Robert E. Bogan, and Senior Assistant Attorney

General Charles H. Richardson, all of Columbia; and Solicitor George M. Ducworth, of Anderson, for Respondent.

ANDERSON, Judge:

Ronald L. Woodruff appeals his conviction for trafficking in crack cocaine. Woodruff contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). We reverse.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the suppression hearing, the trial court viewed two police video tape recordings which depicted a June 4, 1998 traffic stop and thirty minute detention. One of the video tapes came from Officer Matthew Durham's patrol car. The second video tape was obtained from Officer James Littleton's patrol car. Both officers testified at trial regarding the detention. The tapes, together with the testimony, reveal the following.

At approximately 10:22 a.m. on June 4, 1998, Officer Matthew Durham, with the Anderson County Sheriffs Department, stopped a vehicle for speeding. The driver of the automobile was Alex Graham. One of the vehicle's windows was broken. Shortly after Officer Durham stopped the vehicle, Officer James Littleton arrived on the scene. Woodruff was a passenger in the vehicle. Officer Durham asked to see Graham's driver's license or identification, but Graham was unable to produce either. Graham told Officer Durham his last name was "Harriston" and provided an address and date of birth. Graham informed Officer Durham that he and Woodruff had been to Atlanta to "see some girls" and the vehicle belonged to Woodruff. Officer Durham called in the information Graham provided for verification, along with the automobile's tag number. Officer Durham testified the resulting report indicated the car belonged to Robert Moore, who had been reported missing.

According to Officer Durham, Woodruff, when questioned, declared he owned the automobile, but he was unable to produce a registration for the car. Upon further questioning, Woodruff indicated he and Graham had taken Graham's girlfriend to Atlanta to "drop her off." Officer Durham stated Woodruff provided several different names during the stop.

About 10:34 a.m., Officer Durham issued Graham a warning ticket for speeding and asked him for permission to search the car. Graham consented to the search.

At approximately 10:35 a.m., prior to the vehicle search, Woodruff got out of the car. Officer Durham conducted a patdown on both Graham and Woodruff. Neither search revealed weapons. The vehicle search, which lasted approximately ten minutes, produced a small set of scales and a number of identification cards, none of which depicted either Graham or Woodruff. Officer Durham stated Woodruff claimed to be one of the persons pictured on one of the identification cards, but the claim proved to be false.

After the vehicle search, Officer Durham searched Woodruff a second time. On direct examination, Officer Durham gave the following account of the second search:

A. At that time after all the names and anything was adding up—kept finding different IDs, the inconsistencies with their stories, the busted window,—at that time I did a more thorough search on the passenger using my hands and went down through his groin area and at that time I felt a bulge in his groin area.

Q. And what did you do when you felt that bulge?

A. Asked the subject what was in his pants.

Q. And what did he tell you?

A. He pulled his britches out and at that time I could visually see the cocaine in his pants.

Q. Did you remove it?

A. No, ma'am.

Q. Who removed it?

A. I asked the subject to remove it for me.

On cross-examination, Officer Durham testified as follows regarding the second search:

A. At that time we started finding more IDs. I think he produced the ID and we got to finding IDs in the car. The stories that they were giving weren't adding up as to where they said they were going and where they were coming from and the window being busted out of the car. Supposedly now he's a missing person out of North Carolina, and then he goes from there to that he's not even the owner of the car—At that time I decided I may have missed something, so, I searched him again.

Q. Okay, when you patted him down the first time, you didn't find any weapons?

A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't expect to find any weapons when you patted him down again, did you?

A. At that time I wasn't looking for weapons.

Q. Well, what were you looking for?

A. I was looking to see if there was any more IDs or anything else on him that made me believe that he isn't who he says he is.

Q. And the second time you searched him this was a more extensive search, wasn't it?

A. Yes, it was.

....

Q. But,—you felt a bulge in his pants.

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay, did that bulge feel like a knife?

A. A knife?

Q. Yeah.

A. No.

Q. Did it feel like a gun?

A. No.

Q. Did it feel like brass knuckles?

A. No.

Q. Did it feel like any type of weapon?

A. No.

Q. What did it feel like?

A. At the time I wasn't sure; that's why I asked him what he had in his pants and at that time he pulled his waistband out and when he did that I looked down in his pants and you could visually see the cocaine in the bag.

Approximately thirty minutes elapsed between the time Officer Durham made the traffic stop and the time he conducted the second search of Woodruff. The material seized from Woodruff was determined to be 30.34 grams of crack cocaine.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Woodruff argues the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the crack cocaine because it was seized pursuant to an unlawful and unreasonable thirty minute Terry search. We agree.

I. Law

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734, 737 (1891). It has, however, long been recognized that not all personal encounters between policemen and citizens involve "seizures" of persons thereby bringing the Fourth Amendment into play. State v. Foster, 269 S.C. 373, 237 S.E.2d 589 (1977); State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 525 S.E.2d 535 (Ct.App.1999). "The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but `to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.'" United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980)(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081-82, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1126 (1976)). A person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "whenever a police officer accosts [the] individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903 (1968). See also Sikes v. State, 323 S.C. 28, 30, 448 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1994)

("An individual is `seized' when an officer restrains his freedom, even if the detention is brief and falls short of an arrest."). That is, "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16,

88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16,

20 L.Ed.2d at 905 n. 16.

In determining whether an encounter between a law enforcement official and a citizen constitutes a seizure, thereby implicating Fourth Amendment protection, the correct inquiry is whether, considering all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509. So long as the person approached and questioned remains free to disregard the officer's questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy and, therefore, no constitutional justification for the encounter is necessary. Id. See also Foster, 269 S.C. at 379,

237 S.E.2d at 591 (person has not been seized where he is neither detained nor frisked and remains free to refuse to cooperate with enforcement officers).

The Supreme Court has often observed that searches and seizures "`conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'" Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20, 105 S.Ct. 409, 410, 83 L.Ed.2d 246, 250 (1984) (per curiam) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967) (footnotes omitted)). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)

(Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside judicial process, without prior approval by magistrate or judge, are...