State v. Woods

• Decision Date: 19 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-82,82-82
• Citation: 203 Mont. 401,662 P.2d 579,40 St.Rep. 533
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jacob H. WOODS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 579

662 P.2d 579

203 Mont. 401

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jacob H. WOODS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 82-82.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Jan. 10, 1983.

Decided April 14, 1983.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1983.

Moses Law Firm, Charles F. Moses, Billings, for defendant and appellant.

Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Ted O. Lympus, County Atty., Kalispell, for plaintiff and respondent.

SHEEHY, Justice.

Jacob H. Woods was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide in District Court, Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, involving the deaths of Ronald Johnson and Phillip Kessner. He appeals his conviction to this Court. We affirm.

The most important issues raised by Woods are that the Youth Court proceedings against him were constitutionally defective, and that he was charged in District Court on an information that was unsupported by affidavit or sworn testimony.

That the Youth Court proceedings against Woods were defective is eminently obvious. The petition initiating the proceedings in Youth Court did not state the facts constituting the offenses with which he was charged in ordinary, concise language so as to enable a person of common understanding to know what was intended. Section 41-5-501(2)(c), MCA. The petition did not include a list of the witnesses the State intended to use in proving the commission of the offenses against him. Section 41-5-501(7), MCA.

The petitioner was arrested in Woodward County, Oklahoma. After he was brought to Montana, he was detained without any sworn statement presented to the court that Woods needed to be placed in detention. Section 41-5-502(4), MCA.

However, by what process or authority Woods was arrested in Woodward County, Oklahoma, is not shown in the record. As far as the record discloses, he was not taken into custody "by a law enforcement officer pursuant to a lawful order or process of [the] court." Section 41-5-302(1)(a), MCA.

A warrant for the arrest of Woods was issued out of the Youth Court on March 19, 1981. On that date he was already in the custody of the sheriff of Woodward County, Oklahoma. There is no provision in the Youth Court Act for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Presumably the warrant of arrest, therefore, was issued under section 46-6-201, MCA. However, a warrant of arrest is invalid unless it is based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. Art. II, Sec. 11, 1972 Mont. Const.; State ex rel. Wicks v. District Court (1972), 159 Mont. 434, 498 P.2d 1202; Petition of Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. Here there was no showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing in the Youth Court proceedings, upon which to base the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

From the record, therefore, the initiation of the Youth Court proceedings against Woods on March 18, 1981, his earlier arrest in Oklahoma, and his subsequent detention in Flathead County during the Youth Court proceedings were all patently unlawful. Yet, it avails Woods nothing. An illegal arrest of a defendant does not preclude the State from proceeding on a criminal charge against him. In United States v. Crews (1980), 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537, the Supreme Court stated:

"Insofar as respondent challenges his own presence at trial, he cannot claim immunity from prosecution simply because his appearance in court was precipitated by an unlawful arrest. An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction (citing cases). The exclusionary principal of Wong Sun [v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ] and Silverthorne Lumber Company [251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1920) ] delimits what proof the government may offer against the accused at trial, closing the courtroom door to evidence secured by official lawlessness. Respondent is not himself a suppressible 'fruit,' and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the government of the opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction of evidence wholly untainted by the police misconduct." 100 S.Ct. at 1251.

See also, State v. Ritchson (1981), Mont., 630 P.2d 234, 239, 38 St.Rep. 1015.

We attach no weight, therefore, to Woods' contentions that his arrest and detention were unlawful or that the Youth Court proceedings were unlawful or not based upon probable cause, or that the petition filed in the Youth Court was deficient.

The crimes with which Woods was charged were alleged to have been committed before he became 18 years of age. He was under the age of 21 years at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the Youth Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the charges against him. Section 41-5-203, MCA. The Youth Court is required to retain jurisdiction unless such jurisdiction is terminated by a transfer of the proceedings to the adult criminal court. Section 41-5-205(1), MCA. Woods complains that the Youth Court proceedings against him should have been dismissed because those proceedings were not decided or determined within 15 days after service of the petition. (Section 41-5-516(1), MCA.) That provision must give way in this case, however, to the necessity for a transfer hearing whether Woods should be tried in the adult criminal court. Section 41-5-206, MCA, provides that after a petition in Youth Court alleging delinquency has been filed, the county attorney may move, before a hearing on the petition on its merits, to transfer the matter of prosecution to the District Court if the youth were 16 years of age or more at the time of the unlawful conduct, for crimes such as criminal homicide. Section 41-5-206, MCA. The 15-day time limitation of section 41-5-516, MCA, has no application when the charges are subject to transfer to the adult criminal court, and a timely motion as here is made to transfer the proceedings.

Counsel for Woods objected to the transfer of the proceedings from the Youth Court to the District Court, but the Youth Court overruled his objections based upon the deficiencies in the Youth Court proceedings. Under the rule we have stated, even though his arrest and detention may have been illegal, that was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution nor could it be a bar to the transfer of the cause from the Youth Court to the District Court.

But Woods also contends that the information filed in the District Court against him was improper because it too was filed without supporting affidavit or sworn testimony and without leave of court. Woods claims that the information was improperly filed under Art. II, Sec. 20, 1972 Mont. Const., because probable cause was not established after examination and commitment by a magistrate or after leave granted by the court. This contention again has no weight. It overlooks or ignores the transfer hearing held before the Youth Court. There, witnesses were sworn and their testimony given which established beyond cavil probable cause for the filing of the information in the District Court against Woods. The Youth Court made findings of fact which stated that the relevant evidence indicated reasonable grounds to believe that Woods had committed the acts alleged. The Youth Court further found that there was no facility available at Miles City or elsewhere in which Woods could be held or detained if the cause was retained in the Youth Court and that the gravity of the offense required the transfer of the prosecution to the District Court. The Youth Court therefore ordered that an information charging Woods be filed in the District Court. Thus, Woods did in fact receive a hearing before an impartial magistrate, the Youth Court, which ordered the county attorney to file the information in the District Court. We determine that such procedure satisfied the state constitutional requirements that criminal actions in District Court be initiated either by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate or after leave granted by the court.

We now examine Woods' contention that there was no corroboration of the testimony of accomplices sufficient to sustain his conviction. In connection with this issue, we must delineate the facts.

On September 13, 1978, at 11:25 p.m. on Highway 93, Flathead County police officers investigated the injury of two victims found on the shoulder of the highway. One was dead and one was alive. The officers found a 10-speed bicycle badly bent, a plastic grill and grill piece, green paint chips and other evidence. The victims were taken by ambulance to the hospital where one was pronounced dead on arrival and the other survived for approximately 35 to 40 minutes. It appeared that the victims had been run down on the highway while riding their bicycle. The police investigation was futile until 2 1/2 years later when an anonymous crimestoppers tip directed them to Bobby Aho, who gave police a signed statement about the night of the killing. His statement indicated that Woods had been driving around Kalispell with Jerry Schneider and Bobby Aho in Tim Fraleigh's car. They met the victims, Kessner and Johnson, who Woods claimed owed him money for drugs. He was angry that they had neither the drugs nor the money and determined to "get them." He drove up behind them while the two were riding on one bicycle down Highway 93, sped up and swerved into them. Woods drove on after the collision.

Woods was arrested in Woodward, Oklahoma, on March 18, 1981. At the time, he was nearly 19 years old but was 16 years old at the time of the offense. The Montana Codes required that he be proceeded against in the Youth Court. We have already indicated the proceedings that followed his arrest.

Woods contends that the passengers in his automobile, Schneider and Aho, must be considered accomplices, and that there is no corroboration for their testimony. The State argues that they were not in fact accomplices and that in any event, their...