State v. Woods, 53487
| Decision Date | 24 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 53487,53487 |
| Citation | 283 So.2d 753 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie R. WOODS. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
John E. Miller, Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley. Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Nathan E. Wilson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appellant Lonnie R. Woods was tried and convicted of armed robbery; he was sentenced to serve fifteen years at hard labor. From his conviction and sentence defendant has appealed, relying upon one bill of exceptions to obtain a reversal.
Defendant reserved his bill of exceptions to the ruling of the trial judge denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The motion was based on the failure of the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Woods to recuse himself.
There is no factual dispute in the case. Defendant, following his arrest, was represented by the office of the public defender of East Baton Rouge Parish. His case was allotted to Nathan E. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender. Mr. Wilson represented the accused at his arraignment at which time the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Subsequently, Mr. Wilson was appointed as an assistant district attorney for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. As such, Mr. Wilson conducted the prosecution of Mr. Woods on behalf of the State of Louisiana.
Following his conviction and before sentencing, the accused filed in the trial court a motion for a new trial. The motion was made in proper person, although the defendant had retained counsel. Defense counsel alleges and it is uncontroverted by the State that the first time he knew of the dual capacity in which Mr. Wilson participated in the case when he received a copy of the defendant's motion for a new trial.
A hearing was held by the trial judge on the defendant's motion. Mr. Wilson testified that he had no recollection of having represented Mr. Woods and that he had no independent recollection of the case from his discussion with Mr. Woods. He stated that the first time that he knew of the conflict was at the opening of the defendant's trial on the merits, when the clerk read the court's minutes which indicated that Mr. Wilson had been present and representing the defendant at the arraignment.
The trial court at the conclusion of the hearing denied the motion for a new trial stating that the defendant had made no showing of prejudice which would require setting aside the conviction. To this ruling of the trial court the defendant reserved his one bill of exceptions.
Article 680 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
'A district attorney shall be recused when he:
'(1) Has a personal interest in the cause which is in conflict with fair and impartial administration of justice;
'(2) Is related to the party accused or to the party injured, or to the spouse of the accused or party injured, to such an extent that it may appreciably influence him in the performance of the duties of his office; or
'(3) Has been employed or consulted in the case as attorney for the defendant before his election or appointment as district
Article 680 is couched in mandatory language.
Article 680 is couched in mandatory language. There is no doubt that Mr. Wilson should have been recused in this case. This is readily conceded by the State in its brief before this court. The State, however, urges that the defendant did not file a timely motion for recusation, and, in the alternative that no prejudice has been shown and any violation is therefore harmless error.
Article 681 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure for the recusation of a district attorney:
Neither the State's attorney nor the defense counsel realized prior to the trial that the assistant district attorney had previously represented the defendant. The defendant's testimony at the hearing on the motion for a new trial indicates that he was not aware that the procedure was irregular until such time as he was remanded to jail and spoke with other prisoners. Thus, while there was actually no timely motion for recusation under article 681, the record does reveal that this was not due to any fault of defense counsel or the assistant district attorney.
Under article 681 a motion to recuse must be filed prior to the commencement of the trial. A strict construction of the statutory language would allow a district attorney to prosecute a case when he should have recused himself, if the defense fails to file timely the motion to recuse. Defense counsel here testified that the first time he learned of Mr. Wilson's dual capacity was when he was given a copy of the motion for a new trial filed by the defendant in proper person while awaiting sentencing. A motion to recuse may be regarded as timely filed if the procedure is instituted within a reasonable period after the defense counsel learns of the impropriety.
Article 921 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
'A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.'
Although the motion to recuse was properly filed, there has been no violation of defendant's...
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State v. Veillon
...attorney to prosecute a case when he should have recused himself, if the defense fails to timely file the motion to recuse. State v. Woods , 283 So.2d 753 (La. 1973).7 In the instant case, defendant did not file a pretrial motion for recusation of Ms. Boyd, even though defense counsel shoul......
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State v. Fallon
...followed, not applicable to the assistant district attorney.' Official Revision Comment, La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 680. Cf. State v. Woods, 283 So.2d 753 (La.1973). There is likewise no merit to the contention that the assistant district attorney should have been excluded from the courtroom o......
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State v. Lewis
...to recuse the trial judge, we conclude that, here too, the defendant had prior knowledge of any potential conflict. See State v. Woods, 283 So.2d 753 (La.1973). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's denial of the motion was Objections to Habitual Offender Bill By this assignment, ......
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97-1244 La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98, State v. Lewis
...to recuse the trial judge, we conclude that, here too, the defendant had prior knowledge of any potential conflict. See State v. Woods, 283 So.2d 753 (La.1973). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's denial of the motion was Objections to Habitual Offender Bill By this assignment, ......