State v. Woodson
Decision Date | 11 February 1993 |
Citation | 315 Or. 314,845 P.2d 203 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Donald Ronnall WOODSON, Respondent on Review. CC C89-05-32774; CA A64036 (Control); CA A62899; SC S39583. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Janet A. Klapstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With her on the petition were Charles S. Crookham, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Eric R. Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.
Defendant appeals his conviction of attempted rape in the first degree. 1 He contends that the trial court erred by amending the indictment. The issue is whether the amendment altered the substance of the indictment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the amendment altered the substance of the indictment and reversed. State v. Woodson, 113 Or.App. 688, 833 P.2d 1339 (1992). For the reasons stated below, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the trial court's judgment.
The first formal charge against defendant was a District Attorney's information dated May 30, 1989, charging him with attempted rape in the first degree. On June 6, 1989, defendant was indicted. 2 Although count 1 in the indictment was captioned "Attempted Rape in the First Degree," the body of the indictment read as follows:
"The said defendant, on or about May 7, 1989, in the County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and knowingly, by forcible compulsion, engage in sexual intercourse with [victim], a female, contrary to the Statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon."
Before trial, the prosecutor told the court that the grand jury had intended to charge defendant with attempted rape in the first degree but that, due to a "scrivener's error," the body of the indictment charged the completed crime of rape. 3 The prosecutor asked the court to amend the text of the indictment to charge the lesser crime. Defendant objected, arguing that the amendment altered the substance of the indictment and that the state therefore was required to obtain a new indictment. He relied primarily on Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of the Oregon Constitution. 4 The court overruled defendant's objection and amended the indictment by interlineation by adding the words "attempt to" before the words "engage in sexual intercourse with [victim]." The case was tried to a jury, which found defendant guilty of attempted rape in the first degree.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in amending the indictment. The Court of Appeals agreed, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. We allowed the state's petition for review.
The state contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the amendment altered the substance of the indictment, arguing that the amendment merely cured a "scrivener's error" and, therefore, that it was permitted by Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). See State v. Moyer, 76 Or. 396, 399-401, 149 P. 84 (1915) ( ). 5
In State v. Wimber, 315 Or. 103, 114, 843 P.2d 424 (1992), this court set forth an analysis for determining whether an amendment to an indictment is a permissible alteration as to form. We will inquire:
"(1) Did the amendment alter the essential nature of the indictment against defendant, alter the availability to him of defenses or evidence, or add a theory, element, or crime?" 6
In this case, the answer to that question is "no."
"(2) Did the amendment prejudice defendant's right to notice of the charges against him and to protection against double jeopardy?"
Again, in this case the answer is "no."
"(3) Was the amendment itself sufficiently definite and certain?"
In this case, the answer is "yes."
The fourth question in the Wimber analysis--"Did the remaining allegations in the indictment state the essential elements of the offenses?"--relates to deleting allegations. Id. In this case, no words were deleted physically, but the allegation of a completed act of intercourse was deleted in effect by virtue of the addition of the words "attempt to." As to Wimber's fourth question, the remaining allegations in the indictment, after the amendment, stated all of the essential elements of the crime of attempted rape in the first degree.
The trial court's amendment in this case also satisfied the concerns expressed by the dissent in State v. Wimber, supra, 315 Or. at 116, 843 P.2d 424 (Unis, J., dissenting). The amendment protected the right of the grand jury, not the prosecutor, "to determine whether a particular charge should be brought" and "to insure that the charge presented against a defendant was based on facts found by the grand jury." Id. at 118, 843 P.2d 424. 7 Neither is this a case of " 'A prosecution for an offense other than that the grand jury had in mind,' " a possibility about which the dissent in Wimber also expressed concern. Id. at 123, 843 P.2d 424, quoting LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure 451, § 19.2. Rather, the amendment here was for the express purpose of prosecuting the exact crime that " 'the grand jury had in mind.' " Id. Because the amendment did not serve to amend the substantive decision of the grand jury in an impermissible fashion, it did not violate Article VII (Amended), section 5(6). 8
ORS 136.460 provides:
"Upon a charge for a crime consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the accusatory instrument and guilty of any degree inferior thereto or of an attempt to commit the crime or any such inferior degree thereof."
Attempted rape is a lesser included offense of rape. Even if the indictment had not been amended, the jury could have found defendant guilty of attempted rape in the first degree. ORS 136.460; see State v. Washington, 273 Or. 829, 835, 543 P.2d 1058 (1975) ( ); State v. Gibbons, 228 Or. 238, 241-42, 364 P.2d 611 (1961) (). 9 Thus, the interlineation effected no change in the indictment; the indictment already charged defendant with, and he could have been convicted of, attempted rape.
Defendant has not argued that the allegations in the amended indictment fail to state any essential element of the crime of attempted rape in the first degree or that the double jeopardy function of the indictment (identifying the crime so as to provide protection against further prosecution based on the same crime) has not been served. Nor has he argued that the judicial review function of the indictment (informing the court of the facts charged so that it may determine whether the state's case is based on a legally valid interpretation of the offense) has not been served. Because the amendment merely specified a lesser included crime, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the amendment violated Article VII (Amended), section 5. 10
Defendant also assigns as error the trial court's ruling denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the attempted rape count. Because the Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of the amendment to the indictment, it did not discuss that assignment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices that the jury could have made, State v. Walters, 311 Or. 80, 85, 804 P.2d 1164, cert. den. 501 U.S. 1209, 111 S.Ct. 2807, 115 L.Ed.2d 979 (1991), we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that the elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Walters, supra, 311 Or. at 85, 804 P.2d 1164 ( ); State v. Krummacher, 269 Or. 125, 137-38, 523 P.2d 1009 (1974) (). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1 ORS 163.375(1) provides:
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