State v. Woodtke

• Decision Date: 23 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32487.,32487.
• Citation: 25 A.3d 699,130 Conn.App. 734
• Parties: STATE of Connecticutv.Laura WOODTKE.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

130 Conn.App. 734

25 A.3d 699

STATE of Connecticut

v.Laura WOODTKE.

No. 32487.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 25, 2011.Decided Aug. 23, 2011.

Jennifer Mellon, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).Emily Graner Sexton, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Judith Dicine, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).GRUENDEL, ROBINSON and WEST, Js.ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Laura Woodtke, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following her conditional plea of nolo contendere, of criminal damage to a landlord's property in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–117f.¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied her motion to dismiss because her prosecution was time barred by the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 54–193.² We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the defendant's claim. On August 8, 2006, New Haven police responded to allegations of vandalism to a rental property. On September 15, 2006, an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant for the charge of criminal damage to a landlord's property in the second degree.³ Lieutenant Raymond Hassett of the New Haven police department served the warrant on July 16, 2009, two years and ten months after the warrant initially was issued, after he discovered it when he checked the defendant's name in connection with an unrelated incident.

By motion dated October 29, 2009, the defendant sought to dismiss the matter based on the delay between the issuance and the service of the arrest warrant. The defendant argued that the warrant was executed with unreasonable delay and a lack of due diligence so that prosecution of the defendant violated § 54–193, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.

On February 5, 2010, following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined that the “defendant lived openly in the city of New Haven during the relevant time period, making no attempts to consciously elude service of the warrant.” The court noted that the fact that the defendant did not consciously elude authorities militated in favor of dismissal of the action. The court, however, also found that the New Haven police department's warrant unit had been phased out several years ago, leaving the primary means of locating individuals with outstanding warrants to be identification checks during traffic stops or investigation of unrelated criminal activities. Thereafter, the court determined that although the delay in executing the warrant may have been unreasonable in a small community where the defendant did not consciously elude the authorities, New Haven is a large urban area with critical issues to attend to that take precedence over locating subjects of warrants for misdemeanors. Ultimately, the court concluded that the delay of service of the arrest warrant was not unreasonable and denied the motion to dismiss. The court did not address whether the defendant's rights under the United States constitution or the Connecticut constitution had been violated.

On May 20, 2010, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, conditioned on her right to appeal from the court's denial of her motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes § 54–94a.⁴ The court accepted the plea and determined that the motion was dispositive of the case. The defendant was sentenced to one year incarceration, execution suspended, and two years of probation. The defendant was also ordered to pay $917 in restitution to the victim. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the court improperly denied her motion to dismiss because her prosecution was time barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 54–193.⁵ In making this claim, the defendant concedes that the arrest warrant was issued within the applicable limitations period. She argues, however, that the statute of limitations was not tolled, and thus the prosecution was time barred, because the arrest warrant was executed with unreasonable delay after the limitations period had expired. We agree.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. “Our standard of review of a trial court's ... conclusions of law in connection with a motion to dismiss is well settled.... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts.... Thus, our review of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Soldi, 92 Conn.App. 849, 852–53, 887 A.2d 436, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 913, 895 A.2d 792 (2006).

Section 54–193(b) provides in relevant part that an individual may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor only if prosecution commences within one year after the offense was committed. The offense of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree is a misdemeanor; General Statutes § 53a–117f (d); and thus § 54–193(b) applies. In the present case, the police were notified of the alleged vandalism on August 8, 2006, and an arrest warrant for the defendant was issued on September 15, 2006. The warrant was not served on the defendant until July 16, 2009, two years and ten months after the warrant was initially issued. The question then, is whether the statute of limitations under § 54–193(b) tolled after the warrant was issued on September 15, 2006, so that the state was not time barred from prosecuting the defendant two years and ten months after the warrant was issued.

In State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 450, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that “[w]hen an arrest warrant has been issued, and the prosecutorial official has promptly delivered it to a proper officer for service, he has done all he can under our existing law to initiate prosecution and to set in motion the machinery that will provide notice to the accused of the charges against him. When the prosecutorial authority has done everything possible within the period of limitation to evidence and effectuate an intent to prosecute, the statute of limitations is tolled.... An accused should not be rewarded, absent evidence of a lack of due diligence on the part of the officer charged with executing the warrant, for managing to avoid apprehension to a point in time beyond the period of limitation.” (Citation omitted.)

The Crawford court, however, noted that there must be some limit as to the time in which an arrest warrant may be executed so as to protect a defendant from a stale prosecution. Id. The Crawford court adopted the approach of the Model Penal Code and concluded that “in order to toll the statute of limitations, an arrest warrant, when issued within the time limitations of § 54–193(b), must be executed without unreasonable delay. ... We do not adopt a per se approach as to what period of time to execute an arrest warrant is reasonable. A reasonable period of time is a question of fact that will depend on the circumstances of each case. If the facts indicate that an accused consciously eluded the authorities, or for other reasons was difficult to apprehend, these factors will be considered in determining what time is reasonable. If, on the other hand, the accused did not relocate or take evasive action to avoid apprehension, failure to execute an arrest warrant for even a short period of time might be unreasonable and fail to toll the statute of limitations.” (Citations omitted.) Id., at 450–51, 521 A.2d 1034. Therefore, the issuance of an arrest warrant within the statute of limitations will effectively toll the statute of limitations, even if the warrant is not executed within that time frame, provided that the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. See, e.g., State v. Jennings, 101 Conn.App. 810, 818, 928 A.2d 541 (2007).

A statute of limitations claim is an affirmative defense for which the burden rests with the defendant to prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Crawford, supra, 202 Conn. at 451, 521 A.2d 1034; see also State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403, 416, 660 A.2d 337 (1995). Despite this, “once a defendant puts forth evidence to suggest that she was not elusive, was available and was readily approachable, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the delay in executing the warrant was not unreasonable.” State v. Soldi, supra, 92 Conn.App. at 857, 887 A.2d 436.

The state argues that to claim effectively a violation of § 54–193(b), the defendant must also demonstrate that she suffered some type of prejudice or disadvantage. A prejudice requirement however is only necessary for a due process claim, not a statute of limitations claim. “Connecticut courts consistently have considered only two events when ruling on whether a defendant may successfully raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense: (1) the issuance of the warrant by a judicial authority; and (2) the execution or service of the warrant on the accused.” State v. Kruelski, 41 Conn.App. 476, 480, 677 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 238 Conn. 903, 677 A.2d 1376 (1996). “An accused's primary protection from having to answer to stale criminal charges is the statute of limitations.... When it can be shown, however, that a delay has been intentional, and actual significant prejudice to the accused has thereby resulted, due process requires dismissal of the information.... Where a delay does not prejudice the accused, no balance need be struck between the cause and effect of delay. The statute...