State v. Woody

Citation699 S.W.2d 517
Decision Date15 October 1985
Docket NumberNo. 13996,13996
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Geraldine Margie WOODY, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

C.J. Larkin, Columbia, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Christine M. Szaj, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

CROW, Judge.

A jury found Geraldine Margie Woody ("appellant") guilty of two counts of selling a controlled substance, proscribed by § 195.020.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983. Count I charged that she sold marihuana to Ernest Arrasmith on June 19, 1984; Count II charged that 6 days earlier, on June 13, 1984, she sold cocaine to Arrasmith. The jury fixed punishment at 5 years' imprisonment on each count; the trial court assessed those sentences, ordering that they run concurrently.

Appellant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of either count. Additionally, she insists that the trial court erred "in allowing introduction of evidence of appellant's alleged prior drug sales," and that the trial court wrongly refused to instruct the jury on two "lesser-included offenses" under Count I.

In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to them, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and we ignore contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Guinan, 665 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 227, 83 L.Ed.2d 156 (1984); State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1875, 85 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). The test is whether the evidence, so viewed, is such that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty. State v. Bonuchi, 636 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 576-77 (1979).

Evidence supportive of the verdicts showed that on June 13, 1984, Arrasmith was "working undercover for the Jasper County Sheriff's Department." About 3:00 p.m., that date, Arrasmith, guided by a woman who was aiding him in making "contacts with people who were selling drugs," went to a "trailer" near Carthage where appellant, then age 26, was residing with Max Jeys, a man whom appellant was "wanting to marry."

Arrasmith's reason for going to the trailer was "to purchase cocaine." He had been furnished $500 by the Chief Deputy Sheriff for that purpose.

Arrasmith testified that appellant and Jeys were in the trailer when he entered. Arrasmith began "negotiations" with Jeys to purchase 4 grams of cocaine. Jeys initially quoted a price of $550, but "some bartering or some negotiations" produced an agreement for $480.

What occurred next is revealed in this excerpt from Arrasmith's testimony:

"Q. Now, you had five hundred dollars, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Who did you give that to? A. Max Jey [sic].

Q. Was Gi-Gi 1 in the room all this time, Geraldine?

A. Yes, she was.

Q. Were there any samples of that cocaine given out that day?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. And who gave those out? A. The Defendant.

Q. Geraldine Woody? A. Yes.

Q. How big a sample are we talking about?

A. Well, it was in a little brown vial with a snorter which you put your nose to snort it. She passed me the, uh,--

Q. You're going to have to speak up a little bit, Ernest, okay?

A. She passed the vial to me to snort.

Q. Did she tell you anything when she passed the vial to you?

A. She said, 'This is just like the cocaine that you'll be buying.' "

Arrasmith testified that appellant demonstrated how to use the apparatus, and that he thereafter placed it to his nose and simulated inhalation. Then, this:

"Q. ... Now, you gave the five hundred dollars to Max Jeys, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. But you only purchased four hundred and eighty dollars worth of cocaine, is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. Did you get change back? A. Yes, I did.

Q. And who did you get the change back from?

A. From the Defendant.

Q. How'd that take place, Ernest?

A. I give Max the five hundred dollars and he told her that he needed some change out of this five hundred dollars, and so she went to her purse and brought back a twenty dollar bill."

Arrasmith then left the trailer.

He returned on June 19, again finding appellant and Jeys there. On that occasion, Arrasmith bought "a little cocaine" from Jeys for $35, then Arrasmith asked Jeys about purchasing some marihuana. They agreed on a price of $25 for a "quarter bag." 2 Arrasmith testified he gave the money for the marihuana to Jeys. Then, this:

"Q. And who gave you the marijuana?

A. The Defendant.

Q. Geraldine? A. Yes.

Q. And where did she get that from?

A. Out of her purse."

During his testimony, Arrasmith was shown a bag containing marihuana. He identified it as "the marijuana that she passed me out of her purse."

Appellant testified that she was present in the trailer both times Arrasmith was there, but she denied involvement in any of the sales. Appellant conceded that she knew there was cocaine in the trailer, but she maintained that Jeys cut it up and wrapped it for Arrasmith. Appellant denied handing Arrasmith a vial of cocaine to sample, denied telling him that it was the same as he was buying, and denied giving him $20 change. Appellant likewise denied handing Arrasmith any marihuana from her purse. Asked what she did during Arrasmith's two visits, appellant testified: "I didn't do nothing. I just set in the room."

No one except Arrasmith and appellant testified about the two incidents in question.

Appellant's challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence on Count I is twofold. First, says appellant, Arrasmith's testimony, at best, established only that she possessed marihuana. Appellant emphasizes that Arrasmith's testimony did not show that she received any consideration for transferring the marihuana to him. Citing State v. Mueller, 598 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Mo.App.1980), appellant asserts that in order to be guilty of selling a controlled substance, a person must receive or agree to receive some consideration in exchange for transferring the substance. Appellant argues that even if Arrasmith's testimony be accepted as true in all respects, it proved only that she handed him a bag containing marihuana, not that she received or agreed to receive any consideration for the transfer.

Appellant's contention is answered by State v. Schlagel, 490 S.W.2d 81 (Mo.1973). There, the accused handed a controlled substance to the buyer, after which the buyer and a companion of the accused discussed the price, agreeing on $235. The buyer attempted to hand $240 to the accused, but the accused did not take it, so the buyer handed the money to the accused's companion. The latter was unable to make change, so the accused took $4 from his pocket and handed it to the buyer. Rejecting the accused's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of sale of a controlled substance, the Supreme Court stated that evidence fairly showing any form of affirmative participation in a crime is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. at 84. In Schlagel, as here, the cause was submitted to the jury on the theory that the accused and his companion acted together with the common purpose of committing the offense. 3 The opinion in Schlagel points out that it is not necessary that the accused be shown to have performed each and every act. Id. at 84.

The evidence in Schlagel is virtually identical with the State's evidence on Count I in the instant case. In each, the evidence showed that the accused handed the contraband to the buyer, and in each the buyer handed the purchase money to the accused's companion. In neither did the accused receive anything of value from the buyer. The only difference between Schlagel and Count I of the instant case is that in Schlagel, the accused gave the buyer $4 change.

In State v. Dotson, 635 S.W.2d 373 (Mo.App.1982), an undercover agent and an informant entered a tavern, where the informant soon engaged the accused in conversation. Shortly after the conversation ended, the accused and a companion approached the agent and the informant, and the accused said, "If you want the pot, follow us outside." The agent and the informant were led to a motor vehicle by the accused and his companion. The accused's companion reached inside the vehicle, removed two bags of marihuana, handed one bag to the informant, and handed the other to the agent, receiving payment separately from each. The accused did not participate in the exchange of the marihuana or the money. Upholding the accused's conviction for sale of marihuana, Dotson explained that while presence at the scene of a crime, without more, does not prove a person aided or abetted the commission thereof, when a person present at the commission of the offense shows by some affirmative participation that the crime is an enterprise he wishes to bring about, he becomes an aider and abettor. Id. at 373-74. Dotson held that the evidence that the accused was in the company of the seller and that the accused directed the buyers to the site of the sales and remained there until the transactions were consummated was sufficient to support a finding that the accused consciously assisted and encouraged the commission of the crime. Id. at 373-74.

In the instant case, appellant admitted at trial that she was present in the trailer when Arrasmith and Jeys discussed the marihuana transaction on June 19. Arrasmith's testimony established that he and Jeys agreed that Arrasmith would purchase a quarter-ounce of marihuana for $25. Appellant, in her testimony, conceded that Arrasmith's testimony, in those respects, was true. The only conflict between appellant's testimony and that of Arrasmith was that appellant denied handing...

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4 cases
  • State v. Theus, s. WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 24, 1998
    ...automatic but is "dependant on the circumstances of the case" and would depend on "the extent of prejudice therefrom." State v. Woody, 699 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Mo.App.1985) (citations omitted). See also State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 942 (Mo. banc For example, in State v. Woody, the court fo......
  • State v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 1988
    ...admission of unrelated crimes evidence comes under this rule. State v. Hawkins, 703 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Woody, 699 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Mo.App.1985). Error which in a close case might require reversal can be disregarded when the evidence of guilt is strong. State v. Boyd, 679 ......
  • State v. Sloan, WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 3, 1990
    ...is not per se prejudicial in the trial of a criminal case. State v. Pippenger, 708 S.W.2d 256, 268 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Woody, 699 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Mo.App.1985). Whether reversal is required depends upon the circumstances of the case and the extent of the prejudice therefrom. Pippenger, ......
  • State v. McClintic
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 13, 1987
    ...shows that the accused may be guilty of possession even though he may not be guilty of selling. Corley was followed in State v. Woody, 699 S.W.2d 517, 525 (Mo.App.1985). In the instant case, appellant, in his own testimony, solemnly admitted every element of a sale of marihuana, as statutor......

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