State v. Workman

Decision Date30 April 1993
Docket NumberNo. 910190,910190
Citation852 P.2d 981
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. David L. WORKMAN and Nita Workman, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and petitioner.

Edwin Beus, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.

STEWART, Justice:

David and Nita Workman were charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, and sexual exploitation of a minor, a second degree felony. Nita Workman was also charged with obstructing justice. A jury acquitted the Workmans on the aggravated sexual abuse charges, convicted them of sexual exploitation of a minor, and convicted Nita Workman of obstructing justice. The trial judge arrested judgment, and the State appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct.App.1991). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard in reviewing the trial court's order arresting judgment.

David and Nita Workman are the parents of thirteen children, including a daughter whom we identify only as E. Eleven or twelve of the children were living at home in 1985, when the Workmans met and befriended Clinton Kelly during a family vacation in Idaho. Kelly, who was in the Navy, began visiting the Workmans in their Layton, Utah home from about 1985 or 1986 to 1988. He visited the family approximately six times in 1986, four times in 1987, and once or twice in 1988. While visiting the Workmans, Kelly presented himself "as a clean cut, polite young man who was impressed with the Workmans' family life and who was interested in learning more about the Workmans' religious beliefs." Id. at 1199. When visiting, he slept in the home and shared meals. He also participated in the chores and attended church with the Workmans. Kelly was later convicted of sexually abusing E. based on events that occurred in 1987 and 1988.

Over the two and one-half years that Kelly visited the Workmans, he showed a particular interest and attachment to E., who was seven years old in 1986. Over time, he gave her gifts of jewelry and clothing, which included panties, bras, Easter dresses, a coat, and overalls. He also paid ten dollars per week for E.'s ice skating lessons, sent her roses on several occasions, and telephoned her frequently from San Diego, where he was stationed.

During the time in question, Mrs. Workman was occupied with cleaning, cooking, canning, gardening, yard work, laundry, chauffeuring, and other daily tasks necessary to the maintenance of a large household. Her workload was increased by Mr. Workman's epilepsy, which prevented him from driving.

The Workmans' conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor was based on one photograph that Kelly took of E. in the early part of 1986 and circumstantial evidence arising from Kelly's conduct. Shortly before taking the photograph, Kelly purchased Mary Lou Retton gymnastics suits for E. and three of her sisters. The suits were cut high on the outer thigh and patterned after the one worn by Mary Lou Retton in the 1984 Olympics. Their style is similar to those commonly worn by female gymnasts in public, both locally and nationally. The suits, when properly worn, expose the lower part of the wearer's buttocks.

Kelly took three photographs of E. wearing her gymnastics suit. The first two photographs show E. casually standing in her parents' bedroom, apparently showing off the new suit. Mr. Workman is shown lying on the bed, with Mrs. Workman leaning back against his upraised knee. Both are fully clothed in daytime attire and appear to be conversing with each other. The third photograph, which is the basis for the conviction, shows E. bending over the bed toward her mother, with her buttocks toward the camera. Just prior to taking the photograph, Kelly pulled the bottom of E.'s suit up at the thighs and pulled down her panties, which she wore under the suit, thereby exposing the cheeks of her buttocks. E.'s private parts were, however, fully covered. Mr. and Mrs. Workman appear in the background of this picture also, but Mrs. Workman's body is visible only from the waist down, making it impossible to determine where she was looking. Mr. Workman, whose face appears in the picture, is looking toward the camera, but his view of E.'s buttocks appears to be blocked by Mrs. Workman's body.

The State insists that the Workmans knew at the time the picture was taken that Kelly was photographing E. with her buttocks exposed. Kelly testified at the preliminary hearing that the Workmans reacted angrily when he took the photograph, but at trial he testified that he could not remember the Workmans' reaction, if any, but guessed that Mrs. Workman was upset. The Workmans testified that they did not remember the photo being taken and that they were not aware that it existed until the police showed it to them in 1988.

The trial judge arrested judgment for the sexual exploitation convictions on the ground that there was no evidence that the Workmans had the requisite mental state. In a unanimous opinion written by Judge Garff, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the State's evidence of the Workmans' mental state, as required by the sexual exploitation statute, was so inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not have convicted the couple.

The issue on certiorari is whether the court of appeals applied the correct legal standard in reviewing the trial court's order arresting judgment. 1 The State argues that in reviewing the trial court's arrest of judgment, the court of appeals did not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, but impermissibly reweighed conflicting evidence to reach a different result. We disagree.

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court may arrest judgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense." The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment is erroneous is the same as that applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. Under that standard, a trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).

When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence. State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1980); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987); State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977); State v. Harless, 23 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210, 211 (1969). Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Logan, 563 P.2d at 813-14. In some unusual circumstances, however, a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility. For example, "testimony which is inherently improbable may be disregarded, ... but to warrant such action there must exist either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." Curtis v. DeAtley, 104 Idaho 787, 663 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1983) (quoting Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575, 582 (1979)); see also Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799, 806 (1983) (evidence may be disregarded when it is "clearly contrary to some immutable law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict with one or more established and uncontroverted physical facts"). Thus, a reviewing court may evaluate whether the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Petree, 659 P.2d at 445; see also State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Utah 1989) (opinion of Stewart, J., stating the position of the Court).

In the instant case, the evidence is not in conflict with respect to the statutory elements of the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor. As the State concedes, the evidence against the Workmans on the sexual exploitation charge consists solely of the photograph of E., described above, and evidence that the Workmans were aware of some inappropriate, but not illegal, behavior by Kelly toward E. 2 The photograph speaks for itself and raises no issue of credibility. The issue of the Workmans' innocence or guilt, therefore, turns solely on the inferences that can be reasonably and logically drawn from the evidence.

When, as here, the evidence consists solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence, the role of the reviewing court is to determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3(1) (1990) defines the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor as follows:

A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor:

(a) When he knowingly produces, distributes, possesses, or possesses with intent to distribute, material or a live performance depicting a nude or partially nude minor for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or any person's engagement in sexual conduct with the minor.

(b) If he is a minor's parent or legal guardian and knowingly consents to or permits that...

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