State v. Worwood
| Decision Date | 22 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 20060048.,20060048. |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mitchell WORWOOD, Defendant and Petitioner. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, Jared W. Eldridge, Nephi, for plaintiff.
Scott P. Card, Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 In this case, we consider the constitutional scope of an investigative detention conducted under reasonable suspicion. The detention at issue occurred when an off-duty highway patrolman, Korey Wright, stopped Marshall Worwood on suspicion that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Wright did not conduct field sobriety tests at the site of the initial encounter. Instead, Wright detained Worwood in Wright's truck and transported him down a canyon to Wright's home, where an on-duty officer conducted field sobriety tests. The district court denied Worwood's motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. We reverse the court of appeals, finding that Wright exceeded the scope of what was reasonably necessary to further his investigation.
¶ 2 On June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off-duty Highway Patrol trooper, was driving with passenger Skylar Fautin down Deep Canyon in Juab County after a day of horseback riding. Wright saw defendant Mitchell Worwood standing by a truck that was partially blocking the road. Wright noticed "a big wet spot on the road" and a beer can behind the truck. Worwood got into the truck and pulled it off the road, presumably so that Wright could pass him.
¶ 3 Suspecting that Worwood had been drinking, Wright pulled up next to Worwood's truck. Wright did not identify himself as a police officer but stated that, given their small community, Worwood "knew who [he] was." From the driver's seat of Wright's truck, he asked Worwood if everything was all right. Worwood responded that he had pulled over to urinate. Wright observed that Worwood's speech was slow and slurred and that his eyes were bloodshot. Wright then exited his vehicle, approached Worwood, and while standing by Worwood's truck door, noticed the smell of alcohol. At some point during the encounter, Wright also observed a cooler that had been recently emptied.
¶ 4 From these facts, Wright determined that Worwood had "some alcohol in him," so he stepped out of his truck, walked over to Worwood, and stated, "[W]e'd better have a trooper look at you before you drive anymore."
¶ 5 Wright asked Worwood to step out of his own truck and get into Wright's truck. Without a means of contacting an on-duty officer in the canyon, Wright instructed Fautin to drive Worwood's truck down the canyon, call the police from the dairy at the bottom of the canyon, and reconvene at Wright's house. Wright, in turn, drove Worwood a mile and a half down the canyon to Wright's own home, where they were met by on-duty Officer Kevin Wright.
¶ 6 Officer Kevin Wright performed four field sobriety tests on Worwood at Korey Wright's residence. Two tests, the horizontal gaze and nystagmus tests, determined possible intoxication from eye movement. The third required Worwood to walk nine steps, heel to toe, and turn. The fourth test required Worwood to stand on one leg for thirty seconds. When Worwood failed these tests, Officer Kevin Wright arrested him.
¶ 7 Worwood pled not guilty to the charge of driving under the influence with two prior convictions, a third degree felony.1 He then filed a motion to suppress on the basis of alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. In view of the court of appeals' holding and the arguments of both parties, we limit our suppression analysis to the field sobriety tests.2
¶ 8 The district court denied the suppression motion. It found that the initial conversation between Wright and Worwood was consensual and did not amount to a detainment and that Wright's subsequent detention of Worwood fell within the bounds of a constitutional investigative detention.
¶ 9 After this ruling, Worwood entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed to the court of appeals. In a narrow holding, the appeals court affirmed, stating, "[W]e cannot conclude that an off-duty law enforcement officer exceeds the permissible scope of an investigatory detention when he transports a driver he suspects to be intoxicated a short distance from an uninhabited area to meet an on-duty officer for further investigation."3 Judge Thorne dissented, claiming that Wright's actions amounted to a de facto arrest.4 Alternatively, Judge Thorne argued that under an investigative detention analysis, the duration and scope of the stop were unreasonable.5
¶ 10 We granted Worwood's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine "[w]hether delay in the performance of a field sobriety test and transportation of a suspect" are constitutional.
¶ 11 This court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, with particular attention to whether the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision under the correct standard.6 In cases involving Fourth Amendment questions under the United States Constitution, we review mixed questions of law and fact under a correctness standard in the interest of creating uniform legal rules for law enforcement.7
¶ 12 Factual findings underlying a motion to suppress are evaluated for clear error.8 As the court of appeals correctly stated, parties challenging the facts under a clear error standard have a judicially imposed obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the challenged finding.9 In his briefs to us and to the court of appeals, Worwood seems to dispute the district court's finding that Wright smelled alcohol on Worwood prior to detaining him in Wright's truck, but Worwood failed to actually challenge this finding by marshalling the evidence. We consequently accept the trial court's factual findings as conclusive. Because its findings are quite sparse, however we also look to the record consistent with the district court's findings.10
¶ 13 We first consider Worwood's state constitutional claim, but find it to be procedurally barred. We then turn to Worwood's claims under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and find that Wright's initial encounter with Worwood was justified under reasonable suspicion. The scope and coercive nature of the stop, however, exceeded the constitutional bounds of an investigative detention. Because the field sobriety tests were conducted as a result of the unreasonable scope and coercive nature of the stop, we hold that the results of those tests must be suppressed.
¶ 14 We would have welcomed an analysis under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; however, we find Worwood's state constitutional claim to be procedurally barred and inadequately briefed. We have repeatedly instructed counsel on the consequences of failing to properly preserve and develop a state constitutional law claim.11 Still, this instruction bears repeating, given the frequency with which these claims are inadequately briefed before this court.
¶ 15 When interpreting state constitutional provisions that are similar or identical to those in the federal constitution, we encourage a primacy approach.12 Under the primacy model, "`a state court looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when state law is not dispositive.'"13
¶ 16 In developing an independent body of state search and seizure law, we have held that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment, despite nearly identical language.14 In order to further develop state constitutional law, however, claims must be properly presented to this court.15 In criminal cases, "`specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record'" before the issue can be heard on appeal.16 The issue must be "`raised to a level of consciousness'" that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address it.17 It follows, then, that perfunctorily mentioning an issue, without more, does not preserve it for appeal.18 Although inapplicable in this case, a court may consider an unpreserved issue when plain error is apparent or in an exceptional circumstance.19 Furthermore, in part on the basis of the principle that preservation requires the lower court to be cognizant of a discreet issue, we have repeatedly refrained from engaging in state constitutional law analysis unless "an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed."20
¶ 17 On some level, we understand counsel's hesitance to robustly address state constitutional issues in the lower courts. The similarity between the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution plus the fledgling development of state search and seizure law makes some reliance on principles from federal cases likely. And because the federal search and seizure rules provide a floor from which state constitutional law can depart, interpretations of these provisions will oftentimes substantially overlap.21 Finally, as a practical matter, trial courts may be reluctant to decide search and seizure issues on grounds that deviate from well-established, albeit murky, federal constitutional principles.
¶ 18 Nevertheless, in keeping with our preservation policy, a state constitutional law argument must be raised in the trial court, preserved through the appellate process, and adequately briefed to us. As with most legal arguments, there is no magic formula for an adequate state constitutional analysis. Arguments based, for example, on historical context, the constitution's text,...
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