State v. Wright

Citation225 Tenn. 652,475 S.W.2d 546,3 Pack 652
Parties, 225 Tenn. 652 STATE of Tennessee, Petitioner, v. John William WRIGHT, Respondent.
Decision Date17 January 1972
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Bart Durham, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Tenn., Nashville, Noel R. Bagwell, Dist. Atty. Gen., Clarksville, for petitioner.

James O. Noland, Carol A. Catalano, Clarksville, for respondent.

OPINION

DYER, Chief Justice.

A history of this case will serve to clarify the issue.

On January 22, 1965, John William Wright was convicted of (1) burglary in the third degree, and (2) of being an habitual criminal. This case was seasonably appealed to this Court and affirmed by an opinion styled Wright v. State, 217 Tenn. 85, 394 S.W.2d 883 (1965).

Subsequently Wright filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, under which, inter alia, he raised the following issue: That the habitual criminal conviction was void inasmuch as one of the prior convictions (referred to as the 1956 conviction) necessary to support the habitual criminal conviction was void. This 1956 conviction was alleged to be void on the ground that neither upon the indictment nor upon the minutes is there any indication the indictment being endorsed 'a true bill,' or signed by the foreman of the grand jury. The trial court dismissed this petition for the writ of habeas corpus. An appeal was taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which court affirmed the action of the trial court by an unpublished opinion dated December 30, 1968. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in denying Wright any relief upon the allegation this 1956 conviction was void, did so on the ground the validity of these prior convictions supporting the habitual criminal conviction was adjudicated by this Court on direct appeal in our case of Wright v. State, Supra. The pertinent part of the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion, unpublished, dated December 30, 1968, is as follows:

By his second assignment, the petitioner says that his conviction under the habitual criminal count is void because one of the convictions relied on was void because it was based on an invalid indictment, in that the minutes of the Court did not show that it was endorsed 'a true bill' and signed by the foreman of the grand jury.

In considering the petitioner's appeal in Wright v. State, supra, our Supreme Court said:

'(1) The proof shows without any doubt that there were three previous convictions of this plaintiff in error within the purview of T.C.A. § 40--2801, entitled 'Persons Defined as Habitual Criminals', and with the conviction of burglary in the third degree under the first count in this case it was sufficient to warrant the punishment under the statute (T.C.A. § 40--2802) of the defendant as an habitual criminal.' 217 Tenn. at 87, 394 S.W.2d at 884.

We think the validity of the petitioner's prior convictions has already been adjudicated on direct appeal and that this assignment is without merit. Furthermore, he is confined under a valid judgment and sentence for burglary in the third degree. (Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion dated December 30, 1968, unpublished.)

On September 10, 1969, Wright filed the petition now before the court for post-conviction relief pursuant to T.C.A. § 40--3802 et seq. In this petition Wright again raises the issue this 1956 conviction is void on the same grounds as set out in his petition for habeas corpus. Based upon the prior adjudication of this issue by the Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished opinion dated December 30, 1968, the trial court refused to hear any proof touching on this issue. Upon appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals, by a divided court, remanded the cause for a hearing on this issue. We granted certiorari.

Wright, in order to be successful under this petition filed pursuant to our post-conviction statutes, must show the error relied upon to void this 1956 conviction is a constitutional error. T.C.A. § 40--3805 sets out the relief to be granted under our post-conviction statutes in the following language:

Relief under this chapter shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement in any way of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States, including a right that was not recognized as existing at the time of the trial if either Constitution requires retrospective application of that right.

Even though the failure of the indictment to reflect the endorsement 'a true bill' or be signed by the...

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4 cases
  • Gant v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
    • 25 Septiembre 1973
    ...State ex rel. Carroll v. Henderson, 1 Tenn.Cr.App. 427, 443 S.W.2d 689; State ex rel. Leighton v. Henderson, supra; State v. Wright, Tenn., 475 S.W.2d 546; Ray v. State,supra, and cases therein cited. Altogether untenable is the petitioner's charge that he was prejudiced by the trial court'......
  • Kelley v. State, No. M2004-01158-CCA-R3-PC (TN 9/15/2005), M2004-01158-CCA-R3-PC.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 15 Septiembre 2005
    ...noted, post-conviction proceedings cannot be used to raise and relitigate issues decided on direct appeal. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 475 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn. 1972); Long v. State, 510 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). The petitioner presented these questions on direct appeal, and a panel of......
  • Forster v. State, No. M2004-00452-CCA-R3-PC (TN 6/24/2005), M2004-00452-CCA-R3-PC.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 24 Junio 2005
    ...App. 408, 454 S.W.2d 182, 184 (1970); Morgan v. State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 454, 445 S.W.2d 477, 478 (1969); see also State v. Wright, 225 Tenn. 652, 475 S.W.2d 546 (1972); Searles v. State, 582 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Forrest v. State, 535 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); Helt......
  • Martin v. State, No. E2004-00740-CCA-R3-PC (TN 10/11/2004), E2004-00740-CCA-R3-PC.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • 11 Octubre 2004
    ...proceedings may not be used to raise and relitigate issues decided and disposed of on direct appeal. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 475 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn. 1972); Long v. State, 510 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). The petitioner averred that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to cha......

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