State v. Wright

Citation77 Conn.App. 80,822 A.2d 940
Decision Date27 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. 23660.,23660.
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Ian WRIGHT.

Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

C. Robert Satti, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BISHOP, J.

The defendant, Ian Wright, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), as enhanced by General Statutes § 53-202k, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court's charge to the jury was defective and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On October 15, 2000, at approximately 11 p.m., Betty Robertson entered the Jamaican American and Puerto Rican Club (club) in Bridgeport to attend a party. Everyone, including the victim, Wilfredo Sanchez, was searched for weapons as they entered the club. Robertson noted, however, that the defendant and his brother, David Wright, were not searched when they entered the club. After Robertson and the victim entered a hallway near the rest rooms to "roll some marijuana," the defendant began flicking the hallway lights. When the victim asked the defendant to stop, a fight started between them.

During the fight, John Williamson was standing behind the defendant, but close to the rest room, while David Wright was standing at the end of the hallway, also to the rear of the defendant. Robertson stated that as the victim was getting the better of the fight, she heard gunshots, and saw the victim fall to the ground and Williamson fall into the women's rest room. After the gunshots, Robertson saw both the defendant and David Wright run past her, both with guns in their hands, and, as they fled, she heard more gunshots from outside the club.

At trial, Williamson testified that while he was in the men's rest room, he heard the sound of people fighting and, as he departed the rest room, saw a fight. Subsequently, he heard two gunshots and fell into the women's rest room, having been shot in the leg. While he was lying on the floor, he heard another gunshot. During the shooting, he did not see either the defendant or his brother.

The state also called James Hamilton to testify concerning a conversation that he had had with the defendant while both were incarcerated after the evening in question. Hamilton, who had no involvement in the incident, testified that while he and the defendant were cell mates, the defendant told him that during the evening of the shooting, he had seen the victim by the rest room and had told the victim to stop selling drugs because it was his family's club. Hamilton claimed that the defendant told him that he had been in possession of a gun at the time and that when he and the victim began to fight, he drew his gun. Hamilton added that the defendant told him that as he and the victim had struggled for the gun, it discharged, after which the defendant had backed up and shot the victim. Hamilton also testified that the defendant indicated to him that both he and his brother had had weapons. The defendant stated that he had a .45 caliber gun and that his brother had a .38 caliber weapon, and that as he and his brother were leaving the club, they both fired their guns.

Shortly after the shooting at the club, Bridgeport police observed the defendant who, while driving his automobile near Bridgeport Hospital, drove past a stop sign. After the police pursued the defendant's car, both the defendant and his brother fled from the car and were apprehended after being chased by the police. The police noted that the car windows had been damaged, likely the result of gunshots. In the course of the police chase, David Wright was seen discarding a gun that later was determined to be the murder weapon. The defendant was discovered, shirtless, lying in an alley hidden by brush. He was not found in possession of a weapon, nor was any other weapon found in his vicinity.

The defense called John Pettway, who testified that he was in the club after 10 p.m. on the evening in question, and that the victim had been searched upon entering the club and that no gun was discovered on him. Pettway indicated that there had been a fight between the victim and another man in the rest room hallway. During the fight, he heard the "shooter" tell the victim that this was his "people's club," that he saw the victim strike the shooter in the face and that he saw the "shooter" draw a gun.1 Pettway testified that he first heard one gunshot and then several more as he started to leave the hallway. He saw the defendant and his brother leave the hallway, with the defendant waving a gun and telling the crowd to "back off." Pettway then saw Patrick Wright, the club's owner, lock the club doors.

From an autopsy, it was determined that the victim had died as a result of a bullet wound from a .38 caliber gun. That weapon later was determined to be the gun that David Wright had thrown from the defendant's car while being pursued by the police. Bullet casings from that same weapon were discovered in the defendant's car and outside the club. Williamson's gunshot wound was found to have been caused by a .45 caliber weapon. At the scene, the Bridgeport police also recovered a .45 caliber shell casing from the hallway and other .45 casings outside the club, all from the same weapon. In addition to those casings, the police found other casings of various calibers outside the club. Results consistent with gunshot residue were found on the hands of the defendant and David Wright.

A fair reading of the transcript supports the defendant's claim that the prosecution's theory was that the defendant was either the shooter or an accessory to David Wright, who was the shooter. Although neither the defendant nor David Wright testified at trial, it may be inferred from defense counsel's questioning and argument that the defense strategy was to suggest that David Wright had shot the victim without the defendant's knowledge or participation. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. Upon being polled, the jury indicated its conclusion that the defendant had been an accessory in the victim's murder. This appeal followed the defendant's sentencing to a total effective term of thirty-five years incarceration. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first assess the defendant's claims of instructional error. As to the murder count, he claims that because he was charged as an accessory to murder, he was entitled to an instruction that the jury must acquit him if the principal's use of force was justified under General Statutes § 53a-19. Second, as to the charge of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, he claims that he was entitled to an instruction on the doctrine of necessity. We discuss each claim in turn.

"Our standard of review for claims of instructional error is well established. [J]ury instructions must be read as a whole and ... are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.... The whole charge must be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the jurors in guiding them to a proper verdict ... and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error.... Our standard of review on this claim is whether it is reasonably probable that the jury was misled.... The test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law.... Therefore, jury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect, or technically accurate. Nonetheless, the trial court must correctly adapt the law to the case in question and must provide the jury with sufficient guidance in reaching a correct verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Alesandro v. Clare, 74 Conn.App. 177, 181-82, 812 A.2d 76 (2002).

A

The following additional procedural facts are relevant to our discussion of the defendant's claim. Although the state initially charged the defendant as the shooter, there was evidence adduced at trial that David Wright had fired the weapon, which resulted in the victim's death. On that basis, at the conclusion of the evidence, the state requested, and the court gave, an instruction concerning the defendant's accessorial liability pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-8.

The defendant asserts that he was entitled to a reasonable use of physical force charge premised on his claim that in regard to the state's charge that he was criminally responsible as an accessory, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the shooter held a reasonable belief that the defendant was in imminent danger of physical harm from the victim.2 As to that alternative, because the court charged the jury under the accessory statute, the defendant argues that he was entitled to a charge that if the shooter was justified in his use of deadly force, then the shooter's justification should be imputed to the defendant.

The defendant's theory in that regard is that his liability as an accessory could be only derivative and that if the shooter's discharge of the weapon was justified, he could not be found criminally liable for the victim's killing because, at most, he would be only an accessory to a justified shooting. In response, the state argues that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a charge based on a third party shooter's reasonable belief of the need to use...

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