State v. Wright

• Citation: 372 N.E.2d 453,267 Ind. 590
• Decision Date: 10 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 876S279,876S279
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. William WRIGHT, Appellee (Defendant below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 453

372 N.E.2d 453

267 Ind. 590

STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. William WRIGHT, Appellee (Defendant below).

No. 876S279.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 10, 1978.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Daniel Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.

John E. Eisele, Anderson, Julius Lucius Echeles, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

This is an appeal by the state from the granting of a Post Conviction One petition. It presents two issues for review:

1. Whether the petitioner met his burden of proof in attempting to show that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; and

2. Whether the court erred in not making a finding on the state's defense of waiver.

The petitioner, Wright, was tried in 1969 on charges of armed robbery and kidnapping. He was found guilty and subsequently raised five issues on appeal. This court affirmed the trial court on all five issues. Wright v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 197, 285 N.E.2d 650.

In his post conviction petition, Wright alleged that the showing of his prior criminal record to the victim prior to positive identification was exculpatory evidence which the state failed to disclose. At the hearing on the petition, the court agreed with Wright, granted his petition and ordered a new trial. The court granted relief on the theory that the prosecutor's failure to provide Wright with certain exculpatory evidence violated the requirements of due process enunciated in Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and Fair v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 494, 250 N.E.2d 744.

The evidence which was not disclosed was brought out at the post conviction relief hearing. The police officer testified that the victim may have seen Wright's prior criminal record prior to an identification at police headquarters. He also said that there may not have been a positive identification made prior to this time. However, the victim testified at the trial that he was positive of the identification about an hour after the crime.

A summary of the testimony from the record reveals the following.

In February of 1969, James Woodsmall was robbed by two men. He was forced to sit between the two men in the front seat of his car and was driven around for about five minutes. The two robbers abandoned the car in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The petitioner, Wright, was arrested in this area about one-half hour later. Woodsmall was taken to look at the petitioner at that time but stated he could not be sure this was one of the robbers. At the original trial, Woodsmall stated the reason for his indecision:

" 'I was nervous and confused and I didn't want to be too fast about it or to make a false accusation. I waited for an hour or so until I simmered down. By the time I got to the bank I had simmered down and I knew.'

"He stated that he was then sure that appellant was one of the culprits. Woodsmall was able to get a full front view of appellant when appellant initially climbed into the car and had a side view of him for the course of the ride which lasted about five minutes."

Wright, supra, 259 Ind. at 200, 285 N.E.2d at 652. Woodsmall further testified at trial that he was sure that petitioner was one of the men and indicated he would not be testifying in court were he not absolutely sure.

I.

Our analysis begins with the recognition that the trial court's assumption that Brady, supra, is fully applicable here is erroneous. That case involved prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence after a specific request by the defense for the evidence. The United States Supreme Court has further interpreted the Brady rule in situations involving voluntary disclosure in United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342. The Court held that a prosecutorial nondisclosure is a constitutional error only when the undisclosed evidence "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist," and "the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record." Id. 427 U.S. 112, 96 S.Ct. 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 355.

By this standard, Wright's petition must fail. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner is in the nature of speculations. It is not in itself exculpatory. In view of the facts brought out in the original trial, these speculations do not raise a reasonable doubt about Wright's guilt. The victim testified twice at the trial that he was sure shortly after he left the scene that petitioner was one of the kidnappers. He explained his unwillingness to identify at the scene, and he gave strong and unequivocal identification testimony.

Furthermore, there was no claim of actual suppression of any evidence. The prosecutor told the defense counsel he could see all of the state's files on the case. The possibility of error in an identification must always be considered by defense counsel. The defense was free at any time before or during the original action to question the police and the victim as to the details of the identification procedure. The police officer testified at the post conviction relief hearing that the defense counsel at the original trial had never asked him any questions about the identification. It is not the duty of the prosecution to bear the burden of assembling the defense counsel's evidence. Ortez v. State (1975), Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 838.

As the United States Supreme Court noted, the ultimate issue is whether the prosecutor's omission is of sufficient significance to result in a denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.

"(T)here is 'no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.' . . . The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense."

Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. 109, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 353.

The uncertainty of the police officer's testimony considered with the positive statements of the victim about his identification at the original trial means that the evidence at the post conviction relief hearing does not meet the materiality standard of Agurs. Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof in showing that the prosecutor was required to voluntarily disclose this evidence.

Perhaps the trial court was not aware of the interpretation of Brady enunciated by Agurs, but in light of the Agurs standard the finding of the trial court is contrary to law and must be reversed.

II.

The state also contends that ...