State v. Wright
| Decision Date | 06 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 30480-1-I,30480-1-I |
| Citation | 888 P.2d 1214,76 Wn.App. 811 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Darrick Donte WRIGHT, Appellant. |
Paul Casey, King County Deputy Pros., Seattle, for respondent.
Darrick Donte Wright appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in admitting his postarrest statement, (2) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial and (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He also challenges his standard range sentence on the ground that the trial court should have exercised its discretion to score his prior offenses as one in calculating his offender score. We affirm his conviction. We agree, however, that the trial court was required, but failed, to exercise discretion in determining whether Wright's prior convictions should be counted as a single offense for sentencing purposes. We therefore remand the case to the trial court with instructions to exercise discretion in calculating Wright's offender score.
Around midnight on November 14, 1991, Officer Timothy Fountain heard a gunshot about a block away from the area in Seattle he was patrolling. He broadcast this information over the radio and asked for backup. Fountain drove westbound on Cherry Street and saw Wright and Robert Smith standing on the corner of 25th and Cherry. He approached them and asked whether they had heard a gunshot. Wright responded that the shot had come from a white Reliant K car which had driven southbound on 25th street. Fountain drove in that direction and spotted a white Reliant K car parked in a driveway. He concluded, however, that it had not been driven recently because it was covered with a uniform coat of condensation. Fountain suspected that Wright and Fountain located Wright and Smith on the south side of Cherry and 25th where they were standing facing a row of bushes. Fountain could not see what they were doing. When Wright and Smith saw Fountain's patrol car approach, they began to walk quickly away from the area. Fountain stopped them about 25 feet from the bushes. Officer John Fox, one of the officers who responded to Fountain's request for backup, found a loaded pistol lying on top of some leaves near the sidewalk in the area where Wright and Smith had just been standing. Fox testified that it had rained earlier in the evening, but the side of the pistol that had been on the ground was wet while the side facing upward was fairly dry. From this information, be deduced that the pistol had only been on the ground for a short period of time.
Smith had given him false information and returned to speak with them further.
Wright and Smith were arrested and placed in separate patrol cars. 1 Wright was placed in a patrol car with officers Gary Jackson and John Knight and given his Miranda 2 warnings, which he waived. Wright told Knight that he wanted to speak to him alone, and Jackson got out of the car. When they were alone, Wright said that the pistol was his and that it had discharged accidentally. The officers took Wright to the police station where he again received Miranda warnings. He again waived them and gave a written statement admitting to possession of the gun. The State was unable to lift any identifiable fingerprints from the gun. At trial, Wright acknowledged making these statements to Knight, but testified that he had lied to Knight because the officer had promised him he would receive only a citation and would be allowed to leave if he admitted possessing the pistol. He also testified that it was actually Smith who had the pistol prior to their arrest.
Wright was charged with a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) for possessing a pistol while having been convicted of a felony violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act (VUCSA), contrary to RCW 9.41.040(4). He moved to exclude his statements to Knight and to dismiss the charge on the ground that the State could not establish the corpus delicti of the crime. Wright's motion was denied, and he was found guilty as charged at trial. At his sentencing hearing, Wright argued that the court should consider the prior offenses for which he had received concurrent sentences as one offense in calculating his offender score. The court ruled that it did not have discretion to do so and counted each of his prior offenses separately.
Wright contends that his statement to Knight should have been suppressed under the corpus delicti rule. A defendant's extrajudicial confession or admission is inadmissible unless there is independent prima facie proof of the corpus delicti of the crime. State v. Cobelli, 56 Wash.App. 921, 924, 788 P.2d 1081 (1989). Corpus delicti generally involves only two elements: (1) an injury or loss and (2) a person's criminal act as a cause thereof. State v. Smith, 115 Wash.2d 775, 781, 801 P.2d 975 (1990). However, in some instances, identification of a particular individual is required to establish the corpus delicti of a crime. Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash.2d 569, 574, 723 P.2d 1135 (1986); State v. Hamrick, 19 Wash.App. 417, 419, 576 P.2d 912 (1978). Wright argues that, as a threshold matter, to establish the corpus delicti of the crime with which he was charged, the State must show not only that a crime occurred, but also the identity of the person who committed it.
In Hamrick, 19 Wash.App. 417, 576 P.2d 912, we held that, in some instances, the corpus delicti rule requires identification of a particular person as the perpetrator of the charged crime. Hamrick was charged with driving while intoxicated after being involved in a 2-car accident. After the accident, he made statements to the police admitting that he had been driving one of the vehicles in the accident. 19 Wash.App. at 418, 576 P.2d 912. The trial court dismissed the charge. We held that his case had been properly dismissed on corpus delicti grounds because there was no evidence, other than Hamrick's statement In Corbett, 106 Wash.2d 569, 723 P.2d 1135, the Supreme Court agreed with the Hamrick ruling, holding that the requirement that the intoxicated person be the driver or in control of the car is inherent in the offense of driving while intoxicated. The corpus delicti of the crime cannot be proved without proving someone's criminal agency. Proving criminal agency, in turn, requires identification of a particular individual who is under the influence. Thus, the court concluded that "the corpus delicti of the offense[ ] ... cannot be established absent proof connecting [a defendant] with operation or control of a vehicle while intoxicated." 106 Wash.2d at 574, 723 P.2d 1135. See also State v. Sjogren, 71 Wash.App. 779, 862 P.2d 612 (1993).
establishing that he was driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle. 3 We reasoned that although "the corpus delicti of most crimes does not involve the issue of identity, the corpus delicti for the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... requires evidence that defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor." 19 Wash.App. at 419, 576 P.2d 912
No case addresses the issue of whether identification of a particular individual is required to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of possession of a short firearm or pistol while having been convicted of a felony VUCSA. Under the reasoning of Hamrick and Corbett, we conclude that identification of a particular person is necessary to establish the corpus delicti of this crime. Like the crime of driving while under the influence with which Hamrick and Corbett were charged, the crime charged here is one that inherently requires the proof of identity. RCW 9.41.040(4) criminalizes the possession of a short firearm or pistol by a person who has previously been convicted of a felony VUCSA. At trial, Wright stipulated to his prior felony VUCSAs. In order to establish the corpus delicti of the crime, the State must show (1) possession of a short firearm or pistol and (2) that the person possessing it was previously convicted of a felony VUCSA. The second element Wright next argues that the State did not meet this requirement because there was no evidence aside from his confession that it was he, and not Smith, who was the person in possession of the pistol before they were arrested. 5 He contends, therefore, that the State did not produce independent evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime. Independent evidence is sufficient if it prima facie establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. A prima facie showing requires evidence that "supports a 'logical and reasonable deduction' that the crime occurred." State v. Solomon, 73 Wash.App. 724, 727, 870 P.2d 1019, review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1028, 883 P.2d 327 (1994) (quoting State v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 32, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993)). A reviewing court assumes the truth of the State's evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. Solomon, 73 Wash.App. at 727, 870 P.2d 1019.
of the crime cannot be proved without identifying a particular person. 4 Thus, we agree with Wright that, under[888 P.2d 1219] the corpus delicti rule, the State is required to make a prima facie case that the defendant charged with a violation of RCW 9.41.040(4) is the perpetrator of the crime before his or her extrajudicial statement may be admitted into evidence
In denying Wright's motion to dismiss, the trial court relied on the following facts: (1) Fountain heard a gunshot; (2) Wright was close to or in the place from which the shot had evidently been fired; (3) Wright gave the officer false information; (4) Wright was next to the bushes with his hands out of view when Fountain returned; (5) Fox found the gun in...
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