State v. Wulff
| Decision Date | 29 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 41179.,41179. |
| Citation | 157 Idaho 416,337 P.3d 575 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Micah Abraham WULFF, Defendant–Respondent. |
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General argued.
Phelps & Associates, Spokane, for respondent. Douglas D. Phelps argued.
The State of Idaho appeals the Kootenai County district court's grant of Micah Wulff's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless blood draw. That blood draw took place after Wulff was in custody for driving under the influence. The district court held that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) suggests that warrantless blood draws are not always permitted under Idaho's implied consent statute. The State argues that McNeely was limited to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and Idaho's implied consent statute is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. We affirm the district court.
On October 23, 2012, a sheriff's deputy stopped Micah Wulff after observing Wulff's vehicle speeding twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour over the speed limit. The deputy asked Wulff why he was driving so fast. Wulff replied, "I don't know, I probably shouldn't be driving." As Wulff spoke, the deputy smelled an alcoholic beverage odor coming from the vehicle. The deputy noticed that the smell grew stronger as Wulff exited his vehicle and observed that Wulff's eyes were red and bloodshot. Wulff admitted he had been drinking and then had difficulties with the field sobriety evaluations. The deputy reported that he believed Wulff was driving under the influence (DUI) based upon Wulff's field sobriety test, speeding, admission he had been drinking, and alcohol odor.
The deputy then took Wulff into custody. Wulff refused a breath test, so the deputy informed Wulff that he would take him to the hospital for a blood draw. Wulff stated that he understood and accompanied the deputy to his vehicle. At the hospital, Wulff became uncooperative as a nurse began to prepare his arm for a blood draw. Wulff placed his left arm in a blocking position and told the nurse "you're not touching me." After two security officers arrived, Wulff allowed the nurse to draw his blood. The deputy did not obtain a warrant for the blood test. The test results showed a .217 blood alcohol content.
The State charged Wulff with felony DUI. Wulff moved to suppress the blood draw results. Wulff argued that he did not consent to the blood draw and there were no exigent circumstances to allow a warrantless blood draw. The State argued that the warrantless blood draw was appropriate under Idaho's implied consent statute, Idaho Code section 18–8002, because Wulff gave his irrevocable implied consent to the blood draw by taking advantage of the privilege of driving on Idaho's roads. The State further argued that Missouri v. McNeely did not decide the constitutionality of implied consent statutes, so Idaho's implied consent statute allows warrantless blood draws under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Alternatively, the State argued that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw.
The district court granted Wulff's motion to suppress. The court first concluded that McNeely indicated that implied consent statutes cannot act as per se exceptions to the warrant requirement because McNeely emphasized the importance of the totality of the circumstances. The court reasoned that while McNeely did not explicitly address implied consent statutes, "it would be antithetical to interpret the McNeely opinion as permitting warrantless blood draws simply because a state has legislation that allows such action." After discounting the State's implied consent argument, the court determined that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless blood draw. The State timely appealed.
We review a district court's order granting a motion to suppress evidence using a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). This Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of those facts. Id. We must follow controlling precedent "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) (quoting Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998) ).
A. The district court correctly granted Wulff's motion to suppress.
The district court granted Wulff's motion to suppress. The court held that the consent exception to the warrant requirement did not apply and the officer's warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances. The court's holding on exigent circumstances is not at issue. Instead, the State focuses on the district court's holding that the Idaho implied consent statute did not fall into the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The district court stated that "the recent United States Supreme Court case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant." The court focused on McNeely 's language that "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." McNeely, ––– U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 1563, 185 L.Ed.2d at 709. The court reasoned that allowing warrantless blood draws based on Idaho's implied consent statute would act as a per se exception to the warrant requirement, which contradicted McNeely 's language that warrantless blood draws should be examined case by case. After acknowledging that McNeely did not explicitly address implied consent statutes, the court noted that interpreting the McNeely opinion as permitting warrantless blood draws simply because a state's legislation allows them would make McNeely "a dead letter." Thus, the court held that the blood draw did not fall within the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
The State argues that the consent exception may be implied under Idaho's implied consent statute because the issue in McNeely was limited to "nonconsensual" blood testing and McNeely 's holding was limited to blood draws taken under the exigency exception. The State also argues that McNeely endorsed implied consent laws.
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833–, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917–18 (1966) ; State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). "Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, § 17 is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion." State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503, 975 P.2d 789, 791 (1999). We will not address the Idaho Constitution in this case because the district court's decision and the parties' arguments were confined to the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031–32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575–76 (1971) ; Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. To overcome this presumption of unreasonableness, the search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. at 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576 ; Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. Exigency and consent are two well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Kentucky v. King, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) ; Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741.
We have held law enforcement officers do not need a warrant for a forced blood draw based upon the exigency and consent exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989), abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (exigency); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742 (consent). As to exigency, this Court held that warrantless blood draws are permissible under that exception because "the destruction of the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency which justifies the warrantless search." Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370, 775 P.2d at 1212. In other words, the fact that our bodies metabolize alcohol over time means that valuable evidence is lost in the time required to get a warrant, which created exigent circumstances to allow a warrantless blood draw. See State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712, 184 P.3d 215, 218 (Ct.App.2008).
We also held that Idaho's implied consent statute allows warrantless blood draws under the consent exception. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302–03, 160 P.3d at 741–42. Idaho Code section 18–8002 provides that a person gives "implied consent" to evidentiary testing, including blood draws, when that person drives on Idaho roads and a police...
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State v. Wulff, 41179.
...157 Idaho 416337 P.3d 575STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff–Appellantv.Micah Abraham WULFF, Defendant–Respondent.No. 41179.Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, August 2014 Term.Oct. 29, 2014.337 P.3d 576Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Atto......