State v. Yancey

• Decision Date: 09 November 1928
• Docket Number: 5175
• Citation: 272 P. 495,47 Idaho 1
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. J. A. YANCEY and GEORGE C. EMERY, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

272 P. 495

47 Idaho 1

STATE, Respondent, v. J. A. YANCEY and GEORGE C. EMERY, Appellants

No. 5175

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 9, 1928

CRIMINAL LAW-MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-INJURING JAILS-CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

1. Though circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant conviction, must create more than suspicion of guilt, mere possibility of innocence will not avoid a verdict, where conclusion or inference of guilt is logical.

2. Weight and effect to be given to circumstances pointing to guilt, inferences to be drawn therefrom, extent to which circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, and reasonableness of any claim, or projected hypothesis of innocence, are questions primarily for jury.

3. That defendants escaped through hole in room of county jail to which all prisoners had access, and were the only prisoners who did so, in absence of explanation, was strong incriminating circumstance tending to show they were guilty of making the opening, justifying their conviction of felony in injuring county jail in violation of C. S., sec. 8562.

4. Circumstantial evidence held sufficient to warrant conviction of defendants, who escaped from county jail, for felony in injuring jail, in violation of C. S., sec. 8562.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Canyon County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.

Defendants were convicted of felony, and appeal. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Petition for rehearing denied.

John C Rice, for Appellants.

In order to sustain a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be consistent with his innocence, and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. (State v Marcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 193 P. 80.)

In explaining the foregoing rule of law, this court has said: "If all the material circumstances in evidence point to guilt and exclude any reasonable hypothesis except guilt--in other words, if they are inexplicable on the theory of innocence--a conviction is warranted." (State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 231 P. 718.)

Where the evidence is sufficient to establish only a suspicion of the guilt of defendants, they should not be convicted, and the jury should be so charged. (State v. Marcoe, supra; 16 C. J., p. 996, sec. 2409.)

To warrant a conviction the evidence must identify the accused as the person who committed the crime charged. Identity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (16 C. J., p. 774, sec. 1584.)

Even if it be proved that one of two or more persons committed the crime, yet if it is uncertain which is the guilty party all must be acquitted. (People v. Woody, 45 Cal. 289; Campbell v. People, 16 Ill. 17, 61 Am. Dec. 49.)

Frank L. Stephan, Attorney General, and Leon M. Fisk, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Circumstantial evidence is only required to produce in the minds of the jury a sense of conviction to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.

It need not have the convincing effect of positive evidence. (State v. Levy, 9 Idaho 483, 75 P. 227; State v. McLaughlin, 42 Idaho 219, 245 P. 77; State v. Yturaspe, 22 Idaho 360, 125 P. 802.)

The circumstances must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt, but this does not mean that a mere suspicion or possibility of innocence will be sufficient to defeat the conviction. (State v. Marcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 193 P. 80; State v. Hurst, 36 Idaho 156, 209 P. 724; State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 231 P. 718; Findley v. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 12, 36 Am. Dec. 557; Hill v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 477, 230 S.W. 910; 8 R. C. L. 225.)

The hypothesis of innocence must be a reasonable and rational one. (State v. McLennan, supra; Hamlin v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 579, 47 S.W. 656; People v. Lejkojes, 48 Cal.App. 654, 192 P. 160; People v. Ward, 105 Cal. 335, 38 P. 945; People v. Nelson, 85 Cal. 421, 24 P. 1006; People v. McDougal, 74 Cal.App. 666, 241 P. 598.)

C. F. Koelsch presented oral argument for Appellant Emery.

BAKER, District Judge. Wm. E. Lee, C. J., and Givens, J., concur. BUDGE, J., Dissenting.

OPINION

BAKER, District Judge.

--The appellants were convicted of felony in injuring the county jail of Canyon county.

No question other than the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is presented. The evidence upon which the plaintiff relied to connect the appellants with the offense was wholly circumstantial. There was no explanation or denial of any incriminating circumstances testified to by witnesses for the plaintiff. Appellants contend their guilt has not been established to that degree of certainty required where the evidence is circumstantial. The facts testified to are: That on the night of August 7, 1927, there were from ten to thirteen prisoners confined in the jail. All of them had free access to a room known as the kitchen. On the morning of August 8 the jailer discovered that the metal ceiling had, during the preceding night, been pried down in one corner of the kitchen from an attack made from within and that the appellants were missing. No other prisoners escaped. Appellants were apprehended some two days later at Huntington, Oregon, and were returned.

Appellants argue that the circumstances are consistent with defendants' innocence and do not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt and point out that the hole may have been made for the purpose of escape or may have been made by one prompted by motives of malicious mischief; that if made for the purpose of escape the person who made it may have abandoned his plan to escape and appellants may have concluded to adopt for the purpose of escape the easy means so made available; that the evidence does not disclose that the joint efforts of two men were required to commit the offense and it is not shown whether the offense was committed by the two defendants or by either aided and abetted by the other.

Of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence this court in State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 302, 231 P. 718, among other things said:

"The evidence need not demonstrate the guilt of the defendant beyond the possibility of his innocence; and if the circumstances as proved produce a moral conviction to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt they need not be absolutely incompatible, on any reasonable hypothesis, with the innocence of the accused."

The above statement was quoted with approval in State v. Dawn, 42 Idaho 210, 245 P. 74.

The value of circumstances as evidence depends upon the degree of certainty with which they point to a particular conclusion. While such evidence to be sufficient must create more than a suspicion of guilt, a mere possibility of innocence will not avoid a verdict where the conclusion or inference of guilt is logical.

A theory of innocence must be rational and must find its support in facts. We are not required to adopt an unreasonable theory or one not fairly founded upon evidence. We are not required to give to circumstances a strained or artificial construction in determining whether they are consistent with innocence.

The weight and effect to be given to circumstances pointing toward guilt, the inferences to be drawn therefrom, the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and the reasonableness of any claim, or projected hypothesis, of innocence are questions primarily for the jury. They are but matters to be considered by the jury in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

There is in the evidence no basis for the contention that the hole in the ceiling was made by one prompted by a desire to destroy or was made for any purpose other than to facilitate escape or that it was originally made by another prisoner with the idea of escaping and that he abandoned his plan.

The hole in the ceiling was well designed to be used as a means of escape. That physical exertion in an uncomfortable position was required to make it and that it was promptly used as a means of obtaining liberty well justify the inference that it was made with such use in mind. No other conclusion is reasonable. The defendants were jointly benefited by the crime committed. They promptly and alone used the hole to make their escape. Their conduct furnishes evidence of motive on their part in injuring the jail and satisfactory evidence of motive is of much aid in establishing identity. Except for the equal opportunity the other prisoners had to commit the crime of which appellants were convicted, there is no circumstance in evidence which would permit of doubt as to their guilt.

On principle, the fact that the defendants escaped through the hole and were the only prisoners who did should receive the same weight as an incriminating circumstance as the fact of possession of stolen property receives in larceny prosecutions. In the case of State v. Bogris, 26 Idaho 587, 144 P. 789, an instruction, to the effect that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a strong incriminating circumstance tending to show guilt, was considered and of it this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Budge, said:

"We are of the opinion that the instruction is also fully supported by the case of State v. Sanford, 8 Idaho 187, 67 P. 492, which announced 'the rule of law that possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance from which, when unexplained, the guilt of the accused may be inferred.'"

In that case the defendant and four other persons had equal opportunity to commit the offense and the only incriminating circumstance pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of the others, was his unexplained...