State v. Yates

• Decision Date: 11 December 1906
• Citation: 132 Iowa 475,109 N.W. 1005
• Parties: STATE v. YATES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

132 Iowa 475

109 N.W. 1005

STATE

v.YATES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 11, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Fremont County; W. R. Green, Judge.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of an assault with intent to commit murder. On trial he was convicted, and he appeals. Affirmed.W. E. Mitchell, for appellant.

C. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and Lawrence De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BISHOP, J.

As far as necessary to be stated in the outset, the facts of the offense charged were as follows: John Barhyte, the person upon whom the assault was made, was the keeper of a restaurant in Tabor. In the early evening of Christmas Day, 1905, the defendant entered such restaurant. He was more or less intoxicated, and soon began to make use of profane and indecent language. Barhyte ordered him to leave, and, upon his refusal to do so, took him by the arm, led him to the door, pushed him out on the steps, and closed the door. Defendant reopened the door, when Barhyte again pushed him out. As Barhyte turned to enter the room defendant stabbed him in the left side with a knife. As described by the attending surgeon, the resulting wound extended from near the edge of the shoulder blade down through and including part of the axillary space under the shoulder, and was about 3 1/2 inches in length and 2 inches in depth. The surgeon also testified that, but for the treatment applied, death might have resulted. After the assault defendant went to the home of his brother in Tabor where he was found shortly after midnight by the sheriff and arrested. On the trial the fact of the assault was not questioned in evidence; the defense sought to be established being that defendant was so far intoxicated that he did not realize what he was doing. The further facts material to be considered will be noticed as we proceed.

1. Lester Yates, brother of defendant, answered the demand of the sheriff for admittance when the latter appeared to make the arrest. Lester then called defendant saying that the sheriff was after him, and he had better go and give himself up. As a witness on the trial, defendant was asked by his counsel what he said to his brother when the latter informed him of the presence of the sheriff. An objection by the prosecutor was sustained, the court remarking: “I have a good deal of doubt whether any of that evidence is competent or not, any evidence whether he recollected it or not.” Counsel for appellant does not complain specifically of the ruling. It is the gist of his contention that the remarks made by the court in ruling were improper and prejudicial in that the effect thereof was to cast discredit on the defense of complete intoxication sought to be established. We are not disposed to think that any such importance should be attached to the language complained of. The remarks of the court were not addressed to the subject of drunkenness as a defense. It is evident that, on the contrary, the court was considering whether or not proof of complete drunkenness could be made out in the way in which it was being attempted. Moreover, as we shall see presently, the subject of drunkenness as a defense was fully covered by the instructions given to the jury.

2. In the eighth instruction, after making reference to the claim of defendant that he was drunk at the time of the assault, the court said: “On this point you are instructed that drunkenness in itself is no defense, but, if the defendant was so completely intoxicated, and was in such a besotted condition, that he was incapable at the time of forming an intent, then he cannot be found guilty,” etc. And again in the ninth instruction it was said: “If the liquor which he claims to have drank had merely inflamed his passion and caused him to be quarrelsome and abusive, while, at the same time, he was able to distinguish right from wrong, and knew at the time he was doing wrong, if he did assault Barhyte, then drunkenness would be no defense.” It is contended in respect of the instructions thus given that they involve an inconsistency, the tendency whereof would be to bring confusion into the minds of the jury. Accordingly, it is said, there was error. The contention is devoid of merit. By general law every man is presumed to be in possession of his mental faculties until the contrary is made to appear. Now, in a case of this kind the matter of intoxication becomes material only as related to the question of intention--a specific intent being an essential element of the crime charged. Within common knowledge a man becomes intoxicated--that is, drunk--when he passes under the influence of alcoholic liquor. And there are degrees of intoxication varying all the way from slight stimulation to complete coma. It is only at some point along the line between the two extremes that the loss of control of the mental faculties occurs. It follows that a defense to a crime involving intention cannot be established by merely showing that the perpetrator, was, at the time, intoxicated; he must go farther, and make it...