State v. Yates

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Spencer W. YATES, Appellant.
• Citation: 302 P.2d 719,208 Or. 491
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 24 October 1956

Page 719

302 P.2d 719

208 Or. 491

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Spencer W. YATES, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 3, 1956.

Decided Oct. 24, 1956.

Dwight L. Schwab, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Hutchison, Schwab & Burdick, Portland, and Edward M. Murphy and Gordon G. Carlson, Roseburg.

Don H. Sanders, Dep. Dist. Atty., for Douglas County, Roseburg, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief was Robert M. Stults, Dist. Atty. for Douglas County, Roseburg.

Before WARNER, C. J., and ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND, and PERRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant Spencer W. Yates is a member of the Bar of Oregon. He was found guilty in the circuit court for Douglas County of a direct contempt committed in the presence of the court and he was sentenced to imprisonment for one day in jail. He now appeals. The alleged contempt occurred in the course of a jury trial in an action for personal injury entitled Dorothy J. Tucker v. Arcoa, Inc., an Oregon corporation, in which case Mr. Yates represented the plaintiff. The subject under consideration was the sufficiency of a 'trailer hitch' on the trailer which had injured the plaintiff. The witness under examination was James R. Grady, a safety engineer employed by the State Industrial Accident Commission. The witness was a man of 14 years experience and was a member of the approval committee whose responsibility it was to check equipment, machine design and safeguards for compliance with the Oregon safety requirements. He testified to certain apparent defects in the trailer hitch. Thereafter the following transpired:

'Re-Redirect Examination by Mr. Yates

'Q. What is your opinion as to the adequacy of this coupling device and its satisfactory operation based upon your examination of it? A. Well, before we--it is my opinion before we could grant an approval on it we would ask for the points that I brought out be corrected.

'Re-Recross Examination by Mr. Davis

'Q. Well, that wasn't very responsive even yet. Is it your opinion--what is your opinion of this coupling device? A. My opinion is that it would not meet the requirements for approval.

'Court: Well, what technical training have you had along devices of this sort, or any other devices--schooling and things of that kind? A. The way we work--in other words, when we require information we ask that competent people make tests. We would, for example, in metallurgy, we would ask that responsible people make tests of the material and the hardness and durability and ability to withstand wear. We would ask that the manufacturer mount the hitch in a position where it is to be used and to simulate conditions where it is to be used and test it through destruction so that we could know just what it will stand.

'Q. (By Mr. Davis) Well without those things then you can't actually form an opinion until you have those tests, can you? A. We would require that----

'Court: Oh, listen. He asked you a question. You give a respective answer.

'Mr. Yates: If it please the Court----

'Court: I am getting tired of this man giving evasive answers. I want the question read to him. I want him to give a responsive answer, if he can; if he can't, let him say so. (The question was started to be read by the reporter.)

'Mr. Yates: May it--if it please the Court, may I object to the Court's irascible tone? I mean, you can tell him without----

'Court: Listen. I don't care to hear you make any remarks about the tone of my voice!

'Mr. Yates: I have entered the objection. That is all I have to say.

'Court: Yes, sir. Let that be the last one you ever make of that kind in this court. (The question was read by the reporter.)

'A. That is right.'

The objection of the defendant Yates to the Court's irascible tone constitutes the sole basis for the judgment of contempt.

On the 28th day of February the trial ended with a judgment of involuntary nonsuit. On Saturday, March the third, the trial judge by telephone notified the defendant to be in court at 9:30 a. m. on Monday the fifth day of March. The trial court certified to a bill of exceptions in the contempt proceeding. Attached thereto is a transcript of the proceedings held on the 5th of March. No testimony was taken at that time. The transcript consists of a lengthy oral statement by the trial judge in which he found the defendant guilty and gave the defendant an opportunity to offer a public apology for the contempt, to which the defendant replied, in part, 'I feel I cannot retract what, in my own conscience I know to be true.' The defendant asked permission to make a short statement with respect to the very issue in hand, and the court replied that he did not care to hear any statement. The defendant then objected to the proceedings upon the ground that they were not timely and because the trial judge was not qualified to pass upon the questions involved, whereupon the court pronounced the jail sentence to which we have referred.

Aside from the verbal comments of the court, the only findings made or entered appear in the judgment order, which reads as follows:

'This cause came on for hearing before the undersigned Circuit Judge and a jury on February 26, 1956, and continued to be heard on February 27, 1956, plaintiff appearing by her attorneys, Spencer W. Yates and Gordon G. Carlson, and the defendant appearing by one of its attorneys, Robert G. Davis, when on said 27th day of February, 1956, while said Court was in session and in the immediate view and presence of the Court, and James R. Grady was a witness in said cause, having been duly sworn, the said Grady gave evasive and argumentative answers to questions propounded to him by the attorneys; that the Court thereupon directed said witness to give responsive answers to said questions and the said Spencer W. Yates then and there used the following disorderly, contemptuous and insolent language toward the Judge of this Court while holding Court, which tended to impair the authority of said Court, said language being in words as follows: 'May it--if it please the Court, may I object to the Court's irascible tone? I mean, you can tell him that without--';

'It is, therefore, hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that said Spencer W. Yates is guilty of disorderly, contemptuous and insolent behavior toward the Judge of this Court while holding Court, tending to impair the authority of such Court, and that he be imprisoned in the county jail of Douglas County, Oregon one day.

'Dated March 5, 1956.

'Carl E. Wimberly

Circuit Judge'.

The bill of exceptions is a most unusual document. Among other recitals it contains the following:

'The Judge's tone of voice was marked with anger when he stated to the witness, Grady,

"Oh, listen. He asked you a question. You give a responsive answer.' and when the Court further stated to the witness Grady,

"I am getting tired of this man giving evasive answers. I want the question read to him. I want him to give a responsive answer, if he can; if he can't, let him say so.'

'The appellant's objection to the Court's tone of voice was stated respectfully and was not made in a contemptuous or insolent manner. Attached hereto and made a part hereof is an affidavit of appellant, Spencer W. Yates, marked Exhibit C.'

The judge then certified to the correctness of the bill of exceptions including the transcript of the contempt proceedings and the exhibits attached,

'excepting that a disagreement has arisen between appellant's counsel and the Court as to the truth of the statement contained in Lines 1 through 10, page 4, of said Bill of Exceptions and that as to the said recitation the appellant and his counsel aver that said recitation is true and the Court avers that said recitation is false. I further certify that the Affidavit of the appellant, Spencer W. Yates, attached to the Bill of Exceptions is not a proper part of the Bill of Exceptions and accordingly is stricken therefrom; * * *.'

On 13 April 1956, Gordon G. Carlson, the law partner of, and attorney for, the defendant Yates, filed an affidavit wherein it was stated that there was a disagreement between defendant's counsel and the Court as to the truth of the statements in the bill of exceptions, quoted supra.

In purported compliance with ORS 19.100(5) and ORS 17.515 both parties filed affidavits in the nature of a bystander's bill of exceptions. The affidavit of Yates supporting the disputed portion of the bill was stricken by the Court. Affidavits supporting the contention of defendant as to the alleged irascible tone of the judge and the respectful manner of the defendant were filed by Carlson and by Grady, the witness. Affidavits of two jurors also specifically supported defendant's contention. Both affiants were certified as 'respectable' and 'disinterested' by the clerk of the court. See ORS 17.515(2). In addition, the affidavits of twelve of the jurors were filed. Eleven of them described the tone of the judge's voice as 'angry', 'irritable', 'impatient', or 'burned up'. The affidavit of the twelfth juror was noncommittal. There was no certificate of the clerk of court as to the respectability or distinterestedness of ten of the jurors. The affidavit of defendant Yates was filed on April 5th, the day that the bill of exceptions was certified. The affidavits of Carlson and the two jurors, whose character was certified by the clerk of court, were filed on 13 April, and thus were filed within ten days of certification of the bill of exceptions. The other affidavits were also filed on 13 April. On 23 April, and within ten days of the filing of defendant's affidavits, the trial judge, the official reporter and the bailiff filed affidavits denying that the tone of the trial judge was 'irascible' though the judge said that he was 'obliged to sternly admonish' the witness. None of these three affidavits asserted that the objection made by defendant at the trial was discourteous or offensive in manner. The...