State v. Yates

• Decision Date: 29 November 1977
• Citation: 381 A.2d 536,174 Conn. 16
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Sheldon YATES.

Page 536

381 A.2d 536

174 Conn. 16

STATE of Connecticut v. Sheldon YATES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 13, 1977.

Decided Nov. 29, 1977.

Max F. Brunswick, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and John J. Kelly, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

The defendant was charged in an information with the crime of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59(a)(1) of the General Statutes and the crime of attempted robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-49 of the General Statutes and 1975 Public Acts, No. 75-411, § 1(a)(1) (now § 53a-134(a) (1) of the General Statutes). On a trial to a jury he was found guilty on both counts. He appealed from the judgment rendered on the verdict and briefed the following four issues: (1) error in the action of the trial court in compelling two of the defendant's witnesses to testify in prison clothing; (2) error in compelling the attorney for one of the defendant's witnesses to disclose a privileged communication; (3) error in permitting the state's witnesses to testify pursuant to improper grants of immunity; and (4) error in permitting the state to present an expert witness not disclosed to the defendant prior to the trial.

Evidence was submitted at the trial from which the jury could have found the following facts: On February 16, 1976, at about 8 p. m., in the city of New Haven, three men forced one Benjamin DiLieto into an alleyway. When it became apparent that DiLieto had no money, two of the men fled, and the defendant shot DiLieto in the chest.

The defendant first claims that the court erred in compelling two of his witnesses, Douglas Thomas and Wilbur Cannon, to testify in prison garb, asserting that such attire detracted from their testimonial credibility. The defendant timely objected to that procedure, and the state did not oppose the objection. The court, however, overruled the objection, and the witnesses were compelled to testify in their prison attire.

If the defendant himself were placed on trial while dressed in a prison uniform, there would be error. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126. "(T)he constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment." Id., 504, 96 S.Ct. at 1693.

The logical extension of that principle applies to incarcerated witnesses who are required to testify while dressed in prison attire. ¹ In the minds of the jurors the credibility of such witnesses can be affected in the same manner as the presumption of innocence can be diminished by the defendant's appearance in prison garb. A defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial and it is the duty of the trial court to prevent situations from arising during the trial which would prejudice the accused in the minds of the jury. See United States v. Carter, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 522 F.2d 666; State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 389, 97 N.W.2d 472.

In the present case, however, whatever prejudice may have been caused by the witnesses' attire was nullified by the fact that the witnesses themselves testified to their prior felony convictions and their experiences while in prison. The error viewed in the context of that testimony, therefore, cannot be said to be prejudicial or to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

The defendant next claims that the court erred in compelling Attorney David F. Egan to disclose confidential communications which he had with his client, the witness Cannon. In its questioning of Egan, the state did not seek the substance of any communication that Egan may have had with his client. Rather, Egan was asked if he was contacted by his client, where he was contacted, and what he did after the meeting with his client. That information was sought in order to rebut Cannon's testimony that the police had initiated an attempt to solicit false testimony about the defendant. Egan's testimony was to the effect that he had contacted the police on behalf of his client after meeting with the client.

" The fact that an attorney may not disclose privileged communications between himself and his client does not affect his capacity and duty to testify as to other matters when called on to do so." State v. Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 120, 291 A.2d 750, 755. In the present case Attorney Egan was asked not about any communication but about certain events that occurred after a meeting with his client. Such information is not privileged.

The defendant nevertheless contends that the state improperly circumvented the privilege by the manner in which it elicited the information. The alleged confidential information which can be implied from the testimony was that Cannon had asked his attorney to contact the police to arrange such a meeting. Such a communication could not be confidential since it was meant to be transmitted to another. It was, therefore, not privileged. 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2311 (McNaughton Rev.1961).

The defendant further contends that the court erred in compelling the state's witnesses, Ronald Cohens and James Jones, to testify while under improper immunity grants. They were granted immunity upon the state's motion...