State v. Yeaton
| Citation | 500 P.3d 583,406 Mont. 465 |
| Decision Date | 14 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0041 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Eric D. YEATON, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Haley Connell Jackson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana
¶1 Eric D. Yeaton (Yeaton) appeals a November 22, 2019 judgment and sentence from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in Lincoln County. Yeaton pleaded guilty to felony operation of a noncommercial vehicle by a person with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .08 or more, in violation of §§ 61-8-406 and -731, MCA. The District Court imposed a five-year sentence of imprisonment with two years suspended and fees and fines totaling $5560, as well as an order to pay imprisonment, probation, and alcohol treatment costs "if financially able." These latter, financial aspects of the sentence are the subject of his appeal.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
¶3 We affirm on Issues One and Three and reverse and remand on some of the costs in Issue Two.
¶4 Yeaton was arrested following a traffic stop on January 20, 2019. A blood test showed him to have been driving with a BAC greater than .08, a violation of § 61-8-406, MCA. Yeaton had at least four prior intoxicated driving convictions, and he had attended a residential alcohol treatment program pursuant to a prior conviction, as provided for in § 61-8-731(2), MCA. These facts subject Yeaton to the felony punishment rules and probationary conditions set out in § 61-8-731(3)-(4), MCA.
¶5 Yeaton pleaded guilty to the BAC offense, and the Lincoln County District Court held a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the parties and the court discussed Yeaton's presentence investigation report (PSI) and the financial aspects of the sentencing recommendations contained in the PSI, most of which the District Court adopted in its judgment. Yeaton offered the District Court several corrections to the PSI on file, which was drafted by referencing an older PSI of Yeaton's. In addition to clarifying some other details, Yeaton noted that his assets and debts in the new PSI should be listed as "none" rather than "unknown." Yeaton's attorney then raised with the District Court two issues from the PSI's numbered recommendations.
¶6 The first regarded fees and other financial charges. The District Court agreed to drop some of the recommended fees but kept several: a $5000 fine,1 a $500 administrative surcharge,2 a $50 DUI-specific surcharge,3 and a $10 court information technology fee.4 Yeaton objected to these fines and fees on the grounds that he could not afford them and that they could not be levied against a defendant whose sole income source was social security disability payments. On the social security point, Yeaton cited State v. Eaton , 2004 MT 283, 323 Mont. 287, 99 P.3d 661, during the sentencing hearing.
¶7 Yeaton's second argument regarded financial charges for the costs of chemical dependency evaluation, aftercare treatment during probation, and imprisonment. The PSI's recommended provision stated that the defendant, "if financially able, as a condition of probation, shall pay for the cost of imprisonment, probation, and alcohol treatment ...." The District Court adopted this language in its judgment and sentence. Yeaton argues on appeal that this provision violates statutes and this Court's precedents requiring district court findings about ability to pay.
¶8 This Court reviews sentencing conditions, fines, and fees "first for legality, then for abuse of discretion as to the condition's reasonableness under the facts of the case." State v. Ingram , 2020 MT 327, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799 (citing State v. Daricek , 2018 MT 31, ¶ 7, 390 Mont. 273, 412 P.3d 1044 ). We determine legality by considering only "whether the sentence falls within the statutory parameters, whether the district court had statutory authority to impose the sentence, and whether the district court followed the affirmative mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes." Ingram , ¶ 8 (citing State v. Himes , 2015 MT 91, ¶ 22, 378 Mont. 419, 345 P.3d 297 ).
¶9 Issue One: Is it legal under federal and state law to order fines, fees, and surcharges against a defendant whose current income is only social security benefits?
¶10 Shortly after Yeaton filed his first brief in this appeal, we issued our decision in State v. Ingram , 2020 MT 327, 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799. Ingram resolved the exact issue that Yeaton raises regarding social security.
¶11 In Eaton , we held that a district court may not levy a financial charge calculated as a percentage of a defendant's net income including social security benefits. Eaton , ¶¶ 23-27. This violates a federal law that protects such payments from garnishment and other "legal process." See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). However, in Ingram , we considered a mandatory fine issued with no reference to the income source from which it would be paid. We recognized that income sources can change over time and made a distinction between creating a debt and requiring social security benefits be used to satisfy a debt. Ingram , ¶¶ 11-12. The former does not violate federal law, while the latter does.
¶12 Ingram thus makes clear that the fines, fees, and surcharges the District Court included in Yeaton's sentence are legal. The $5000 fine, as discussed below, was a statutory minimum. The $500 fee was a percentage of the fine, as directed by statute. And the $50 and $10 charges were flat statutory rates. None of these charges, therefore, were made in reference to Yeaton's social security income or required to be paid from that income source.5 The State may not collect from Yeaton's social security benefits to satisfy these debts, but it is permitted to impose them.
¶13 Issue Two: Did the District Court improperly fail to inquire into Yeaton's ability to pay the fines, fees, and surcharges ordered?
¶14 Yeaton also raised arguments about his inability to afford the $5560 of fines, fees, and surcharges ordered by the District Court. These costs fit into two categories: a $5000 fine issued pursuant to § 61-8-731(3), MCA, and $560 in fees and surcharges pursuant to §§ 46-18-236 and 3-1-317, MCA.
¶15 The legality of the $5000 fine in Yeaton's judgment is made clear by State v. Mingus , 2004 MT 24, 319 Mont. 349, 84 P.3d 658. In Mingus , we held that statutory provisions that require an inquiry into ability to pay—in §§ 46-18-231 and -232, MCA —do not apply to statutorily mandated fines. Mingus , ¶ 15. Yeaton acknowledged in District Court that the $5000 fine was mandatory. Yeaton raises a new argument on appeal that the fine might be discretionary, but even if he were able to show it was, such an issue creates an "objectionable sentence, not an illegal sentence." State v. Kotwicki , 2007 MT 17, ¶ 21, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892. We review sentencing decisions for legality, and Yeaton's $5000 fine is within statutory parameters. Daricek , ¶ 7 ; § 61-8-731(3), MCA. Because Yeaton failed to object to the fine on these grounds in District Court, he waived this issue and cannot raise it now on appeal.6 Kotwicki , ¶ 22.
¶16 However, the $560 in fees and surcharges falls under different rules than the larger mandatory fine from the DUI statutes. These fees and surcharges are subject to the ability-to-pay inquiry required by §§ 46-18-232 and -236(2), MCA. Again, a district court's failure to make the inquiry renders a sentence only objectionable, not illegal—but here, Yeaton sufficiently objected regarding his ability to afford these fees and surcharges. When the District Court asked Yeaton's attorney whether any provisions in the PSI should be rejected, Yeaton's attorney told the District Court that "[o]ne of the things that Mr. Yeaton struggles with is obviously paying for things ... [s]o, obviously, all of the fines and fees I am asking to be waived ... he gets social security and he cannot afford those." The State colors this objection as referring only to the Eaton argument addressed above, but we view the attorney's objection as sufficient to invoke the protections of §§ 48-18-232 and -236(2), MCA. The attorney specified that the basis for his objection to these provisions was Yeaton's ability to afford them. See Pumphrey v. Empire Lath & Plaster , 2006 MT 99, ¶ 30, 332 Mont. 116, 135 P.3d 797 (); State v. Castle , 1999 MT 141, ¶ 11, 295 Mont. 1, 982 P.2d 1035 ().
¶17 Here, the District Court addressed Yeaton's objection to these fees and surcharges at the same time as it considered the mandatory fine and the social security issue. The District Court then treated the mandatory fine the same as the fees and surcharges when it imposed all these costs without further discussion of Yeaton's financial resources. However, as noted, the fees and surcharges are subject to more strenuous inquiry rules, and the District Court did not make the "serious inquiry or separate...
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...... statute when explaining his affordability problem, but we can. interpret objections in this context similarly to under. evidentiary rules, where an objection can be sufficient if. the "specific ground is apparent from the context.". State v. Yeaton, 2021 MT 312, ¶ 16, 406 Mont. 465, P.3d (citing State v. Castle, 1999 MT 141,. ¶ 11, 295 Mont. 1, 982 P.2d 1035). Recently, for. example, we discerned a sufficient objection to costs when. the attorney raised general affordability concerns at. sentencing, stating that "one of the things that ......