State v. Yodprasit, No. 96-491

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Writing for the CourtLAVORATO
Citation564 N.W.2d 383
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Sombat B. YODPRASIT, Appellant.
Decision Date21 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-491

Page 383

564 N.W.2d 383
STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
v.
Sombat B. YODPRASIT, Appellant.
No. 96-491.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
May 21, 1997.

Ruth M. Carter and Robert Tiefenthaler of Carter, Carter & Tiefenthaler, Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney,

Page 384

and Robert J. Katcher and Dewey P. Sloan, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

The defendant, Sombat Yodprasit, appeals from his convictions and sentences imposed following his pleas of guilty to charges of going armed with intent and willful injury. See Iowa Code §§ 708.4, 708.8 (1995). All of Yodprasit's claims relate to proceedings that took place in the juvenile court before that court waived its jurisdiction. His appeal raises the following issue: Does a defendant who pleads guilty in the district court thereby waive any claims arising out of previous juvenile court proceedings? We think so and affirm.

In the fall of 1995, racial tensions between some Asian and white high-school students were running high in Sioux City. On September 8, 1995, a fight broke out between some Asian and white students in a parking lot. Justin Hegge, a white student, was severely cut across his stomach by an Asian student.

Following an investigation of the incident, the State filed a delinquency petition on September 13. The petition charged that Yodprasit had committed delinquent acts that would have constituted the crimes of going armed with intent, attempted murder, and willful injury, if committed by an adult. On the same day, the State also filed a motion asking the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction so that Yodprasit could be prosecuted as an adult.

The next day the juvenile court held a detention hearing. Yodprasit's attorney stipulated--for the purposes of that hearing only--that there was probable cause to believe that Yodprasit had committed a delinquent act.

On November 1 the juvenile court heard the State's waiver motion. A different attorney was now representing Yodprasit. During the hearing, the court restricted Yodprasit's cross-examination of some State witnesses. The court also received into evidence police reports and the testimony of a police officer who was not on the State's designation-of-witness list.

Following the waiver hearing, the juvenile court entered a written ruling granting the State's waiver motion. In its ruling, the juvenile court found there was probable cause to believe Yodprasit had committed a delinquent act that constituted a public offense. See Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(b) (requiring juvenile court--as a condition for waiver--to find probable cause to believe juvenile has committed a delinquent act constituting public offense). The court made this finding based on the evidence presented and, in the alternative, based on the finding of probable cause at the detention hearing. Id. (permitting juvenile court for waiver purposes to rely on probable cause finding from Iowa Code section 232.44 detention hearing).

In addition, the court found that (1) there were no reasonable prospects for rehabilitating Yodprasit if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction and (2) the waiver would be in the best interest of Yodprasit and the community. Both findings are required to support a waiver order. See Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c).

We dismissed Yodprasit's interlocutory appeal of the waiver order. Following our dismissal, the State filed an information in the district court, charging Yodprasit with going armed with intent and willful injury.

Yodprasit withdrew his former pleas of not guilty to these charges and pleaded guilty. He did this pursuant to a plea agreement with the State under which the State agreed to dismiss the pending complaint in which he was charged with attempted murder.

Later, the district court sentenced Yodprasit to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years on the going-armed-with-intent charge. The court deferred judgment and placed Yodprasit on probation on the willful injury charge.

This appeal followed. Yodprasit raises several issues all dealing with matters arising out of the juvenile court proceedings. He contends the State failed to prove probable cause that he had committed a delinquent act which would constitute a public offense. He

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also challenges the juvenile court's actions in the waiver hearing such as (1) restricting his cross-examination of some State's witnesses, (2) admitting into evidence police reports regarding the incident giving rise to the charges, and (3) allowing a police officer to testify who was not on the State's designation-of-witness list. Additionally, he contends his first attorney was ineffective for stipulating to probable cause at the detention hearing. Last, he contends the State never established a lack of reasonable prospects to rehabilitate him if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction.

The State insists that Yodprasit's guilty plea in the district court constituted a waiver of all of these claims arising out of the previous juvenile court proceedings. In support of its position, the State points to the long-standing principle in Iowa that a valid guilty plea generally waives all defenses and objections.

The State cites numerous cases to support its position, but foremost in importance is State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1968). In Delano, we held that a guilty plea freely and voluntarily entered waives all defenses and objections, even as to constitutional guarantees. Delano, 161 N.W.2d at 72-73. Such waiver, the Delano court held, applies "to conduct of criminal prosecution and any objection to prior proceedings which may include a violation of [the defendant's] rights." Id. at 73. The State argues, therefore, that errors in a "prior proceeding" such as a juvenile...

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24 practice notes
  • State v. Tucker, No. 19-2082
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • May 7, 2021
    ..., 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001) ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction should not be confused with authority." (quoting State v. Yodprasit , 564 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1997) )). Section 814.7 simply does not deprive this court of jurisdiction.Regardless, section 814.7 does not violate the separat......
  • State v. Ambrose, No. 13–0450.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • January 2, 2015
    ...proceeding as a criminal case, which is the type of case the district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide. See State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1997) (citing Iowa Constitution art. V, § 6 ); State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482–83 (Iowa 1993). Ambrose impliedly acknowl......
  • State v. Rice, No. 27210.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • January 16, 2013
    ...reject the assertion of a jurisdictional error. We find instructive the case of State v. Yodprasit, which considered this very issue. 564 N.W.2d 383 (Iowa 1997). Yodprasit, a juvenile offender, pled guilty in adult court following the waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. On appeal,......
  • State v. Zarlengo, 20 MA 0036
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • December 15, 2021
    ...Iowa Supreme Court found a juvenile court's probable cause decision was waived upon a guilty plea after bindover. State v. Yodprasit , 564 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1997). Recognizing the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and a court's authority within a case, it was observed, "The......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
24 cases
  • State v. Tucker, No. 19-2082
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • May 7, 2021
    ..., 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001) ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction should not be confused with authority." (quoting State v. Yodprasit , 564 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1997) )). Section 814.7 simply does not deprive this court of jurisdiction.Regardless, section 814.7 does not violate the separat......
  • State v. Ambrose, No. 13–0450.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • January 2, 2015
    ...proceeding as a criminal case, which is the type of case the district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide. See State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1997) (citing Iowa Constitution art. V, § 6 ); State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482–83 (Iowa 1993). Ambrose impliedly acknowl......
  • State v. Rice, No. 27210.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • January 16, 2013
    ...reject the assertion of a jurisdictional error. We find instructive the case of State v. Yodprasit, which considered this very issue. 564 N.W.2d 383 (Iowa 1997). Yodprasit, a juvenile offender, pled guilty in adult court following the waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. On appeal,......
  • State v. Zarlengo, 20 MA 0036
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • December 15, 2021
    ...Iowa Supreme Court found a juvenile court's probable cause decision was waived upon a guilty plea after bindover. State v. Yodprasit , 564 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1997). Recognizing the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and a court's authority within a case, it was observed, "The......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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