State v. Yokley
| Decision Date | 27 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | 39783-4-I,Nos. 39782-6-,s. 39782-6- |
| Citation | 91 Wn.App. 773,959 P.2d 694 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Donald Maynard YOKLEY, and Penny Gay Yokley, and each of them, Respondents. |
Raymon E. Thomas, Prosecuting Atty King County, King County Prosecutor/Appellate Unit, Seattle, for Respondents.
Frederick O. Frohmader, Tacoma, Charles D. Williams, Silverdale, for Appellant.
In January 1996, 8-year-old Anton Sirotin found a tennis ball in his brother's closet. The ball had been packed with explosive flash powder and equipped with a fuse. Anton thought colored paper or a prize would come out of the ball if he lit the fuse. When the ball exploded in the Sirotins' fireplace, it blew off Anton's left hand, imbedding his fingers and bones in the sheetrock and ceiling. The force of the blast severely bent the iron fireplace grate and knocked framed pictures off the wall 10 feet away.
An investigation led to the discovery of two separate operations producing and selling large quantities of explosive items, including M-80s, M-100s, M-250s, 5-inch tube devices, and tennis ball bombs. One operation was conducted by appellants Donald and Penny Yokley, 1 who were charged with violations of the State Explosives Act.
The State seeks reversal of two pretrial orders resulting in the dismissal of all four counts against the Yokleys. One order suppressed evidence on the ground that a search warrant affidavit was facially insufficient. 2 The second order dismissed the two remaining counts against Donald Yokley on the grounds that the items in those counts were fireworks and were therefore either exempt from the Explosives Act, RCW 70.74, or chargeable only under the more specific Fireworks Laws. RCW 70.77.
For the reasons stated below, we reverse both rulings and remand for further proceedings.
Shortly after the January 1996 explosion that injured Anton, an investigator received information implicating Donald Yokley in explosives manufacturing and distribution. The investigator also received information from the Department of Labor and Industries that Donald Yokley did not possess a valid, current license to purchase, manufacture, use, transport, store or sell explosives or explosive devices.
In May 1996, an informant and undercover officer phoned Donald Yokley at his home and placed an order for 5,000 M-80s, 200 M-100s, 60 M-250s, 200 5-inch tube devices- , and a number of aerial launchers or mortars used for launching shells into the air. Yokley delivered those items to the undercover officer in a parking lot at the Northgate Mall.
Police subsequently obtained a warrant to search the Yokleys' apartment and vehicles. The search netted numerous explosive items, including M-250s and tennis ball bombs, as well as tools and materials used in manufacturing those items.
Based on the 5-inch tube devices and M-100s Donald delivered at the mall, the State charged him with two counts of "Explosive Devices Activity Without a License." The M-250s and tennis ball bombs found in the apartment resulted in two additional counts against Donald and Penny.
The defense moved to suppress the evidence seized at the apartment, arguing that the supporting affidavit failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the Yokleys were acting without an explosives license. The court granted the motion, effectively terminating the prosecution of the two counts arising from the apartment search.
The court and counsel spent considerable time discussing the effect of the exemption in the Explosives Act for "fireworks" 3 and the defense's contention that the items delivered by Donald were "fireworks." The prosecutor asserted, and the court ultimately agreed, that the exemption is an affirmative defense.
The parties disagreed on how the word "fireworks" in the Explosives Act exemption should be defined for the jury. The defense argued that since the word was not defined in the Act and was not ambiguous, it should be given its ordinary meaning. The prosecutor responded that the court had to look to the definitions of "fireworks" in the State Fireworks Law 4 and related provisions of the Washington Administrative Code.
After extensive arguments, the court ultimately relied on the definitions in the Fireworks Law, but concluded that the items in this case were "fireworks" because they fit the description of "salutes" in the American Pyrotechnics Association standards for "display fireworks." 5 The APA standards were germane, the court explained, because the definition of "fireworks" in the Fireworks Law incorporates federal regulations by reference, which in turn incorporate the APA standards.
When asked to explain why he should not be required to amend the charge to a violation of the Fireworks Law, the prosecutor argued that the court was ignoring portions of the Fireworks Law defining "fireworks" in terms of their U.N. designation. The prosecutor further argued that "display fireworks" provide some special visual or audible effect which the items in this case do not provide.
The court adhered to its ruling and dismissed the remaining two counts against Donald. This appeal followed. 6
From the outset of this case, the parties' arguments have revolved around one central issue: are the items delivered at Northgate and found at the Yokleys' apartment "fireworks" within the meaning of the "fireworks" exemption in the Explosives Act. If so, the Yokleys are exempt from prosecution under the Act. That issue was hotly contested and exhaustively argued in the proceedings below. Although the State's brief on appeal focuses more narrowly on whether the court properly ruled on the "fireworks" exemption as a matter of law, it is clear from the brief and oral argument in this court that the State contends the court erred in holding that the items in question are fireworks. Because that issue is implicitly raised and potentially dispositive, and because it presents an opportunity to provide needed guidance for future prosecutions of this nature, we will exercise our inherent power to address it. 7
Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the items are exempt "fireworks" turns on how that word is defined. The Explosives Act contains no definition of the word. 8 As a general rule, an undefined statutory term is accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. 9 There are exceptions to this rule, however.
Several decisions suggest that a court can always look to statutes "in pari materia" to determine if something other than the plain, unambiguous meaning of a term was intended by the Legislature. 10 Another exception allows courts to look to other sources of intent when the plain meaning of a term would lead to unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. 11 Both exceptions apply here.
The first applies because the Explosives Act and Fireworks Law both relate to explosive materials and devices and are, therefore, "in pari materia"--i.e., they relate to the same "thing" or "class of ... things." 12 The second applies because "unlikely" or "absurd" consequences would result under the statutes in effect at the time of the trial court's ruling 13 if the ordinary definition of "fireworks- " advocated by the Yokleys applies. Under that definition, any explosive could be an exempt "firework" so long as it is designed and sold for "audible or visual effects." Conceivably, then, a powerful homemade explosive device designed for such effects would not only be an exempt "firework" under the Explosives Act, but, as demonstrated later in our discussion of the Fireworks Law, could also fall outside the scope of the "fireworks" definitions in the Fireworks Law. That such a device could be unregulated by either of those laws is an unlikely, if not absurd, result.
Hence, the plain meaning rule is inapplicable here and we may look to related statutes and other indicia of legislative intent.
When the Explosive Act and the Fireworks Law are construed together, there is little doubt what the Legislature intended when it exempted "fireworks" from the Explosives Act. These are regulatory acts sharing the overlapping purpose of regulating the sale, possession etc. of explosive substances through licensing requirements. The Explosives Act defines "explosives" broadly enough to potentially cover any firework "capable of producing destructive effects on contiguous objects or of destroying life or limb." RCW 70.74.010(3). 14 Hence, without a "fireworks" exemption, the schemes would overlap, causing duplicative regulation. The most reasonable reading of the "fireworks" exemption, therefore, is that it is intended to exempt from Explosive Act licensing requirements those items and activities that are already subject to licensing under the Fireworks Law. This construction preserve the spirit and integrity of the statutory scheme. 15
The legislative history of the exemption supports this construction. The original Explosives Act of 1931 included an exemption for "common fireworks which are to be used for celebration or commercial purposes." 16 The first Fireworks Law and statutory definition of "fireworks" appeared in 1943. It was repealed and replaced with new Fireworks Laws and definitions in 1951 and 1961.
In 1969, the Legislature, for the first time, amended the Explosives Act exemption for "fireworks." 17 The Legislature repealed the 1931 exemption language quoted above and replaced it with language exempting "[t]he sale and use of fireworks[.]" The express purpose of the 1969 amendatory Act was "to modernize the state explosives act" to keep pace with technological advancements occurring "since the original act was passed in 1931." 18 The sweeping amendments to the Act included new references to classifications of the U.S. Department of Transportation and other provisions generally updating the Act. In that context, the change in the "fireworks" exemption language is most...
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