State v. Youmans
| Decision Date | 24 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 42795 |
| Citation | 383 P.3d 142,161 Idaho 4 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Ldonna Marie YOUMANS, Defendant–Appellant, and Tamera Kelly, Ada County Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Intervenor–Respondent. |
Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney; James K. Dickinson, Senior Deputy, Boise, for intervenor.
Ldonna Marie Youmans appeals from her judgment of conviction after a jury found her guilty of burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, Youmans argues: (1) the district court erred by admitting certain testimony into evidence; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of possession of a controlled substance; (3) the district court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) the district court was without jurisdiction to supplement the record and to make factual findings after Youmans filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences. We vacate the district court's order granting the motion to supplement the record for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Over a span of two months, Youmans was captured six separate times on surveillance video wearing nursing scrubs and entering the Garden Plaza of Valley View retirement facility. Youmans had previously been employed as a visiting nurse at the retirement facility. Each time she entered the facility between 11:20 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., when the majority of residents were at lunch. Youmans ultimately entered at least seven apartments and attempted to enter an additional eleven. Following Youmans' entry into their apartments, residents reported missing prescription medications, including hydrocodone. Management at the retirement facility contacted local law enforcement.
After viewing the surveillance footage and interviewing one of the victims, Det. Paporello met with Youmans. Youmans acknowledged that she had been at the facility and claimed she was there to visit former clients. However, she did not know the names of the individuals into whose rooms she had entered. Youmans was subsequently arrested and during her booking at the jail, officers discovered seventeen loose prescription pills at the bottom of her purse. Det. Paporello later identified the prescription pills as hydrocodone.
Following trial, a jury found Youmans guilty of burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.1 The district court entered judgment against Youmans and imposed concurrent unified sentences of ten years with three years determinate on the burglary conviction, five years with three years determinate on the attempted burglary conviction, and retained jurisdiction. After the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Youmans' sentences and placed her on probation for a period of ten years.
Youmans timely filed a notice of appeal prior to the expiration of the retained jurisdiction period. In the notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal Youmans identified, as a potential appellate issue, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for failing to turn over the computer hard drive. At the time of the retained jurisdiction hearing, the State requested the opportunity to clarify the record regarding the claim. Ultimately, the district court determined that it had jurisdiction to supplement the record, allowed the filing of evidence relating to the claim, heard argument and entered factual findings, and concluded that no misconduct occurred. Youmans appeals.
Youmans claims: (1) the district court erred by admitting the officer's testimony as to the identity of the pills found in her purse; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of possession of a controlled substance; (3) the district court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) the district court was without jurisdiction to supplement the record and to make factual findings after Youmans filed a timely notice of appeal.
Youmans argues that Det. Paporello's testimony identifying the pills found in her purse should not have been admitted into evidence because the State did not provide proper foundation. Accordingly, Youmans asserts the convictions for burglary, attempted burglary, and possession of a controlled substance should be vacated. The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the province of the trial court. A trial court's determination that evidence is supported by a proper foundation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gilpin , 132 Idaho 643, 646, 977 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, a trial court's determination as to the admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed where there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. Zimmerman , 121 Idaho 971, 973–74, 829 P.2d 861, 863–64 (1992). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger , 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
At trial, Det. Paporello testified that he used an online database to identify the pills found in Youmans' purse. He indicated that he entered identifying characteristics of the pills including the numbers, shape, and color into the database, and the database named the type of substance and milligram strength which corresponded with those identifiers.2
Det. Paporello stated that the use of an Internet search to identify a pill was something he knew based on his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, and that it was common for other officers to use online resources. Det. Paporello acknowledged that he did not recall the name of the website he used to identify the pills and that he is not a narcotics officer.3 However, Det. Paporello explained that he had discussed this identification method with a narcotics officer and that officers commonly use websites to identify prescription pills in the field. Thereafter, over defense counsel's objections,4 Det. Paporello testified that the pills found in Youmans' purse were hydrocodone.
Youmans argues that Det. Paporello's testimony lacked foundation because the State did not identify Det. Paporello as a prescription pill expert, nor would he meet the threshold required to testify as an expert witness. Youmans also argues that the State had an obligation to identify the "treatise" upon which Det. Paporello was relying. However, the State asserts that the testimony was properly admitted as lay opinion testimony under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701, which provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
We agree that Det. Paporello testified as a lay witness. He described the steps he personally undertook to identify the loose pills found in Youmans' purse, which included utilizing an unnamed online database. Further, Det. Paporello testified that the pills were hydrocodone, the controlled substance with which Youmans was charged with possessing, and that the manner in which he identified the pills was consistent with the practice of other officers. Finally, using such a database does not require scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. Det. Paporello did not speak to the chemical nature of the controlled substance; rather, only to its classification, which could be determined by comparison of observable characteristics, including shape, color, and numeric identifiers. The probative value of this testimony would have been greater if the database was named and there was consistency in the online sources used by officers in the field to identify prescription pills. Nevertheless, the evidence carries probative value that the online database used was adequate to specifically identify what type of prescription pills were found in Youmans' purse. It is not dissimilar to other types of testimony allowed from lay witnesses. See State v. Barnes , 147 Idaho 587, 590–96, 212 P.3d 1017, 1020–26 (Ct. App. 2009) (); State v. Waller , 140 Idaho 764, 767, 101 P.3d 708, 711 (Ct. App. 2004) (). Youmans’ assertions speak more to the weight and reliability of the testimony than to the foundation and the jury had the opportunity to determine how much to rely upon Det. Paporello's statements. Therefore, Det. Paporello's testimony was supported by adequate foundation.
Youmans argues that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence that the pills found in her purse were a controlled substance and adopts her argument, as stated above, that the district court improperly permitted Det. Paporello to testify that the pills were hydrocodone. Youmans further argues that even if Det. Paporello's testimony was properly admitted, the jury could not properly find that the pills were hydrocodone because they were never chemically analyzed by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial