State v. Young
Decision Date | 12 June 2003 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Clifford YOUNG, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Rebecca Duncan, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were David E. Groom, Acting Executive Director, Office of Public Defense Services, and Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender.
David J. Amesbury, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, DEITS, Chief Judge, and KISTLER, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for aggravated murder, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. We affirm.
In 1997, defendant was indicted on six counts of aggravated murder, one count of first-degree robbery, and one count of first-degree burglary. All eight counts stemmed from the killing of Ruth Bonneau while defendant and another person, Tonya Davis, robbed Bonneau in her home. Following his indictment, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the state. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated murder (counts 2, 5, and 6) and to testify against Davis. The state agreed to recommend that defendant be sentenced to three concurrent life terms with the possibility of parole. The plea agreement provides that, if defendant fails to comply with it, the state will "[p]roceed to trial and sentencing phase on the remaining counts of Aggravated Murder, Robbery, and Burglary."
To remove any doubt about the last point, the agreement adds:
Finally, the agreement states:
Consistently with the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to three counts of aggravated murder, and the trial court sentenced him on October 2, 1998, to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. After defendant began serving his sentence, he breached the plea agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the state tried defendant on the remaining three counts of aggravated murder (counts 1, 3, and 4), as well as the other two charges. Defendant pled guilty to all five charges, and the trial court held a penalty phase hearing on the three new aggravated murder convictions so that the jury could determine whether defendant should be sentenced to life, life without the possibility of parole, or death.
Before the penalty phase hearing, defendant moved to dismiss that hearing for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that he had been charged with a single homicide, that he had been tried and sentenced for that crime, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose a second sentence on him for a single murder. The trial court denied defendant's motion, in part, because we had held in State v. Barrett, 153 Or.App. 621, 958 P.2d 215 (1998), that multiple aggravated murder convictions could be entered for a single homicide. After the penalty phase hearing, the jury sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole on the remaining three aggravated murder counts.
Defendant appealed. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Barrett. See State v. Barrett, 331 Or. 27, 10 P.3d 901 (2000)
. Defendant argues that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Barrett, his aggravated murder convictions on counts 1, 3, and 4 should merge with his earlier convictions on counts 2, 5, and 6. It follows, he reasons, that the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him on counts 1, 3, and 4, although the reasons for that conclusion are not completely clear. He may be arguing that the trial court simply lost jurisdiction over him once he began serving the first sentence. Alternatively, he may be arguing that the court lost jurisdiction because it could not merge the second aggravated murder sentence with the first aggravated murder sentence that he had started serving.1 Before turning to defendant's arguments, we begin with the state's claim that we may not review the issue that defendant has raised on appeal.
On that point, the state notes that the plea agreement provides that, if defendant breaches it, he may be tried on the remaining three counts of aggravated murder and that, if convicted, "all sentencing options under ORS 163.105(1), including the Death Penalty and a Life Sentence without possibility of parole will be available for the jury to consider." The state reasons that, because defendant's sentence on the second group of aggravated murder charges was the product of a stipulated sentencing agreement, ORS 138.222(2)(d) precludes us from reviewing it. The state's threshold argument fails for two reasons. ORS 138.222(2)(d) precludes appellate courts from reviewing a sentence that results from a stipulated sentencing agreement.2 Defendant, however, is not asking us to review his sentence. Rather, he is asking us to decide whether the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence him. A party cannot stipulate to jurisdiction, State v. Miner, 218 Or. 502, 504, 342 P.2d 773 (1959), and nothing in ORS 138.222(2)(d) precludes us from considering defendant's jurisdictional challenge. Beyond that, ORS 138.222(2)(d) "allow[s] review of sentences unless they were `stipulated sentences' as illustrated in ORS 135.407." State v. Kephart, 320 Or. 433, 447, 887 P.2d 774 (1994); see State v. Upton, 132 Or.App. 579, 583-84, 889 P.2d 376,
rev den, 320 Or. 749, 891 P.2d 659 (1995) ( ). In this case, defendant did not stipulate to a sentence "as illustrated in ORS 135.407."3
887 P.2d 774. Rather, he agreed that, if he breached the plea agreement and was convicted of additional charges of aggravated murder, the entire range of sentences for that crime would be available. That is not the sort of stipulated sentence that ORS 135.407 contemplates or to which ORS 138.222(2)(d) applies. We accordingly turn to the merits of defendant's argument.
As noted, two related but separate theories appear to underlie defendant's jurisdictional argument. He may be arguing that, once the trial court sentenced him for aggravated murder and that sentence was executed, the court lost jurisdiction to impose a second sentence on him for that crime.4 Defendant is correct that the trial court lacked authority to modify the executed sentence on counts 2, 5, and 6. See State v. Leathers, 271 Or. 236, 240, 531 P.2d 901 (1975)
(. ) The trial court, however, did not purport to modify that sentence. Rather, it imposed a separate sentence on the new aggravated murder convictions on counts 1, 3, and 4. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him on those new aggravated murder convictions, nor is any apparent. See State v. Terry, 333 Or. 163, 186, 37 P.3d 157 (2001) ( ).5
Defendant may be making an alternative jurisdictional argument based on State v. Highland, 28 Or.App. 251, 558 P.2d 1298 (1977). He may be arguing that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Barrett, the trial court was required to merge the conviction on the second set of aggravated murder convictions (counts 1, 3, and 4) with the first set of aggravated murder convictions (counts 2, 5, and 6). However, the trial court lacked authority to do that because defendant had begun serving the sentence on the first set of aggravated murder convictions. Defendant reasons,
Defendant's alternative jurisdictional argument turns on the premise that he has a right to insist that the aggravated murder convictions on counts 1, 3, and 4 merge with the aggravated murder convictions on counts 2, 5, and 6. Because all the aggravated murder convictions arose out a single homicide, defendant ordinarily would have that right. See Barrett, 331 Or. at 36-37,
10 P.3d 901. In this case, however, defendant gave up his right to seek merger when he agreed that he could be tried and sentenced on the second set of aggravated murder charges separately from the first. The plea agreement provides that, if defendant breaches it, the state may "[p]roceed to trial and sentencing phase on the remaining counts of Aggravated Murder[.]" Later in the agreement, defendant represented that ...
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