State v. Young

• Decision Date: 10 March 1902
• Citation: 67 N.J.L. 223,51 A. 939
• Parties: STATE v. YOUNG.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

51 A. 939

67 N.J.L. 223

STATE

v. YOUNG.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 10, 1902.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to court of oyer and terminer, Burlington county.

John Young was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Charles K. Chambers and Eckard P. Budd, for plaintiff in error.

Samuel A. Atkinson, for the State.

MAGIE, Ch. The record brought before us on this writ of error shows an indictment presented by the grand jury of Burlington county against Charles Brown, Charles Miller, John Young, and Otto Keller, for the murder of Washington Hunter in that county. Upon the application of the prosecutor of the pleas, that court made an order of severance, and John Young, the plaintiff in error, was put upon his trial separately. By the verdict of the jury impaneled thereon, he was found guilty upon the indictment of murder in the first degree, and the sentence prescribed by our law upon such a verdict was duly passed upon him.

The writ of error was taken under the provisions of section 134 of the criminal procedure act of 1898 (Laws 1898, p. 866), which embodies the provisions of the act of March 12, 1878 (Laws 1878, p. 80), under which such a writ of error as that before us has been supported when the case shows that the chancellor has refused to allow a writ out of the supreme court. Kohl v. State, 59 N. J. Law, 195, 35 Atl. 652. It brings before us the entire record of the proceedings had upon the trial of the indictment pursuant to the provisions of section 136 of the criminal procedure act of 1898. By those provisions, we are not only to review any errors of law brought to our attention by bills of exception, but also to determine whether, from the record, the plaintiff in error appears to have suffered manifest wrong or injury in the respects included in section 136. But by the provisions of section 137 the plaintiff in error is expressly required to specify the causes relied on for relief or reversal, and to serve such specification on the representative of the state. The state of the case before us discloses no cause for relief or reversal specified by the plaintiff in error as required by the provisions of section 137. There are assignments of error upon the record, and bills of exceptions. Doubtless such assignments present for consideration any alleged errors of law thus pointed out. By a supplement to the then existing criminal procedure act, approved May 9, 1894 (1 Gen. St p. 1154, § 170), it was enacted that a plaintiff in error in any criminal cause might bring up with his writ of error the entire record of the proceedings upon the trial; and the reviewing court was expressly required to consider and adjudge upon such entire record, and to order a new trial if it appeared therefrom that the plaintiff in error had suffered manifest wrong in certain respects particularly stated in the act. There was, however, no provision in that legislation requiring the plaintiff in error to point out by assignments of error or specification of causes the particulars in respect to which he claimed he had suffered wrong or injury. But while that legislation remained unaltered, this court, in dealing with a writ of error the return to which presented the entire record of the proceedings at the trial, determined that, in reviewing the admission of evidence which was the subject of a bill of exceptions, it would look at the entire record. Roesel v. State, 62 N. J. Law, 216, 41 Atl. 408. The act of 1894 was repealed in 1898 (Laws 1898, p. 934), and some (not all) of its provisions were re-enacted in section 136 of the criminal procedure act of 1898, ubi supra. The legislature thought proper to add the provisions of section 137, and thereby declared that, when a plaintiff in error elected to take up the entire record, he should not be confined to his bill of exceptions, or required to assign error thereon, but he was expressly directed to specify the causes relied on for relief or reversal, and to serve a copy thereof upon the representative of the state by a time fixed. It is to be observed that the legislature has not in express terms limited the consideration of the reviewing court to errors pointed out by bills of exception and assignment of error, or causes for relief or reversal specified in conformity with section 137, nor has it expressly provided that such causes shall be filed and made part of the record. But the clear implication is that the review is to be confined to matters of which the state is apprised either by assignment of error or specification of causes.

The argument in behalf of the plaintiff in error for a reversal of judgment is first and primarily put upon the third assignment of error, which is based upon an exception duly taken to the ruling of the trial court admitting in evidence a written statement made by plaintiff in error when in custody in the city of New York under a charge of the crime in question. Before the ruling thus challenged was made, the bill of exceptions shows that the prosecutor for the state had taken the testimony of witnesses to the circumstances which preceded and accompanied the making and signing of the statement, and the plaintiff in error had called and examined Otto Keller, one of the defendants, and had offered himself as a witness, and been admitted to testify in respect thereto. After this preliminary examination, the ruling brought in question by this exception was made. The law applicable to the admission in evidence against persons charged with crime of a confession of guilt, or of an admission of facts offered and tending to prove guilt has been lately laid down by this court in the able and exhaustive opinion of Chief Justice Depue delivered in the case of Roesel v. State, ubi supra. It is unnecessary, therefore, to discuss the principles on which such evidence is admitted, or the limitations of its admission. It is sufficient to indicate briefly the rules therein settled to be applicable: To render admissible in evidence such a statement it must be shown to have been made voluntarily, and the burden to show that it was thus made is upon the state. An admissible statement is one that is voluntary in the sense that it has not been induced by the pressure of fear, or the influence of hope of some benefit to be derived therefrom in respect to the prosecution for the alleged crime. Whether the statement is voluntary in this sense is to be preliminarily determined by the trial court upon evidence adduced by the state and by the accused, if he offers any, and the question before that court is a mixed question of law and fact The duty of the trial court is to find what facts are established to its satisfaction by the evidence adduced in the preliminary examination, and to apply the law thereto, and thereon determine whether or not the confession or statement has been shown to have been voluntary in the sense in which the word is applicable to such confessions or statements. If the facts found have evidence to support them, and the law applied is unobjectionable, an exception to a ruling admitting such confession or statement in evidence will not be reviewable on an ordinary writ of error.

In the case now under review, the trial court performed its duty with conspicuous care and fidelity. The state called and examined all the witnesses who were cognizant of the circumstances preceding the making of the statement by the accused; the stenographer who took the statement in shorthand as it was made, and who reproduced it in typewriting; and those who were present while the statement was made and when it was signed. The accused was permitted to call and examine all the witnesses he desired. An examination of the evidence as before us in the bill of exceptions clearly shows that there was evidence upon which the conclusions of fact drawn by the court could be supported. As the application of law upon the facts found was plainly not erroneous, the admission of the statement in evidence would not be open to review upon an ordinary writ of error.

But the plaintiff in error elected to bring up with the writ of error the entire record of the proceedings had at the trial. Thereupon he had a right to require this court to consider and determine thereon whether it appeared that he had suffered manifest wrong or injury (among other things) in the admission of testimony. The testimony admitted was his own statement it was admitted upon an adjudication of facts by the trial court. Although there was evidence upon which that adjudication could be supported, yet if that evidence, though pertinent was insufficient to support the conclusions of the trial court, the plaintiff in error might well claim that he had suffered wrong or injury by the admission of the statement if he had presented that question by a proper specification that he relied for relief or reversal upon that cause, we should have been bound to consider it. Whether, under the provisions of sections 130 and 137, a court of review is restricted in its consideration to causes duly specified by the plaintiff in error, and whether an exception to the admission in...