State v. Young

Decision Date05 February 2020
Docket NumberOpinion No. 27942,Appellate Case No. 2018-001861
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
Parties The STATE, Respondent, v. Aaron Scott YOUNG Jr., Petitioner.

F. Elliotte Quinn IV, of The Steinberg Law Firm, LLP, of Summerville, and Jennifer K. Dunlap, of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of Charleston, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone III, of Bluffton, for Respondent.

ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE KITTREDGE:

In the course of a gun battle between mutual combatants, a bullet fired at Petitioner Aaron Young Jr. (Young Jr.) missed its intended mark and killed an unintended victim; all involved in the gun battle, including Young Jr., were charged with murder. The heart of this case deals with the reach of the doctrines of mutual combat and transferred intent.

Young Jr. and his father Aaron Young Sr. (Young Sr.) willingly engaged a rival, Tyrone Robinson, in a cat-and-mouse gun battle in a residential neighborhood. The gun battle came to a tragic conclusion when Robinson shot and killed an unintended victim, an eight-year-old child who was playing in the area. The State charged all three combatants with the murder of the victim. Robinson's murder charge stemmed from a straightforward application of the doctrine of transferred intent. The Youngs' murder charges stemmed from an application of the doctrine of mutual combat,1 under which each combatant is criminally responsible for a death caused by any of the other combatants, regardless of whether he fought with or against the killer-combatant.

Today, we hold mutual combat can properly serve as the basis for a murder charge for the death of a non-combatant under the "hand of one is the hand of all" theory of accomplice liability. When two or more individuals engage in combat via a reckless shootout, they collectively trigger an escalating chain reaction that creates a high risk to any human life falling within the field of fire. In that type of gunfight, all individuals are willing to use lethal force and display a depraved indifference to human life. More importantly, an innocent bystander would not be shot but for the willingness of all combatants to turn an otherwise peaceful environment, often a residential or commercial setting, into a battlefield. In a real sense, each combatant aids and encourages all of the other combatants—whether friend or foe—to create the lethal crossfire. We therefore find the law sanctions holding Young Jr. responsible for the actions of Robinson in causing the victim's death. Both men were equally culpable. As a result, we affirm Young Jr.'s murder conviction and sentence.2

I.

Prior to the date of the gun battle, Robinson and Young Jr. had a history of violent confrontations with one another. On the day in question, Robinson drove to the Youngs' house and began arguing with Young Jr. outside, eventually pulling out a .38 caliber revolver and moving toward Young Jr. Young Sr. was present and attempted to take Robinson's gun away. While the two struggled for possession of the weapon, the revolver discharged. Young Sr. backed away, but Robinson fired once or twice more at the ground by Young Sr.'s feet. Robinson then returned to his vehicle and sped away.

This confrontation began a series of armed exchanges between the Youngs and Robinson across multiple residential neighborhoods over the next hour, wherein one side would catch up with the other, shoot, and flee. During the penultimate exchange, the Youngs were unable to locate Robinson but saw his unoccupied vehicle, so Young Jr. "swiss cheese[d] that car"—shooting at it over twenty times—despite the fact that he (Young Jr.) had just seen a group of children playing on a trampoline a short distance away. As the Youngs fled again, Robinson emerged from hiding and shot at their car three times, missing the Youngs, but tragically hitting the victim, who had been playing on the trampoline. Following their arrests, all three men were charged with the victim's murder.

Prior to the start of trial, Young Jr. moved to dismiss the murder indictment, arguing the charge was based on the theory of mutual combat, which was not a stand-alone theory of criminal responsibility in South Carolina, but instead a limitation on self-defense.3 The State acknowledged that, prior to charging Young Jr., the doctrine of mutual combat had not been used to impose liability for the death of a non-combatant. See, e.g. , State v. Brown , 108 S.C. 490, 499, 95 S.E. 61, 63 (1918) ("[E]very one [sic] is presumed to know the consequences of his act, and if one voluntarily enters a mutual combat where deadly weapons are used, knowing that they are being used, and death results to one of the participating parties , every one [sic] engaged in such combat is equally guilty, regardless of whether he used a deadly weapon or not. And regardless of whether he was on one side or the other makes no difference, and where all are participating in the mutual combat, all are equally responsible for the natural consequences." (emphasis added)). The State argued it was a reasonable extension of the mutual combat doctrine to impose liability on all combatants for the death of an innocent bystander as well. Importantly, Young Jr. conceded the theory of mutual combat would apply to hold Young Jr. responsible for murder if, for example, Robinson had shot and killed Young Sr. instead of the victim because Young Sr. was a co-combatant. However, because the victim was not a combatant, Young Jr. argued he could not be found criminally responsible for the victim's murder.

The trial court denied Young Jr.'s motion to dismiss the indictment, noting that in mutual combat situations all participating parties were responsible for their fellow combatants' actions resulting in injuries to other participants in the combat. Although the experienced trial judge recognized the facts of this case represented an extension of the existing case law, he found Young Jr. could be held liable for the murder of the victim based on the theories of mutual combat and transferred intent, agreeing with the State's argument that

it would be very difficult to understand how if multiple people are shooting at each other and someone in the group is killed and everyone's responsible how they would also not be responsible if an innocent third party was shot.

Comparing this mutual combat scenario with the "hand of one is the hand of all" doctrine, the trial judge concluded, "[I]t is not the identity of the victim that controls, it is the intent, the state of mind which led to the mutual combat in the first place and the consequences that followed from that."

Ultimately, the jury convicted Young Jr. of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. Young Jr. appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Young , 424 S.C. 424, 818 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 2018). We granted Young Jr.'s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals.

II.

Young Jr. argues mutual combat cannot be used as the grounds on which to base criminal responsibility for murder, but instead may only be used as a limitation on self-defense. We disagree.

A.

"The doctrine of mutual combat has existed in South Carolina since at least 1843, but has fallen out of common use in recent years." State v. Taylor , 356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003). To constitute mutual combat, there must be a mutual intent and willingness to fight, "manifested by the acts and conduct of the parties and the circumstances attending and leading up to the combat." Graham , 260 S.C. at 450, 196 S.E.2d at 495 ; see also Taylor , 356 S.C. at 235, 589 S.E.2d at 5 ("The mutual combat doctrine is triggered when both parties contribute to the resulting fight."); Brown , 108 S.C. at 499, 95 S.E. at 63 ("[T]o constitute mutual combat, it is not necessary that there should be a positive agreement between the participating parties to enter the combat; it is sufficient if they [willfully] enter into the conflict, upon the impulse of the moment."). The State is required to prove the rival combatants were armed for the mutual combat with deadly weapons and each combatant knew the others were armed. Taylor , 356 S.C. at 233–34, 589 S.E.2d at 4–5. Mutual combat may be the basis of either a murder or manslaughter conviction depending on the combatant's state of mind at the time of the killing, i.e., whether the combatant acted with malice aforethought.

Id. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 3–4 (quoting State v. Andrews , 73 S.C. 257, 260, 53 S.E. 423, 424 (1906) ).

The majority of jurisdictions impose criminal responsibility on all combatants for the consequences of mutual combat. In line with the majority approach, South Carolina law has long recognized that criminal liability may be imposed on all combatants for the death of one of the participating parties because all are presumed to know and intend the consequences that naturally flow from their unlawful acts. Brown , 108 S.C. at 499–500, 95 S.E. at 63. In South Carolina and many other jurisdictions, the criminal liability stemming from mutual combat does not depend on which side(s) the combatant or the deceased fought. Id. Thus, for example, a combatant may properly be found guilty of murder for the death of a friendly co-combatant at the hands of a rival combatant. See id. In the eyes of the law, it does not matter that the combatant did not intend any harm to the friendly co-combatant. People v. Sanchez , 26 Cal.4th 834, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209, 223 (2001) (Kennard, J., concurring); see also Brown , 108 S.C. at 491–500, 95 S.E. at 61–63 (upholding the manslaughter convictions of three non-striking employees/combatants who participated in a fight between strikers and non-strikers that resulted in the...

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4 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Colas
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 22 Febrero 2021
    ...depraved indifference to human life); State v. Spates, 779 N.W.2d 770, 777 & n.5 (Iowa 2010) (same). See generally State v. Young, 429 S.C. 155, 160-165, 838 S.E.2d 516 (2020) (discussing theories of liability for harm resulting from mutual combat, including depraved-indifference murder). T......
  • State v. Bowers
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    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 29 Junio 2022
    ...summary of the doctrine of mutual combat. Mutual combat relates primarily to the law of self-defense. See State v. Young , 429 S.C. 155, 157 n.1, 838 S.E.2d 516, 517 n.1 (2020) (explaining "the mutual combat doctrine is most commonly used to negate self-defense"). This Court has explained s......
  • State v. Bowers
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 29 Junio 2022
    ...played a role in starting the shootout in which Bowers shot Green, then under the same theory that led us to apply the doctrine in Graham and Young, the would make Bowers responsible for the injury to Green. In other words, even though there had been no prior difficulty between Bowers and G......
  • People v. Carney
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 20 Julio 2023
    ... ... causation)."' "An act is a cause in fact if it ... is a necessary antecedent of an event" '" ... ( State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court ... (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352 ( State Dept. of State ... Hospitals )), and it is commonly ... have similarly viewed a defendant's culpability in ... connection with gun battles. (See e.g., State v ... Young (2020) 429 S.C. 155, 161 [838 S.E.2d 516, 519] ... ["The majority of jurisdictions impose criminal ... responsibility on all combatants ... ...

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