State v. Young

Decision Date02 February 1978
Docket NumberNo. 44919,44919
Citation89 Wn.2d 613,574 P.2d 1171
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Rickey Anthony YOUNG, Appellant.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Sid Wurzburg, Spokane, for appellant.

C. J. Rabideau, Franklin County Pros. Atty., Pasco, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Associate Justice.

Superior Court Judge James J. Lawless was killed when a pipe bomb exploded in his chambers. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for that death. He appeals. We affirm.

Investigation revealed that the pipe bomb had been mailed in a package from Kennewick, Washington, to Judge Lawless at the courthouse in Benton County, one of two counties in the judicial district in which Judge Lawless served. A court reporter hand carried the package from Prosser to Pasco and handed it to Judge Lawless in his chambers. Seconds after the reporter left, a loud explosion occurred. Judge Lawless' death was almost instantaneous, caused primarily by a metal fragment which pierced his heart.

The chamber area was sealed off immediately. A cooperative investigation was undertaken by the Franklin County sheriff's office, the Pasco city police, United States Postal Service inspectors and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau of the United States Treasury Department. An officer with experience and expertise in bombings led the investigative team.

A grid work pattern was set up in the judge's chambers. Objects within the grid were gathered, photographed and packaged.

The lead investigator, senior chemist of the United States Postal Service with experience in investigating more than 50 bombs incidents, took the gathered materials to the service's crime laboratory in Washington, D.C. After several weeks' work, he was able to reconstruct the bomb and part of the wrapping, identify the powder and the triggering device and partially reconstruct the letter which was inside the wrapping but outside the container holding the bomb.

The service's chief fingerprint inspector, a man with 25 years' experience in fingerprint identification, examined these papers for latent fingerprints. Two prints were found on the letter which was identified as having been inside the mailing wrapper. These latent prints were compared with 100 to 150 inked prints of various suspects, including the defendant. The chief inspector testified that one of the latent prints on the letter was identical to the defendant's right thumb print. The other print did not match any against which comparison was made.

The fingerprints were then inspected in a totally independent analysis by another service expert, a person with more than 18 years' experience in print identification. He testified that the one latent print was identical to the defendant's right thumb print.

The State's evidence showed that the defendant was a stranger to neither the criminal justice system nor Judge Lawless. In 1972, Judge Lawless had sentenced defendant, who pleaded guilty to a charge of second degree burglary, during which act defendant had fled but had been shot by the arresting officer. Judge Lawless suspended defendant's sentence for the burglary under rather unusual conditions, stating that he was inclined to send defendant to an institution as recommended by the prosecutor, but instead was imposing a 1-year county jail sentence. Defendant was also ordered to neither contact nor receive contact from, other than by letter, a 16-year-old girl whom he subsequently married. Details of this sentencing hearing were presented to the jury in the instant case as obviously bearing on motive for the bombing.

A few weeks before the bombing, defendant was charged with two separate felonies. A revocation of the suspended sentencing was set for preliminary hearing, which normally would be held before the presiding judge unless referred to the sentencing judge. In this case, the presiding judge and the sentencing judge were the same, Judge Lawless. When defendant inquired of his probation officer who would hear the matter, he was told Judge Lawless. He stated he did not think he could get a "fair shake" from Judge Lawless. Affidavits of prejudice were filed against Judge Lawless in the other felony charges pending against defendant.

The bombing death occurred on June 3, 1974. On August 6, 1974, defendant was arrested on federal charges of mailing a nonmailable explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1716, a potential capital offense. On August 7th, the state murder charge was filed and served on defendant while in federal custody. Defendant was arraigned on the state charge on September 11, 1974. A motion for change of venue was granted and defendant went to trial in Spokane County on December 2, 1974; the jury trial was presided over by Judge William Williams. A mistrial resulted when the jury was unable to agree. In July 1975, a retrial resulted in defendant's conviction.

As his first assignment of error, defendant claims he was denied a speedy trial as required by CrR 3.3. Whether we start with the date of arrest, filing, or the date of arraignment, defendant was not tried within 60 days. Are there time periods which must be excluded? We conclude that because CrR 3.3(d)(2) excludes from the computation of time "preliminary proceedings and trial on another charge", defendant was not denied a speedy trial.

Defendant was charged with three state felonies but held in physical custody by federal authorities. In fact, the county prosecutor had to obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to have defendant present at his arraignment on the murder charge. One of the three state felonies pending at defendant's arrest was a 2-count arson charge. Venue was changed to Pierce County at defendant's request. He was transferred from federal custody in Yakima to federal custody in Tacoma for trial, which resulted in a conviction. Judgment was entered on November 14, 1974, and affirmed in State v. Young, 87 Wash.2d 129, 550 P.2d 1 (1976).

Trial on the federal charge was set for the week of December 17, 1974. Trial of the instant case was set for December 2, 1974. The United States then agreed to dismiss without prejudice and placed defendant in state custody for trial.

Defendant was in federal custody virtually the whole time from arrest to trial on this charge.

We agree with the rationale of State v. Chaney, 17 Wash.App. 258, 562 P.2d 259 (1977), that a defendant in custody of federal authorities pursuant to federal process is involved in preliminary proceedings in trial on another charge until the federal matter is concluded or the defendant is released to state custody. There was no denial of a speedy trial.

The second assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of evidence in the first trial. Such challenge requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the moving party and in the light most favorable to the opposing party. State v. Thompson, 88 Wash.2d 518, 564 P.2d 315 (1977). Whether there is evidence legally sufficient to go to the jury is a question of law, but when there is substantial evidence, and when that evidence is conflicting or is such that reasonable minds may draw different conclusions therefrom, the question is for the jury. State v. Thompson, supra; State v. Reynolds, 51 Wash.2d 830, 322 P.2d 356 (1958).

Second, defendant argues that the presence of his fingerprint on the letter inside the mailing wrapper of the bomb was insufficient by itself to carry the state's case to the jury. He relies on State v. Sewell, 49 Wash.2d 244, 299 P.2d 570 (1956). This disregards other evidence which cumulatively made a jury issue; there is direct evidence of motive and other incriminating facts and admissions which are detailed later in the discussion of Miranda warnings.

The Sewell case is distinguishable. In that case the state proved that someone had entered certain premises and that defendant's fingerprint was on the rear door. The applicable statute required entry as an essential element of the crime. There was no proof, direct or circumstantial, that the defendant had entered. Here defendant's print was found on a letter taped to the package containing the bomb, under which tape were specks of the explosive powder. There was sufficient evidence to go to the jury.

The third assignment of error involves an allegedly deficient statement of rights given pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant was arrested by two postal inspectors on the federal charge. He had earlier been one of a number of people contacted by one of the inspectors for a handwriting sample, but after consulting his attorney had refused to give it. When approached prior to the actual arrest he stated that he would "give you the handwriting." He was informed that he was under arrest and was given a statement of his Miranda rights. Those rights were repeated when he was placed in a vehicle for transportation to the federal courthouse in Yakima. Defendant stated that he understood his rights.

During the 2-hour ride to Yakima, defendant was silent much of the time, but did make several damaging comments and asked several inculpatory questions, all of which were testified to by the inspectors. He asked the reason for his arrest and was told that his print was found in the bomb. He asked why it took so long to find the print. He stated that he understood there was writing on the bomb package, but that it wasn't his, it was that of someone else in Prosser. He inquired whether he would be proved innocent if a bomb exploded while he was in jail.

A fair summary of the inspectors' testimony is that they were not interrogating the defendant; rather defendant made spontaneous statements or asked questions.

The inspectors intended to question defendant at the federal courthouse in Yakima and were in the process of preparing a written waiver of his rights when they were summoned to a probable cause hearing before the local federal magistrate. As ...

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