State v. Young

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: Byrnes
• Citation: State v. Young, 820 So.2d 1182 (La. App. 2002)
• Decision Date: 04 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2002-K-1073.,2002-K-1073.
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Michael R. YOUNG.

820 So.2d 1182

STATE of Louisiana v. Michael R. YOUNG.

No. 2002-K-1073.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

June 4, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Damon Stentz, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for the State.

W. Clifton Stoutz, New Orleans, LA, for the Defendant.

(Court composed of Chief Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge MIRIAM G. WALTZER, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR.).

BYRNES, Chief Judge.

This Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction to review the trial court's ruling that granted the defendant Michael R. Young's motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.

At the May 13, 2002 hearing on Young's motion to suppress the evidence, Officer Richard Blackman testified that on January 24, 2002 at approximately 9:35 p.m., he stopped a vehicle on Chef Menteur Highway, when he observed that the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. Although the Officer was behind the vehicle, he testified that he could see the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. The officer stated that from his vantage point in the rear of the vehicle, he could see that the driver was not wearing the diagonal shoulder part of the seatbelt. The driver/defendant Young quickly exited the vehicle and had both hands in the pockets of his sweatshirt. The officer agreed that if the driver can produce a driver's license, the seatbelt violation is not an "arrestable" offense. Officer Blackman testified that Young produced a driver's license when asked.

While Officer Blackman was interviewing Young, the officer noticed a clear plastic bag filled with a green vegetable material that was hanging out of Young's right front pocket of the sweatshirt. Officer Blackman believed that the clear plastic bag contained marijuana. He stated that he retrieved the marijuana, patted down the defendant/driver Young, read Young his Miranda rights, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of the police car. The officer issued Young a citation for not wearing a seatbelt while driving on the highway. Officer Blackman also arrested him for possession of marijuana.

The trial court found no probable cause and granted Young's motion to suppress. The State's writ application followed.

Standard of Review

The appellate court reviews the district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard, and will review the district court's ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness de novo. U.S. v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102 (5 Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 853, 114 S.Ct. 155, 126 L.Ed.2d 116 (1993). On mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court reviews the underlying facts on an abuse of discretion standard, but reviews conclusions to be drawn from those facts de novo. United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885 (5 Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1078, 118 S.Ct. 1525, 140 L.Ed.2d 676 (1998). An appellate court reviews the district court's determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo. U.S. v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7 Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. Green v. U.S., 522 U.S. 973, 118 S.Ct. 427, 139 L.Ed.2d 328 (1997). Where the facts are not in dispute, the reviewing court must consider whether the trial court came to the proper legal determination under the undisputed facts. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixie Ins. Co., 622 So.2d 698 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993), writ denied 629 So.2d 1138 (La.1993).

At issue in the present case is whether there was probable cause for an arrest or for an investigatory stop based on a seatbelt violation.

Reasonable Suspicion for an Investigatory Stop

A police officer may engage anyone in conversation, even without reasonable grounds to believe they have committed a crime. Goins v. Walmart, 2001-1136 (La.11/29/01), 800 So.2d 783; State v. Duplessis, 391 So.2d 1116, 1117 (La.1980). However, the officer did not just engage in conversation with someone on the street. He stopped the defendant's vehicle.

In State v. Broussard, 00-3230 (La.5/24/02), 816 So.2d 1284, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this Court's finding of no probable cause to arrest based on the conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.¹ In the present case, the trial court found no probable cause without stating whether there was reasonable suspicion for a valid investigatory stop.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1A provides:

A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.

Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is something less than probable cause. It must be determined under the facts of each case whether the officer had sufficient articulable knowledge of particular facts and circumstances to justify an infringement upon an individual's right to be free from governmental interference. State v. Albert, 553 So.2d 967 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989). Police need only some minimal level of objective justification for reasonable grounds for an investigatory stop. State v. Washington, 2000-1936 (La.12/15/00), 775 So.2d 1066, citing State v. Kalie, 96-2650, p. 3 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 881.

In assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, the court must balance the need to search and seize against the invasion of privacy that the search and seizure entails. State v. Tucker, 604 So.2d 600 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 626 So.2d 720 (La.1993); State v. Washington, 621 So.2d 114 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 626 So.2d 1177 (La. 1993). The intrusiveness of a search is not measured so much by scope as it is by whether it invades an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Twenty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred Eleven and No/100 ($23,811) Dollars in U.S. Currency v. Kowalski, 810 F.Supp. 738 (W.D.La.1993).

A reviewing court must take into account the "totality of the circumstances—whole picture," giving deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer "that might well elude an untrained person." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v. Huntley, 97-096 (La.3/13/98), 708 So.2d 1048. Citing Cortez, the Louisiana Supreme Court further noted that: "The court must also weight the circumstances known to the police not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Huntley, supra, 708 So.2d at 1049.

Generally, an actual stop occurs when an individual submits to a police show of authority or is physically contacted by the police. An investigatory stop, requiring only a reasonable suspicion, is as complete a restriction on the liberty of movement as an arrest; a stopping for investigation is not lesser intrusive because the restriction of movement is incomplete, but rather because it is briefer than an arrest. State v. Vincelli, 555 So.2d 21 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989); State v. Walker, 530 So.2d 1200 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1988), writ denied 532 So.2d 763 (La.1988); State v. Senegal, 95-796 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/95), 664 So.2d 832.

Seatbelt Violation

The State claims that the officer properly stopped the vehicle to issue the appropriate citation based on the seat belt traffic violation.

Prior to the 1999 amendment, La. R.S. 32:295.1F provided:

F. No vehicle, driver or passenger in a vehicle, shall be inspected, detained, or searched solely because of a violation of or to determine compliance with this Section.

In State v. Barbier, 98-2923 (La.9/8/99), 743 So.2d 1236, the Louisiana Supreme Court referred to the word "detained" in Section F, and found that the statute prohibited law enforcement from stopping or detaining a vehicle solely for a violation of La. R.S. 32:295.1. Subsequent to Barbier's arrest, but prior to the Supreme Court's opinion, La. R.S. 32:295.1F was amended.

Act 1999, No. 1344, amended Section F as follows:

F. Probable cause for violation of this Section shall be based solely upon a law enforcement officer's clear and unobstructed view of a person not restrained as required by this Section. A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a violation of this Section.

In State v. Dorsey, 2000-2331 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/24/01), 779 So.2d 1008, this Court held that although an officer may not search or inspect the vehicle or occupants based solely on a seatbelt traffic violation, the wording of amended Section F now does not prohibit the police from stopping a vehicle, detaining the occupants, and issuing traffic citations when the occupants of the front seat are not wearing seat belts in traffic.

In the present case, the evidence was seized on January 24, 2002, after La. R.S. 32:295.1 was amended in 1999 and was effective in January 2000. Barbier has no bearing in this case. Officer Blackman lawfully stopped the vehicle from moving ahead and detained the driver in order to issue the traffic citation. Officer Blackman testified that he saw the clear plastic bag containing what appeared to be marijuana partially in plain view in the right pocket of Young's sweatshirt.

Officer's Credibility

In the present case the defendant claims that the trial court granted the motion to suppress because it did not believe that the police officer saw the clear plastic bag "hanging out partially from the right front pocket." The trial court stated: "Court finds no probable cause. Inconsistent statements." The defendant argues that the police officer stated that the defendant got out of the car with his hands in his pockets. The defendant questioned the officer as follows:

[BY MR. STOUTZ:]

Q. Okay. Now, it's your testimony that when he got out of the vehicle he had both hands in his sweatshirt pocket?

A. His hooded sweatshirt pocket, yes.

Q. Let me ask you this, Officer....