State v. Young

• Decision Date: 11 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 10278,10278
• Citation: 618 A.2d 65,29 Conn.App. 754
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. James Willey YOUNG.

Page 65

618 A.2d 65

29 Conn.App. 754

STATE of Connecticut v. James Willey YOUNG.

No. 10278.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 6, 1992.

Decided Dec. 22, 1992.

Certification Denied Feb. 11, 1993.

Denise M. Cloutier and Robert S. Melvin, Sp. Public Defenders, with whom, on the brief, was Sally S. King, for appellant (defendant).

Lawrence J. Tytla, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., and Sarah E. Steere, Law Student Intern, for appellee (State).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, HEIMAN and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.

HEIMAN, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1), ¹ as a lesser included offense of murder. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) omitted a supplemental instruction on self-defense when asked by the jury to explain which elements it must find proven beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) admitted expert testimony on the physical force required to cause one type of revolver to discharge, and (3) admitted an autopsy photograph of the victim. The defendant also claims that (4) the state's conduct denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, (5) the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient for a jury to have reached a verdict of guilty of intentional manslaughter, and (6) he was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury drawn or selected from a fair cross section of his community. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. During the evening of January 3, 1982, the defendant, James Willey Young, and the victim were both patrons of the G & M Cafe, a bar on Truman Street in New London. A dispute arose after the victim accused the defendant of spilling beer in his hair. The defendant and victim then left the club separately. Later that evening, however, both men returned to the club and their argument resumed. As the argument became more heated, the defendant told the victim to remove his hand from the overcoat that the victim was wearing. The defendant took his hand out from under his own coat, exposed a large black handgun and struck the victim in the face with the gun. Other patrons in the bar ran for cover when they saw the defendant display his gun. A moment later, a shot went off, the bullet striking the victim in the right side of his back.

An ambulance crew, New London police officers and state troopers arrived at the scene. The victim had no pulse and was transported to the Lawrence and Memorial Hospital. Despite efforts to resuscitate him, the victim was pronounced dead. At the scene of the shooting, the police recovered a disfigured and "mashed" bullet. They later identified it as one fired from a .38 caliber or .357 magnum revolver.

Prior to the arrival of the police, the defendant fled. A friend drove him to Hartford. En route to Hartford, the defendant disposed of the weapon.

Six and one-half years later, on July 29, 1988, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested the defendant in Roanoke, Virginia. The defendant was charged with the crime of murder and pleaded not guilty.

Before the commencement of the voir dire, the defendant objected to the process by which the jury panel was drawn. He requested that the entire jury array of seventy persons be used as the panel from which he could select a jury. The court responded that there were no other jurors in the courthouse and overruled the objection. The defendant also objected that none of the eighteen venirepersons was black. The court also noted this objection.

At trial, the state introduced into evidence an autopsy photograph of the victim taken two days after his death. The photograph depicted the face and shoulder area of the victim. The victim was unclad, with his eyes half-closed. The defendant objected to the introduction of this photograph. The objection was overruled and the defendant took an exception. The state displayed the photograph to the jury and to its witnesses.

During the trial, the defendant repeatedly characterized the victim as violent, although conceding that he had seen the victim only twice before, did not know his name, had never spoken with him and had never seen him with a weapon. The defendant admitted that he removed the gun from his coat and struck the victim. He could not remember if he had cocked the gun when he removed it from his coat. He remembered, however, that somebody bumped his arm causing the gun to fire.

To rebut the defendant's testimony, the state introduced the expert testimony of Trooper Robert Hathaway. Hathaway testified that the fatal bullet had basic rifling characteristics similar to those found in Smith and Wesson, Ruger, INA, and Llama revolvers. He explained that when any of these weapons were cocked, the trigger pull decreased significantly. He also testified that he was familiar with the trigger pull characteristics of revolvers identified as those from which the fatal shot could have been fired. He testified that he was particularly familiar with Smith and Wesson revolvers and that the trigger pull of those guns was in the range of three to four and one-half pounds when cocked and ten to fourteen pounds when not cocked. On cross-examination, Hathaway acknowledged that the range to which he testified was an average, but that the force required for trigger pull could run even higher.

After five days of trial, the jury commenced its deliberations. The jury sent a note to the court signed by the foreperson which read, "We need a copy of the lesser charge." The trial judge recalled the jurors and reminded them of the original charge and the three lesser charges, offering to reinstruct them. The jury foreperson responded orally, "The second charge. The first lesser charge." The court indicated that charge was intentional manslaughter in the first degree and the foreman responded, "Intentional manslaughter. What are the four elements that have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?" The court thereupon reinstructed the jury as to the two elements of that crime. The defendant did not object to that reinstruction. ²

The jury subsequently returned a verdict of not guilty as to the charge of murder, but guilty as to the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1). The court sentenced the defendant to twenty years incarceration. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly omitted a supplemental instruction on self-defense when asked by the jury to explain which elements it must find proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that the trial court's failure to respond adequately to the jury's confusion as to which elements the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial by jury. The defendant failed to object to the court's reinstruction to the jury as to the elements of intentional manslaughter and seeks review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), and State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Further, the defendant did not make the claim to the trial court that he now advances, that the question asked by the jury foreperson about the "four elements" of intentional manslaughter clearly demonstrated the jury's confusion concerning the defense of justification. He argues that the trial court's response failed to correct this confusion. We are unpersuaded that the defendant has established his entitlement to review of this issue under the doctrine of State v. Golding, supra.

In State v. Golding, supra, at 239-40, 567 A.2d 823, our Supreme Court articulated four conditions that must exist before a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error: "(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim will fail." (Emphasis added.) Id. We are free to focus our attention on whichever condition is most relevant to the circumstances of the particular case under review. Id., at 240, 567 A.2d 823.

The defendant can satisfy neither the second nor the third prongs of Golding, that the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right and that the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The trial court's response to the jury's inquiry was adequate and appropriate under the circumstances.

After a period of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the trial court that stated: "We need a copy of the lesser charge. Signed Ronald Plourde, Foreperson." After consultation with counsel on the record, the trial court indicated its intention to reiterate the charges to the jury. The trial court indicated that it would not explain the lesser included offenses fully, but would tell the jury what the lesser included offenses were. The jurors were brought back to the courtroom and the trial judge listed for them the principal charge and the lesser included offenses. ³ In response to the court's statement that if further explanation was desired the court would provide it, the jury foreperson requested further explanation. ⁴ After the court explained the two elements that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of the crime of intentional manslaughter in the first degree, the jury again retired to...