State v. Young

• Citation: 287 N.C. 377,214 S.E.2d 763
• Decision Date: 06 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 46,46
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Ronnie YOUNG.

Page 763

214 S.E.2d 763

287 N.C. 377

STATE of North Carolina v. Ronnie YOUNG.

No. 46.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 6, 1975.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., George W. Boylan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State of North Carolina.

George C. Collie, Charlotte, for defendant-appellant.

HUSKINS, Justice:

Before pleading defendant moved to quash the bills of indictment on grounds that the death penalty as applied in this State violates the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. After verdict he moved to arrest judgment on similar grounds. Denial of both motions constitutes defendant's first assignment of error.

Under this assignment defendant argues (1) that he was denied due process because the death penalty was applied to him in an arbitrary, capricious, subjective and selective manner due to freakish exercise of prosecutorial discretion and (2) that the death penalty as applied in North Carolina is unconstitutional Per se. These contentions have heretofore been considered by this Court and rejected in numerous cases. See, e.g., State v. Vick, 287 N.C. 37, 213 S.E.2d 335 (1975); State v. Armstrong, 287 N.C. 60, 212 S.E.2d 894 (1975); State v. Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975); State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 213 S.E.2d 280 (1975); State v. Stegmann, 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E.2d 262 (1975); State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 213 S.E.2d 214 (1975); State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 212 S.E.2d 142 (1975); State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 212 S.E.2d 113 (1975); State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974); State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973). Assignment one is overruled.

Prior to the commencement of jury selection defendant moved to sequester all prospective jurors so he could examine the veniremen one at a time in the absence of all other prospective and selected jurors. The trial judge denied the motion and then directed that the jury be selected in the following manner:

'. . . The entire number of jurors who are available will be brought into this courtroom tomorrow morning at 9:30 and the Clerk will read over the names of the entire jury panel at that time in the presence and hearing of the defendant and his counsel.

Immediately the first twelve persons whose names are called will be directed at that time to take seats in the jury box. In other words, we will call the entire panel of jurors one at a time by name with the first twelve being seated in the jury box to my left. As soon as we do that, I will direct that the State will call in the presence and hearing of all the prospective jurors a list of the names of witnesses that the State proposes to call or list of names of witnesses that the State will call. As soon as we complete that process, then I will remove from the courtroom all of the prospective jurors except the twelve who are sitting in the jury box to my left.

The other prospective jurors will be taken to the District Court customarily used, but vacant this week, and will be sequestered in that courtroom under supervision of the Sheriff's office during the process of the jury selection.

With regard to the twelve in the jury box, the State shall then conduct their Voir Dire examination of those twelve and shall make any and all challenges for cause against any of the twelve and it shall then make its peremptory challenge. If the Court shall allow a challenge for cause of if the State shall excuse a juror peremptorily, the Clerk shall call a replacement in the box before the Solicitor completes his examination or challenge of any other of the twelve.

When the State is satisfied with the twelve in the box, the Clerk shall then tender the twelve in the box to the defendant. The defendant shall then conduct his Voir Dire examination of those twelve. The defendant shall then make any challenges for cause against any of the twelve and shall then make any peremptory challenges against any of the twelve. If by reason of cause or peremptorily, a juror shall leave the box during the course of the defense counsel's examination of the jurors, the Clerk shall not immediately call a replacement to the box but shall wait until the defendant shall state to the Court that he is satisfied with the remainder of the twelve which remain.

After they have been tendered him by the State, if there have been no members of the twelve removed, the Clerk shall proceed to empanel the jury. If anyone for cause or peremptorily have been removed by the defendant, then after the remaining ones have been stated by the defendant to be satisfactory with him, he shall have replacements called for the vacant seats by the Clerk from the panel at large. Then the State must by virtue of G.S. § 9--21(b) be allowed to first examine any and all replacement jurors in the box and make challenges both for cause and peremptorily before the defendant shall be allowed to question any replacement. At all times the State is the party to be first satisfied with any given juror before he shall be ever tendered to the defendant. Those jurors who shall have been tendered to a defendant by the State and not challenged for cause or peremptorily by the defendant may not thereafter be challenged by the defendant. The defendant may not stand any at the foot of the list or make any reservation of any challenge to await and see who the replacement shall be. Once the defendant has passed, he has passed for all purposes.'

In accordance with this procedure, the clerk called twelve prospective jurors who took their seats in the jury box and the State proceeded with its voir dire examination. In questioning the jurors the district attorney asked the entire panel whether any of them had read anything in the paper about the case 'back in the summer of 1973.' Ten of the jurors indicated in the affirmative. 'At this point,' defendant again moved to sequester the prospective jurors and for the right to examine them regarding what they had read or heard about the case. The court overruled the motion and instructed the jurors that he would permit examination as to whether any of them, or any of the other prospective jurors, had formed or expressed an opinion about the case. The record then recites:

'. . . The Court further instructed the prospective jurors not, under any circumstances, give up (sic) the benefit of your opinion concerning what you have read or heard if you have one. In other words, don't tell us anything about what your opinion might or might not be. The sole purpose of this is simply to ascertain whether you have any opinion or not. We don't want to know what that opinion is and so not express in any way any opinion about this matter if you have an opinion. Simply indicate that you have formed such an opinion and stop at that point.'

The record recites at this point that defendant thereafter exercised all of his peremptory challenges before the panel of twelve jurors was selected, but it is completely silent in regard to the actual examination of the jurors, the number and identity of those excused for cause, and the identity of those excused peremptorily.

Defendant objected and excepted to the foregoing proceedings in apt time and bases his second assignment of error thereon. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to sequester prospective jurors and his motion to examine the jurors concerning what they had read and heard about this case.

Matters relating to the actual conduct of a criminal trial are left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge so long as the defendant's rights are scrupulously afforded him. State v. Perry, 277 N.C. 174, 176 S.E.2d 729 (1970). Therefore, a motion to examine jurors individually, rather than collectively, is directed to the sound discretion which the trial court possesses for regulating the jury selection process. State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury § 197 (1969); Annot., Voir Dire--Personal Examination, 73 A.L.R.2d 1187, 1203 (1960). Compare State v. Roseboro, 276 N.C. 185, 171 S.E.2d 886 (1970), rev'd as to death penalty, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2289, 29 L.Ed.2d 860 (1971), With State v. Perry, supra.

Here, the jury was selected in the manner previously approved by this Court in various cases, including State v. Dawson, 281 N.C. 645, 190 S.E.2d 196 (1972); State v. Cutshall, 281 N.C. 588, 189 S.E.2d 176 (1972); State v. Atkinson, 278 N.C. 168, 179 S.E.2d 410, rev'd as to death penalty, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2292, 29 L.Ed.2d 861 (1971); State v. Perry, supra; State v. McNeil, 277 N.C. 162, 176 S.E.2d 732 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 962, 91 S.Ct. 967, 28 L.Ed.2d 245 (1971). Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's motion to sequester prospective jurors.

Defendant's second contention under this assignment is that the court's ruling on his motion to examine jurors concerning what they had read or heard about the case denied him the opportunity to ascertain whether grounds existed for challenge for cause and the opportunity to exercise his peremptory challenges intelligently.

The right to make inquiry on voir dire examination as to the fitness and competency of a prospective juror is secured by G.S. § 9--15(a). In regard to this phase of the trial, the presiding judge has the duty to supervise the examination of prospective jurors and to decide all questions relating to their competency. G.S. § 9--14 (1969); State v. Carey, 285 N.C. 497, 206 S.E.2d 213 (1974); State v. Harris, 283 N.C. 46, 194 S.E.2d 796, cert. denied 414 U.S. 850, 94 S.Ct. 143, 38 L.Ed.2d 99 (1973).

Regulation of the manner and the extent of the inquiry on voir dire rests largely in the trial judge's discretion. State v. Bryant, 282 N.C. 92, 191 S.E.2d 745 (1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 987, 93 S.Ct. 1516, 36 L.Ed.2d 184 (1973). A defendant seeking to establish on appeal that the exercise of such discretion...