State v. Youngblood, 31765.

Citation650 S.E.2d 119
Decision Date10 May 2007
Docket NumberNo. 31765.,31765.
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Denver A. YOUNGBLOOD, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Benjamin May 15, 2007.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Starcher June 12, 2007.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maynard June 27, 2007.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A police investigator's knowledge of evidence in a criminal case is imputed to the prosecutor. Therefore, a prosecutor's disclsoure duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982) includes disclosure of evidence that is known only to a police investigator and not to the prosecutor.

2. There are three components of a constitutional due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982):(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must have been material, i.e., it must have prejudiced the defense at trial.

Robert C. Stone, Jr., Martinsburg, for Appellant.

Debra M.H. McLaughlin, Morgan County Prosecuting Attorney, Berkeley Springs, for Appellee.

DAVIS, C.J.

The appellant, Denver A. Youngblood, Jr. (hereinafter Mr. Youngblood), was convicted in the Circuit Court of Morgan County of first degree sexual assault, second degree sexual assault, indecent exposure, two counts of brandishing a weapon, and wanton endangerment with a firearm. The circuit court sentenced Mr. Youngblood to 26 to 60 years imprisonment. The order of conviction and sentence was affirmed by a majority of this Court in State v. Youngblood, 217 W.Va. 535, 618 S.E.2d 544 (2005) (Davis, J. and Starcher, J., dissenting). However, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Youngblood v. West Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed.2d 269 (2006), vacated the judgment of the majority, and remanded the case for consideration of whether the State's failure to turn over an evidentiary note violated the disclosure requirement of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). After carefully considering the supplemental briefs and the record submitted on appeal, and listening to the rearguments of the parties, the circuit court's conviction and sentencing order is reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial on all charges.1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Youngblood was prosecuted for allegedly forcing Katara N.2 to perform oral sex on him on two occasions on or about July 28, 2000.3 The first sexual assault occurred at Mr. Youngblood's home in Berkeley Springs, West Virginia. During this assault three other people were present in the home, but did not witness the alleged assault. The three other individuals were Joe Pitner, Kimberly K.,4 and Wendy S.5 When the first sexual encounter ended, Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Pitner left the home. The three young women thereafter went to a nearby house and made a 911 telephone call. It appears that the women told the 911 operator that they were at an unknown location and needed a ride home. After making the telephone call, the three women voluntarily returned to Mr. Youngblood's home.

By the time the women returned to Mr. Youngblood's home, Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Pitner had returned. All five individuals thereafter got into Mr. Youngblood's car and drove to Mr. Pitner's home, which was also located in Berkeley Springs.6 While en route to Mr. Pitner's home, Mr. Youngblood's mother was passing by in her vehicle and signaled for him to pull over. Mr. Youngblood's mother approached his car and informed him that she heard on her CB scanner that the police were looking for three women who made a 911 call. As Mr. Youngblood spoke to his mother, two police officers appeared. The officers approached Mr. Youngblood's car. One of the officers, A. Thomas, testified on direct and cross-examination regarding the encounter as follows:

Q. Do you know the individual that was stopped talking to Mr. Youngblood?

A. I believe it was his mother.

Q. So you approached the car?

A. Yes, ma`am.

Q. Was there any other officer with you that night?

A. Yes, ma'am, Officer Barney.

. . . .

Q. And you approached the vehicle?

A. Yes, ma`am.

Q. What did you do?

A. I talked to the driver, which is the Defendant. He had another male passenger on the front passenger side of the car. There was three females in the car. Basically, I has asked if they had come from that area and if they were the callers and what was going on and if they knew anything about it.

Q. Do you know what their response was?

A. I got the response of, you know, they weren't the ones that called and they didn't know what was going on.

. . . .

Q. You asked the three girls in the back were they the ones that called the police or the ones that needed help?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. And each of them said no?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did it appear to you that these girls were scared?

A. Looking back on it, no, not that I remember and that is why we thought that it was not part of what was occurring.

Q. Were they winking at you or trying to give you secret signals?

A. Not that I noticed.

Q. Doing anything to try to signal you?

A. Not that I noticed.

Q. But based upon your recollection everybody appeared to be fine.

A. Yes.

The two officers and Mr: Youngblood's mother left the scene. Thereafter Mr. Youngblood drove to Mr. Pitner's home. While at Mr. Pitner's home it was alleged that Mr. Youngblood once again forced Katara to perform oral sex on him. This encounter was also not witnessed by the other three individuals present in the home. Shortly thereafter the women were driven to Hagerstown, Maryland and left there.

After the three women were dropped off, Katara went home. However, Wendy and Kimberly were taken to a sheriff's office by Wendy's mother.7 Wendy and Kimberly informed the police that Mr. Youngblood gave them alcohol and carried a gun.8 After statements were taken from Wendy and Kimberly, the police contacted Katara and took a statement from her. Subsequent to the investigation Mr. Youngblood was indicted in 2001 on sexual assault and other charges involving Katara, and on weapon charges involving Wendy and Kimberly. A jury convicted Mr. Youngblood of all charges and he was sentenced accordingly by the trial court.9

Subsequent to his conviction and sentence, Mr. Youngblood filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The evidence in question was a note that was found at the home where Mr. Pitner resided. The note was found by the owner of the home, Patricia Miles.10 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At that hearing Ms. Miles informed the court that the officer who investigated the case against Mr. Youngblood read the note and told her to throw it away. As discussed more fully in this opinion, the note contained language that could reasonably be interpreted as showing that Mr. Youngblood engaged in consensual sex with Katara-which was his defense at trial. The trial court ultimately denied the motion for a new trial on the grounds that the note only had impeachment value and that the investigating officer's knowledge of the note could not be imputed to the prosecutor.

In Mr. Youngblood's initial appeal to this Court, the majority of the Court found that the trial judge was correct in denying his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The majority opinion did not address the issue in the context of a Brady violation. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the Brady issue.

II. DUTY ON REMAND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is once again before this Court, as a result of the United States Supreme Court granting certiorari, vacating the judgment of the majority, and remanding the case.11 The mandate issued by the United States Supreme Court stated that "the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court." The essence of the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court is as follows:

The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial, saying that the note provided only impeachment, but not exculpatory, evidence. The trial court did not discuss Brady or its scope, but expressed the view that the investigating trooper had attached no importance to the note, and because he had failed to give it to the prosecutor the State could not now be faulted for failing to share it with Youngblood's counsel.

A bare majority of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but without examining the specific constitutional claims associated with the alleged suppression of favorable evidence. Justice Davis, dissenting in an opinion that Justice Starcher joined, unambiguously characterized the trooper's instruction to discard the new evidence as a Brady violation. The dissenters concluded that the note indicating that Youngblood engaged in consensual sex with Katara had been suppressed and was material, both because it was at odds with the testimony provided by the State's three chief witnesses (Katara, Kimberly, and Wendy) and also because it was entirely consistent with Youngblood's defense at trial that his sexual encounters with Katara were consensual.

. . . .

Youngblood clearly presented a federal constitutional Brady claim to the State Supreme Court, as he had to the trial court. And, as noted, the dissenting justices discerned the significance of the issue raised. If this Court is to reach the merits of this case, it would...

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