State v. Yount
| Decision Date | 05 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC99317 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. SHAWN W. YOUNT, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAPE GIRARDEAU COUNTY The Honorable Benjamin F. Lewis, Judge
Shawn W. Yount appeals the circuit court's judgment finding him to be a dangerous offender. Yount claims the circuit court plainly erred in sentencing him to an enhanced range of punishment because the State failed to plead all essential facts and introduce evidence establishing sufficient facts to warrant a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a dangerous offender. This Court agrees. The circuit court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing.
Yount was charged with six counts of the class D felony of second-degree burglary following a string of burglaries in December 2018 and January 2019. Prior to a jury trial, the State filed a motion to amend the information, alleging Yount was a dangerous offender subject to an extended term of imprisonment because: "Defendant has been found guilty of a dangerous felony as follows: on or about June 21, 1994 [D]efendant was found guilty of the felony of kidnapping in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, and such felony was a dangerous felony as defined in Section 556.061(19), RSMo."[1] A copy of Yount's 1994 kidnapping conviction was admitted into evidence. The circuit court then found Yount was a dangerous offender.
The jury found Yount guilty of four counts of second-degree burglary (Counts I, IV, V, and VI). See section 569.170 (). Yount was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for each count, which is the maximum level of punishment for a class B felony. See section 558.011.1(2).[2] Concurrent sentences on Counts I and IV were to run consecutively to concurrent sentences on Counts V and VI, resulting in Yount being sentenced to a total of 30 years imprisonment.
This appeal follows.[3]
Because Yount failed to object to the circuit court's finding that he was a dangerous offender, he concedes he did not properly preserve this point. Accordingly, Yount seeks plain error review under Rule 30.20.
"Plain error review is discretionary, and this Court will not review a claim for plain error unless the claimed error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." State v. Clay, 533 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotation omitted). Under this standard, "the defendant bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice" amounting to plain error. State v Oates, 540 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Mo. banc 2018). "Being sentenced to a punishment greater than the maximum sentence for an offense constitutes plain error resulting in manifest injustice." State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133 136 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Mo. banc 2010)); see also Rule 30.20.
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law reviewed de novo. State v. Richey, 569 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Mo. banc 2019). "When ascertaining the legislature's intent in statutory language, it commonly is understood that each word, clause, sentence, and section of a statute should be given meaning." Middleton v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 278 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo. banc 2009).
Yount argues the circuit court erred in finding him to be a dangerous offender because the State failed to plead all essential facts and introduce evidence at trial establishing sufficient facts to warrant a finding that he was a dangerous offender. More specifically, Yount contends the State pleaded essential facts and introduced sufficient evidence only to establish one of the two required elements of section 558.016.4.
(Second emphasis added).
Additionally section 558.021.1 explains the procedure required for the circuit court to find a defendant to be a dangerous offender:
Pursuant to the above statutory provisions, it is undisputed the State sufficiently pleaded all essential facts and provided evidence establishing Yount has been found guilty of a dangerous felony based upon his 1994 kidnapping conviction, satisfying the conditions of subdivision (2) of section 558.016.4. It is also undisputed the State neither pleaded all essential facts nor provided evidence establishing that, during the commission of Yount's currently charged burglary offenses, he knowingly murdered or endangered or threatened the life of another person or knowingly inflicted or attempted or threatened to inflict serious physical injury on another person. See section 558.016.4(1). Accordingly, because the State satisfied only one of the two subdivisions in section 558.016.4, this Court's sole task is to determine whether both subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 558.016.4 must be sufficiently pleaded and proven pursuant to the requirements of section 558.021.1 before an individual may be designated as a dangerous offender, or whether sufficiently pleading and proving either subdivision (1) or (2) pursuant to section 558.021.1 is adequate.
Significantly, subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 558.016.4 are connected by "and," not "or." Generally, "and" is interpreted to mean "along with" or "together with." See Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Mo. banc 2010); see also Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. banc 2016) ( "and" most commonly means "and"). In other words, under ordinary circumstances, when "and" connects two subdivisions, "and" fulfills its role as a logical connective requiring both subdivisions be satisfied. Burns, 303 S.W.3d at 511.
Nonetheless, as the State points out, in rare situations this Court has treated "and" as interchangeable with "or." See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 511 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. 1974). For example, Hawkins held an alimony statute allowed the award of both alimony in gross and from year to year, even when the statute specified the court may, "in its discretion, decree alimony in gross or from year to year." Id. at 812 (emphasis added). This Court explained:
On the disjunctive use of the word "and": [ ]Ordinarily the words "and" and "or", are in no sense interchangeable terms, but, on the contrary, are used in the structure of language for purposes entirely variant, the former being strictly of a conjunctive, the latter, of a disjunctive, nature. Nevertheless, in order to effectuate the intention of the parties to an instrument, a testator, or a legislature, as the case may be, the word "and" is sometimes construed to mean "or". This construction, however, is never resorted to except for strong reasons and the words should never be so construed unless the context favors the conversion; as where it must be done in order to effectuate the manifest intention of the user; and where not to do so would render the meaning ambiguous, or result in an absurdity; or would be tantamount to a refusal to correct a mistake.
Id. at 812-13 (emphasis added). Ultimately, this Court determined a strong reason existed to find "or" to be interchangeable with "and" because of the clear legislative intent to grant courts "full authority to make [alimony] orders tailored to fit the case at hand; orders that are reasonable and just." Id. at 813.
The State argues this Court should follow Hawkins and interpret "and" connecting subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 558.016.4 to mean "or." However, this Court is not persuaded. As was explained in Hawkins, "and" may be interpreted in a way counter to its generally understood meaning only when strong reasons exist to do so. 511 S.W.2d at 813. Here, none of the State's arguments provide a strong reason for interpreting "and" in a way counter to its generally understood meaning. In contrast to Hawkins, in which there was a strong and clearly evinced desire to grant courts considerable flexibility in making alimony determinations, here the State's pedantic grammatical argument about the placement of a colon near a "predicate nominative adjective phrase" does not provide a similarly strong reason to ignore the statute's plain language.[4] In truth, a commonsense reading of section 558.016.4 provides no indication that the legislature intended for "and" to be construed in any way other than its generally understood meaning. See Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009) ("This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.").
Furthermore unlike...
To continue reading
Request your trial