State v. Zeal
| Decision Date | 10 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–0741.,14–0741. |
| Citation | 868 N.W.2d 202 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jason Michael ZEAL, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Colista K. Anglese of Hammer, Simon & Jensen, P.J., Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kelli Huser, Assistant Attorney General, Ralph Potter, County Attorney, and Timothy Gallagher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., DOYLE, J., and MILLER, S.J.*
Jason Zeal appeals from the judgment and sentence entered following his guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine, a class “C” felony. He contends the court abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea and his motion in arrest of judgment. In the alternative, he contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a timely motion in arrest of judgment. Finding no merit to his claims, we affirm.
In 2013, Zeal was arrested and charged with manufacturing methamphetamine, with enhancement. The parties reached an agreement whereby Zeal would plead guilty to the charge, without enhancement; the State would recommend nothing more onerous than a ten-year suspended sentence plus the minimum fine; and Zeal had the right to request a deferred judgment.
Zeal pled guilty to the unenhanced charge on July 15, 2013. At the plea hearing, the court asked Zeal if he had been made any promises as to what would happen if he pleaded guilty, and Zeal responded, “No, Your Honor.” The court then explained the rights Zeal was waiving, the maximum penalties for the crime, and the elements of the crime with which he was charged. The court asked Zeal if he still wished “to go forward with the plea,” and he responded, “Yes, I do.” The court accepted Zeal's guilty plea.
A presentence investigation report was prepared on October 8, 2013, in advance of the sentencing hearing scheduled for October 14, 2013. Although it noted Zeal “appears eligible for a deferred judgment,” the report declined to recommend one “due to the serious nature of the offense, as well as [Zeal]'s lack of accountability for the offense.”
On October 11, 2013, Zeal filed a “motion to withdraw guilty plea,” alleging that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered and requesting his plea be withdrawn. He also sought “all other relief the Court deems proper and just.” The State resisted, alleging the motion was actually a motion in arrest of judgment, and because it was not filed within forty-five days of his guilty plea, it was untimely. Due to a conflict of interest, Zeal's counsel withdrew, and new counsel was appointed.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Zeal testified that he erroneously believed he could withdraw his guilty plea at any time before sentencing. He claimed he pled guilty because his attorney told him it was the only way he could have the conditions for release reduced and get out of jail. He further alleged his attorney told him that when asked if anyone had made any promise as to what would happen if he pleaded guilty, he needed to answer “no.” Zeal testified his girlfriend had “told on multiple people” and cited his fear for her safety as another reason for having entered a guilty plea. He testified that yet another reason he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea was he had now learned that his plea of guilty might cause him to lose his plumbing license.
The State wished to call Zeal's former attorney to testify at the hearing. The court recessed the hearing. However at the continuation of the hearing, the attorney would not testify as to what he had told Zeal unless Zeal waived his attorney-client privilege on the record. Without the attorney's testimony, the court was limited in its review of Zeal's claims regarding what he had been informed of by prior counsel and whether his plea of guilty was a voluntary and intelligent plea. Zeal declined to make an on-the-record waiver of attorney-client privilege, and the court again continued the hearing to research the privilege issue.
At the second continuation of the hearing, Zeal again declined to waive his privilege. The court informed him that if it ruled against his motion, Zeal would not be allowed to waive privilege and have the testimony considered at a later time, stating:
I want the record to be very clear that when the evidentiary hearing closes on Defendant's motion, and I issue my ruling, if it is adverse to Defendant, I am not going to entertain a motion to reopen this record so as to allow Mr. Hiatt's testimony. I don't know what Mr. Hiatt will say if he testifies. What I am telling Defendant, and I want to be very clear, is that given my ruling, Defendant does not get the benefit of seeing how the Court rules and then getting another bite at calling Mr. Hiatt as a witness. Defendant either has Mr. Hiatt testify now or not at all in connection with this proceeding.
Zeal again declined to waive his privilege.
The district court denied Zeal's motion at the close of the second continuation of the hearing. As a motion in arrest of judgment, the court found the motion was untimely. It then denied the motion to withdraw guilty plea, finding Zeal was not credible because the testimony he gave at the hearing contradicted the statements he made when he pled guilty, showing “that he will say what he thinks he needs to say in order to get what he wants given the situation.” It found Zeal's statement at the plea hearing that he was not promised anything in exchange for his plea was truthful. It found no merit in the other issues Zeal raised.
The court sentenced Zeal to an indeterminate term of incarceration, not to exceed ten years. It suspended the sentence and placed Zeal on five years of probation. Zeal was also fined $1000, and ordered to pay a surcharge and other court costs.
Zeal filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the court's ruling on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
We review motions in arrest of judgment and motions to withdraw a plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds. Id. A ruling is untenable when the law is erroneously applied. Id.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(1) states that “[a]t any time before judgment, the court may permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn and substituted.” We uphold the court's refusal to allow withdrawal “where a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandably and without fear or persuasion.” State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, if Zeal's plea was knowing and voluntary, we will affirm the denial of his motion to withdrawal.
“To ensure that a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, trial courts must follow the colloquy set forth in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b).” Id. at 597 (internal quotation marks omitted). This includes informing the defendant of the nature of the charge, the mandatory minimum punishment and maximum possible punishment, the effect a conviction or deferral of judgment or sentence may have on the defendant's immigration status, the constitutional rights afforded at trial, and the defendant's waiver of the right to a trial by pleading guilty. Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). There is no claim the district court failed to comply with the requirements of the rule. However, the defendant is entitled to rely on statements made by the court regardless of whether they are required under rule 2.8(2)(b). Stovall v. State, 340 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1983). If the court makes a misstatement that is part of the inducement for a defendant's decision to plead guilty that is not corrected and the defendant enters a guilty plea accordingly, the plea is not intelligently and voluntarily made. Id.
Zeal first argues the court misstated the time in which he could withdraw his guilty plea. Zeal claims he believed he could withdraw his guilty plea at any time before sentencing. He argues his confusion over his ability to withdraw his plea shows he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea.
The court made the following statement during the plea hearing:
Lastly, if you change your mind for any reason while we're talking about your rights, you decide that you don't want to enter this plea agreement, you don't have to tell me why. Just tell me that you don't want to go forward with the plea agreement and we'll stop and I will reset the case for trial, okay?
The statement made by the court clearly limits the time in which he could change his mind to “while we're talking about your rights.” No misstatement was made. Although Zeal claims he interpreted this statement to mean he could withdraw his plea at any time, the district court found his testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw was not credible. Giving this finding the deference it is due, we conclude Zeal failed to show the court abused its discretion in denying his motion on his ground.
Zeal also argues he would not have pled guilty if he had known it would cause him to lose his license as a plumber. To ensure a defendant's due process rights are protected, the court must ensure the defendant understands the direct consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 1998). A direct consequence “represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of defendant's punishment.” Id. The loss of his professional license is not a direct result of Zeal's guilty plea, nor is it punishment. Because it is not a direct consequence of his plea, the court had no duty to inform Zeal of the possibility he would lose his license as a plumber by pleading guilty. See State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d 598, 605 (Iowa 2009) (...
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