State v. Zullo

• Decision Date: 15 September 1967
• Docket Number: No. MV,MV
• Citation: 236 A.2d 718,4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 573
• Court: Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Ralph P. ZULLO. 9-25044.

Page 718

236 A.2d 718

4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 573

STATE of Connecticut v. Ralph P. ZULLO.

No. MV 9-25044.

Circuit Court of Connecticut, Appellate Division.

Argued May 15, 1967.

Decided Sept. 15, 1967.

Robert I. Berdon, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Peter W. Gillies, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

PRUYN, Judge.

On this appeal from the judgment of conviction of the charge of violation of the absolute speed limit provisions of the speeding statute, § 14-219(a)(2), after a trial to the jury, the defendant has assigned as error two portions of the court's charge to the jury. We test the sufficiency of the charge by the claims of proof of the parties as set forth in the finding.

The state offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that the defendant was operating his automobile on April 3, 1966, in the left or passing lane for eastbound traffic of the Connecticut Turnpike, a four-lane limited-access highway with two lanes in each direction separated by a median divider; that the defendant was passing other cars, increasing his speed so to do; that while he was passing other cars he was clocked by a state police officer for a distance of one mile at speeds not below seventy-six miles an hour and not above eighty miles an hour; that at the completion of the clock the arresting officer signaled the defendant to the side of the road; that the defendant stated to the arresting officer that he was not sure of his speed because his speedometer was not functioning and he was operating by his tachometer.

The defendant offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that immediately on leaving the Branford toll station of the Connecticut Turnpike he was operating his vehicle in the right lane for eastbound traffic at a speed not in excess of sixty-four miles an hour; that shortly thereafter he pulled into the left lane to pass slower moving automobiles; that his speed at that time was between sixty and sixty-four miles an hour; that his speed was verified by his speedometer and tachometer; that on reaching a point marked by exit 63 and still in the passing lane, he noticed in his rear-view mirror a car approaching his rear with flashing red light at approximately a speed of ninety miles an hour; that traffic in the right lane was heavy and congested and at that time cars were in the right lane and it was impossible for the defendant to reenter the right lane; that to get out of the way of the vehicle with the flashing red light he increased his speed in order to pass the vehicles in the right lane; that the automobile with the flashing red light was a police cruiser chasing a third vehicle in front of the defendant; that the defendant was finally able to pull into the right lane, at which time the state police cruiser passed him, signaling him to follow; and that he did follow, and thereafter both the defendant and the operator of the third vehicle were arrested for speeding.

In its charge to the jury, the court referred to the speeding statute as follows: 'The applicable statute is § 14-219 subdivision (a)(2) . . . That reads, and I will read the applicable portion to you, 'No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state * * * at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway, * * * the intersection of streets and * * * weather conditions. The following shall constitute violations of this section: * * *' and it goes on to contain other language which is not applicable. Then subdivision (a)(2): 'the operation of a motor vehicle at a rate of speed greater than seventy miles per hour upon a multiple-lane limited access highway * * *.' There is the issue and it is very simple * * *. If you find here as a fact that this accused was operating more than seventy miles per hour at this particular time and place beyond a reasonable doubt, then, you would render a verdict of guilty. If you find that he was not operating his motor vehicle at a speed of more than seventy miles per hour at this particular time and this particular place, then, you would return a verdict of not guilty.' Again, later on in the charge, the court repeated that the issue was whether the defendant was operating his motor vehicle at a speed greater than seventy miles an hour.

The defendant excepted to the portion of the charge...