State Va. v. James

• Decision Date: 02 May 2011
• Docket Number: Nos. 35557,35762.,35561,s. 35557
• Citation: 710 S.E.2d 98,227 W.Va. 407
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Appelleev.Charles J. JAMES, Plaintiff Below, Appellant.State of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Appelleev.Jerry Lee Hedrick, Plaintiff Below, Appellant.State of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Appelleev.Steven Daniels, Plaintiff Below, Appellant.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

227 W.Va. 407

710 S.E.2d 98

STATE of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Appellee

v.Charles J. JAMES, Plaintiff Below, Appellant.State of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Appellee

v.Jerry Lee Hedrick, Plaintiff Below, Appellant.State of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Appellee

v.Steven Daniels, Plaintiff Below, Appellant.

Nos. 35557

35561

35762.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 26, 2011.Decided May 2, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “The Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders ... under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W.Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997).

2. “The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Rutherford, 223 W.Va. 1, 672 S.E.2d 137 (2008).

3. “When the constitutionality of a statute is questioned every reasonable construction of the statute must be resorted to by a court in order to sustain constitutionality, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment.” Syl. Pt. 3, Willis v. O'Brien, 151 W.Va. 628, 153 S.E.2d 178 (1967).

4. “In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches. Every reasonable construction must be resorted to by the courts in order to sustain constitutionality, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment in question. Courts are not concerned with questions relating to legislative policy. The general powers of the legislature, within constitutional limits, are almost plenary. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the negation of legislative power must appear beyond reasonable doubt.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965).

5. “In determining whether a given sentence violates the proportionality principle ..., consideration is given to the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, a comparison of the punishment with what would be inflicted in other jurisdictions, and a comparison with other offenses within the same jurisdiction.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W.Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981).

6. West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 (2009) is not facially unconstitutional on cruel and unusual punishment grounds in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article III, § 5 of the West Virginia Constitution.

7. “A criminal statute must be set out with sufficient definiteness to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is prohibited by statute and to provide adequate standards for adjudication.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974).

8. “There is no satisfactory formula to decide if a statute is so vague as to violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. The basic requirements are that such a statute must be couched in such language so as to notify a potential offender of a criminal provision as to what he should avoid doing in order to ascertain if he has violated the offense provided and it may be couched in general language.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 431, 175 S.E.2d 637 (1970).

9. West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 (2009) does not facially violate due process principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article III, Section 10 of the Constitution of West Virginia. The terms of the statute neither infringe upon a criminal defendant's right to jury determination of relevant factual matters, nor are the provisions of the statute regarding conditions of unsupervised release unconstitutionally vague.

10. “[T]he purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to ensure that sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the legislative branch of government, in which lies the substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Sears, 196 W.Va. 71, 468 S.E.2d 324 (1996).

11. The imposition of the legislatively mandated additional punishment of a period of supervised release as an inherent part of the sentencing scheme for certain offenses enumerated in West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 (2009) does not on its face violate the double jeopardy provisions contained in either the United States Constitution or the West Virginia Constitution.

Shayne M. Welling, Wheeling, WV, for Appellant, James.Stephen G. Jory, Michael W. Parker, McNeer, Highland, McMunn and Varner, Elkins, WV, for Appellant, Hedrick.Dwayne J. Adkins, Logan County Public Defender, Logan, WV, for Appellant, Daniels.Robert D. Goldberg, Attorney General's Office, Charleston, WV, for Appellee.Dennis V. DiBenedetto, Grant County Prosecutor, Petersburg, WV, for Appellee.Laura J. Young, Attorney General's Office, Charleston, WV, for Appellee.

McHUGH, Justice:

The pending matter involves three cases consolidated for purposes of appeal ¹ to address challenges to the constitutionality of West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 (2009), providing for a period of extended supervision following release from incarceration for certain sex offenders. While the particular arguments of the appellants vary, the collective basis for challenging the statute as facially unconstitutional on both federal and state grounds is that the statutory provisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment, violate due process rights, and serve to subject a person to double jeopardy. Upon completing our review of the arguments, relevant statutes, applicable case law and commentary, we conclude that West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 is not facially unconstitutional on these grounds. Additionally, we find no breach of constitutional principle or abuse of discretion in the application of the statute. Accordingly, the orders from the three affected circuit courts are affirmed.

I. Factual Background

A. State v. James

Appellant Charles J. James (hereinafter “Mr. James”) was accused of giving alcohol to the thirteen-year-old sister of his girlfriend while he was alone with the minor in the girlfriend's apartment. The minor alleged that after giving her the alcohol Mr. James fondled and massaged her breasts. In response to the unwanted physical advances, the minor ran back to her home, told her mother what had happened and the mother immediately called the police. Mr. James was twenty-five years of age at the time of the incident.

After probable cause was found at the preliminary hearing to bind the case over for presentment to the grand jury, Mr. James entered a plea to first degree sexual abuse pursuant to Kennedy v. Frazier, 178 W.Va. 10, 357 S.E.2d 43 (1987).² According to the terms of the September 2, 2009, sentencing order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County, the trial court sentenced Mr. James to one to five years in the penitentiary for first degree sexual abuse pursuant to the penalty contained in West Virginia Code § 61–8B–7(b) (2006). After denying Mr. James' motion to find the extended supervision provisions of West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 unconstitutional, the lower court also imposed as part of the sentence thirty years of supervised release to commence after the prison term is served.

Mr. James filed an appeal of the sentencing order with this Court. He reiterates the arguments raised below regarding West Virginia Code § 62–12–26 being unconstitutional on the grounds that it: (1) violates double jeopardy prohibitions by allowing multiple punishments to be imposed for the same offense, (2) offends due process principles by removing the jury from the assessment of facts regarding the increased penalty of supervised release, and (3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In the alternative, Mr. James argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an unduly harsh thirty-year period of extended supervision.

B. State v. Hedrick ³

Appellant Jerry Lee Hedrick (hereinafter “Mr. Hedrick”) was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. The general facts underlying the felony convictions are that when Mr. Hedrick was fifty-five years old he made uninvited and unwanted sexual advances to a twenty-five year old employee when she asked for a day off. As charged in the indictment, Mr. Hedrick subjected the employee to sexual contact by touching her buttocks and her breasts without her consent and by use of forcible compulsion.

The August 10, 2009, order of the Circuit Court of Mineral County reflects that the convictions resulted in a sentence of one to five years in the penitentiary for each count of first degree sexual abuse, a fine totaling $20,000, and twenty-five years of supervised release upon completion of the jail term. The prison sentence and fine were made pursuant to the first degree sexual abuse statute (W.Va.Code § 61–8B–7), and the period of supervised release pursuant to the provisions of the extended supervision statute (W.Va.Code § 62–12–26).

In his petition for appeal to this Court, Mr. Hedrick alleged various grounds for reversal. Appeal was granted solely as to the constitutionality of West Virginia Code § 62–12–26. Mr. Hedrick's constitutional arguments center on due process and cruel and unusual punishment concerns.

C. State v. Daniels

Appellant Steven Daniels (hereinafter “Mr. Daniels”) was originally charged by criminal complaint in magistrate court with forty-eight counts of third degree sexual assault (W.Va.Code § 61–8B–5) and for distribution of obscene material to a minor ( W.Va.Code § 61–8A–4). As represented in the information contained in the record, Mr. Daniels was twenty years old when he engaged in sexual relations with...