Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton

Decision Date10 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 17510.,17510.
Citation282 Conn. 1,917 A.2d 966
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. Nancy BURTON.

Nancy Burton, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

Michael P. Bowler, statewide bar counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).

NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a presentment complaint (presentment), filed pursuant to Practice Book, 2004, § 2-47,1 alleging professional misconduct by an attorney who already has been disbarred from the practice of law for unrelated misconduct that occurred subsequent to the events alleged in the presentment. The defendant, Nancy Burton, appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing a complaint brought by the plaintiff, the statewide grievance committee, against the defendant for alleged professional misconduct in 1995.2 The trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the presentment because the defendant had been disbarred, and, therefore, the issue raised was not justiciable.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the presentment. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

In January, 2004, the plaintiff filed the presentment that forms the basis for this appeal. The presentment is largely based on an incident that occurred in 1995, which was the subject of a prior appeal to the Appellate Court. See Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 60 Conn.App. 698, 760 A.2d 1027 (2000); see also Fairfield Grievance Panel v. Burton, CV96 0024 (1997). In that appeal; see Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, at 698, 707, 760 A.2d 1027; the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court affirming the plaintiff's 1997 decision to reprimand the defendant for violating rules 8.2(a)3 and 8.4(4)4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court with orders to reverse the judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal and to remand the matter to the plaintiff for further proceedings. Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, at 707, 760 A.2d 1027. The plaintiff maintains in its brief that after it held the new hearing, it decided to file the presentment at issue in this appeal, rather than issue a reprimand. See Practice Book § 2-35(e).

The following facts, as alleged in the presentment, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In December, 1995, the defendant wrote a letter to the then chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court5 accusing three Superior Court judges of conduct displaying "`the stark appearance of judicial corruption.'" Although the defendant claimed that she had "`witnesses documentation and transcripts'" to support her allegations, the only evidence she produced was her own affidavit. The presentment thus alleges that the defendant's allegations were false and violated rules 8.2(a) and 8.4(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The presentment further alleges that in November, 2001, the trial court disbarred the defendant for unrelated professional misconduct that occurred after the events in 1995. See Sullivan v. Monroe, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 370545, 2001 WL 1429246 (November 2, 2001). The defendant filed a writ of error to this court to contest her disbarment. We dismissed the writ of error, thereby upholding the disbarment. See Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S.Ct. 2422, 158 L.Ed.2d 983 (2004). In Sullivan, the trial court had prohibited the defendant from applying for readmission to the bar for a period of five years. Sullivan v. Monroe, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 370545, 2001 WL 1429246.

In addition to the defendant's disbarment and alleged misconduct in 1995, the presentment also refers to four other incidents for which the defendant was reprimanded by the plaintiff, and claims that the defendant "has been guilty of misconduct, involving her character, integrity, and professional standing. . . ."

At the preliminary hearing on the presentment, the trial court, sua sponte, raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties briefed and argued the matter and, in an oral decision, the court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the presentment because the issue raised therein was not justiciable in light of the defendant's disbarment. The court, therefore, dismissed the presentment.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the presentment. The Appellate Court agreed and concluded that the matter was justiciable, even though the defendant had been disbarred for subsequent unrelated professional misconduct, because it was capable of being adjudicated and a determination of the controversy could result in practical relief to the plaintiff. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 88 Conn.App. 523, 532-33, 871 A.2d 380 (2005). Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id., at 533, 871 A.2d 380. The defendant now appeals from that judgment, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the presentment because the issue of her alleged misconduct is not justiciable in light of her disbarment.

Our standard of review is well established. "We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 532-33, 911 A.2d 712 (2006). Similarly, an issue regarding justiciability implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction and raises a question of law over which our review is plenary. Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 568-69, 858 A.2d 709 (2004).

We begin by noting that subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability are closely related concepts. "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005). Justiciability involves the authority of the court to resolve actual controversies. Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, 271 Conn. at 568, 858 A.2d 709. "`Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.' State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 111, 445 A.2d 304 (1982). `Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute. . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.' . . . . Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 481, 803 A.2d 318 (2002). As we have recognized, justiciability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine. . . . Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 346-48, 844 A.2d 211 (2004)." Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, at 568-69, 858 A.2d 709. Consequently, a court may have subject matter jurisdiction over certain types of controversies in general, but may not have jurisdiction in any given case because the issue is not justiciable.

In the present case, the trial court recognized that it possessed the requisite authority to adjudicate disciplinary matters involving attorneys. See Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 553-54, 663 A.2d 317 (1995) ("The Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar. . . . The judiciary has the power to admit attorneys to practice and to disbar them . . . to fix the qualifications of those to be admitted . . . and to define what constitutes the practice of law. . . . In the exercise of its disciplinary power, the Superior Court has adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility." [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812, 817, 601 A.2d 1021 (1992) ("[f]ixing the qualifications for, as well as admitting persons to, the practice of law in this state has ever been an exercise of judicial power" [internal quotation marks omitted]). The trial court determined, however, that the third prong of the justiciability doctrine had not been satisfied because the court did not have authority to adjudicate a matter involving a disbarred attorney. It also concluded that the fourth prong had not been satisfied because the defendant's disbarment meant that a judicial determination of the controversy could not result in any practical relief to the plaintiff. We disagree.

With respect to the third prong, we set forth the applicable statutory provisions and rules of practice. General Statutes § 51-80 provides in relevant part: "The Superior Court may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor, in accordance with the rules established by the judges of the Superior Court. . . ." General Statutes § 51-84(a) provides in relevant part: "Attorneys admitted by the Superior Court . . . shall be subject...

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