Statham v. The State Of Ga.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1871 |
| Citation | 41 Ga. 507 |
| Parties | W. R. STATHAM, plaintiff in error. v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, defendant in error. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
*Obstructing legal process. Criminal law and practice.
Before Judge Harrell. Webster Superior Court. September Term, 1870.
Statham was indicted for obstructing legal process. The indictment does not appear in the record, nor does the order appointing a Solicitor pro tern. It is said that the Solicitor General, S. Wise Parker, drew the indictment and subsequently undertook to nol. pros, it, and that afterwards a Solicitor pro tern, was appointed.
When the case came on for trial, defendant's counsel moved to quash the indictment, stating that Parker, Solicitor General, had nol. prossed the bill, but that the order had not been entered upon the minuts of the Court, because the presiding Judge had ordered the Clerk not to put it upon the minutes. And they proposed to have said order entered nunc pro tunc. In support of this motion, Parker testified that he is the Solicitor General of said Circuit, and as such entered a nol. pros, in said case, and handed to the Clerk the following:
He further testified, that he received all the Clerk's and Sheriff's costs at March Term, 1870, gave defendant his costs, and intended to enter the nol. pros, then, but did not; that "nol. prossed" was written by him on the bill, but not till after Colonel Goode was appointed Solicitor pro tern, to represent the State in said case. The Clerk testified that, on the first day of the present term, Parker handed him the paper quoted above, but that he did not enter it upon the minutes, because the Judge had ordered him not to enter it, "unless it was signed by the presiding Judge." It was also shown that $34 35, as costs, were paid to Parker, and his receipt for it stated that he would enter a "settlement" in said cause.
The Court refused to allow the nol. pros, to be entered *upon the minutes—said the bill was not nol. prosed, nor was the case settled, because he had not consented to either.
Defendant's counsel then objected to the appointment of Goode as Solicitor pro tem., because he did not reside in the circuit. Goode admitted that he did not reside in the circuit, but stated that he practiced in it regularly. The Court held Goode a competent Solicitor pro tem.
As Goode was about to proceed with the case, defendant's counsel objected, saying, that what he called the indictment was but a presentment of the Grand Jury, and offered to prove by Parker that, in "drawing the bill, " he put the name of John T. Wharton on it, but could not swear that Wharton knew it, or authorized it, or that he gave his consent that it should be done; that he used Wharton's name as prosecutor, because Wharton was the officer whom defendant was charged with having resisted; that at March Term he consented to settle the case at the request of Wharton, Wharton then knowing that his name was "on the bill" as prosecutor and making no objection thereto. Goode asked time to prepare an indictment, but the Court held said paper to be an indictment and ordered the cause to proceed. Defendant's counsel proposed then to prove by Wharton, that his name was put upon the indictment, as prosecutor, without his knowledge, consent, or authority, but the Court would not hear this. The trial proceeded.
Wharton was examined as a witness. During his examination, Goode asked him: "When you went to arrest defendant, did he not resist the arrest?" This question was objected to as leading. The Court, thinking Wharton reluctant to testify, overruled the objection.
Wharton then testified that he had a bench warrant against Statham for assault and battery, went to Statham and told him he must give bond or go to jail; Statham said he would go to jail, walked a few steps with Wharton and then stopped and said, he would not give bond, and that, before he would to to jail, he would cut Wharton's throat from ear to ear. Wharton went into the Court-house, and when he came outagain, Statham "was still striking around." Wharton summoned *some men and arrested him by force, caught hold of Statham\'s hand, in which he had a stick, bent it under his (Wharton\'s) arm, and called the others to help. Statham struggled, and they "closed up."
He refused to go to jail or give security; did not go to jail willingly—he was "toted up." Wharton said Statham did not resist at first, and that he had tried to get bail for him, to keep him from getting into further difficulty; that he kept jerking back, but they put him in jail.
The evidence being closed and argument had, the Court charged the jury, that "if defendant acted against, resisted, either by physical means, by argument or other means, or placed himself in front or acted against the sheriff; or if he withstood, strove against, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stryker v. State
...99 (1985); McCook v. State, 145 Ga. App. 3(2), 243 S.E.2d 289 (1978); Vince v. State, 113 Ga. 1070, 39 S.E. 435 (1901); Statham v. State, 41 Ga. 507, 512(3) (1871). But these cases have no application here because force is no longer an element of misdemeanor obstruction. Stryker's reliance ......
-
Woodward v. Gray
...does not constitute obstruction of a police officer. See Moccia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 764, 331 S.E.2d 99 (1985); see also Statham v. State, 41 Ga. 507, 513(3) (1871); McCook v. State, 145 Ga.App. 3, 5(2), 243 S.E.2d 289 (1978). To obstruct, resist, or oppose for purposes of obstructing an o......
-
Webb v. Ethridge, 87-8716
...that argument becomes violent so as to amount to something calculated to force the officer to desist.' " Id. (quoting Statham v. State, 41 Ga. 507, 512-13 (1871)). "[T]o obstruct an officer there must be some evidence of forcible resistance or objection to the officer (not mere argument) in......
-
People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer
...prosecutor cannot dismiss a prosecution without the concurrence of the court. Newsom v. State, 2 Ga. 60;Durham v. State, 9 Ga. 306;Stathan v. State, 41 Ga. 507. But in the latter case the court said that before the passage of the statute there was no authority of the solicitor general to en......