Staton v. Maries County, 88-1161

• Decision Date: 24 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1161,88-1161
• Citation: 868 F.2d 996
• Parties: 49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 309, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,763 Charlotte P. STATON, Appellant, v. MARIES COUNTY; Milford French, Sheriff, individually and as Sheriff of Maries County, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 996

868 F.2d 996

49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 309,

49 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,763

Charlotte P. STATON, Appellant, v. MARIES COUNTY; Milford French, Sheriff, individually and as Sheriff of Maries County, Appellees.

No. 88-1161.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 16, 1988.

Decided Feb. 28, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 24, 1989.

Carolyn J. Biermann, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Jim Elliott, Vienna, Mo., for appellees.

Before McMILLIAN and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, Charlotte P. Staton challenges the district court's ¹ order entering judgment in favor of defendants Maries County and Sheriff Milford French, and dismissing Staton's sexual harassment claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. (Title VII). For reversal, Staton contends that the district court erred (1) in resolving the issue of Staton's credibility adversely to her; (2) in finding that the alleged sexual harassment was not so pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment; (3) in concluding that Maries County could not be held liable for the conduct of defendant French; and (4) in failing to make findings concerning Staton's entitlement to a remedy. For reasons to be stated, we affirm.

This case has resurfaced after having been remanded by this court for further proceedings in Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir.1986). The facts and procedural history are set forth in detail in our prior opinion and need be restated only briefly here. Staton ² commenced this action in March of 1982, alleging that while she was employed as a dispatcher with the Maries-Osage Ambulance District (which had contracted for certain of its services to be supplied through the Maries County Sheriff's Office), she suffered numerous sexual advances at the hand of, and was eventually raped by, Maries County Sheriff Milford French. Staton's complaint maintained that French's conduct constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Title VII. The Sec. 1983 claim proceeded to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the County and French; the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the Title VII claim. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of the district court on the Sec. 1983 claim and remanded the Title VII portion of the action, ordering the district court to consider both the questions whether Staton had proved the existence of a sexually hostile work environment, and whether Maries County could be held liable under Title VII for the conduct of Sheriff French. 792 F.2d at 750.

In addressing these issues on remand, the district court evaluated the evidence and concluded that Staton failed to establish the existence of a sexually hostile work environment, noting in particular that she "may have, to some extent 'invited' [French's conduct]," and that in any event, the alleged harassment was not "so pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment." Although the court held that French was Moylan's employer and that French was an agent for the County, thus bringing the County within the purview of Title VII, the court determined that the County could not be held liable for the alleged harassment because it did not have notice of French's conduct. Staton now brings this appeal.

Sexual harassment resulting in a hostile work environment is universally recognized as violative of Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Hostile work environment harassment is said to exist when sexual conduct " 'has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.' " Id. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (quoting 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(a) (1985)); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.1988). In order to prevail on a claim of this nature, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action. Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013 (citing Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749).

In the present case, the district court determined that Staton established two elements of her sexually hostile environment claim, to-wit, that she was a member of a protected group and that the alleged harassment was based upon sex. As indicated, the court further found, however, that the alleged harassment may have been invited, and that in any event it did not significantly impact upon the conditions of Staton's employment. In her initial two assignments of error, Staton essentially attacks these latter findings, which we review under the standard delineated in ...