Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer
| Decision Date | 23 July 1998 |
| Parties | Theodore STAUDENMAYER, Appellant, v. Linda STAUDENMAYER, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Daniel P. Lyons, Stroudsburg, for Theodore Staudenmayer.
Marion O'Malley, Montrose, for Linda Staudenmayer.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
This case presents the issue of whether the Superior Court erred when it reversed the trial court and found the existence of a common law marriage prior to a ceremonial marriage between the parties. We reverse and reinstate the trial court's conclusion that the parties were not married prior to their ceremonial marriage.
Theodore Staudenmayer (Theodore) and Linda Staudenmayer (Linda) were married in a civil ceremony performed on December 16, 1984. The Staudenmayers had lived together since March of 1976 and cohabited continuously, except for one brief period, until their final separation in April of 1992. They have one daughter, who was born in March of 1979. Theodore filed for divorce on May 12, 1992, with the result being that there were equitable distribution proceedings.
The trial court held a hearing on January 22, 1996 regarding the equitable distribution of the marital estate. The most contentious issue concerned a structured tort settlement which Theodore received from a personal injury from a forklift accident that occurred sometime in 1982 or 1983. This tort claim was settled in April of 1984, and resulted in monthly payments to Theodore of six hundred dollars ($600.00), with a lump-sum payment of seventy thousand dollars ($70,000.00) on April 4, 2004. Theodore argued that this settlement did not constitute marital property because it occurred prior to the Staudenmayers' wedding in December of 1984. Linda claimed that the tort settlement was marital property because the Staudenmayers had a common law marriage as early as 1978.
In support of her assertion that she and Theodore had a common law marriage before the date of the tort claim, Linda testified that they maintained joint checking accounts as Linda and Theodore Staudenmayer in 1978. She further testified that she began using Staudenmayer as her last name in 1978, and that she changed her Social Security card, driver's license and credit cards at that time to identify her as Linda Staudenmayer. The deed to the Staudenmayers' marital residence in Franklin Township, which was dated August 4, 1978, was conveyed to "Theodore A. Staudenmayer and Linda L. Staudenmayer, his wife ... as Tenants by the Entirety." In addition, Linda testified that the Staudenmayers filed federal income tax returns as "married, filing jointly," beginning in 1978.
On direct examination, Linda testified regarding the establishment of the common law marriage between her and Theodore:
Q. At any time prior to 1984, did you and Mr. Staudenmayer say to each other, we're married or anything to that effect?
A. Yes.
Q. When, do you remember?
A. Probably off and on all through the relationship.
Q. And initially, in 1978?
A. Mostly from 1978 on, he always introduced me as his wife and we just presented ourselves as a [sic] married people.
Q. Did you actually tell people that you were Mr. Staudenmayer's wife before 1984?
A. Yes.
Notes of Testimony, 1/22/96, at 30-31. Following this exchange, however, Linda was asked:
Q. What about members of your family?
A. Immediate members of my family?
Q. Yes, did you tell them that you were husband and wife?
A. I didn't tell my immediate family that we were married. Ted wanted me to present that to his parents.
Q. Did you?
A. I just left it to him.
During cross-examination, Linda admitted that she and Theodore had a civil marriage ceremony. She further admitted that she indicated on support papers filed in March of 1993 that the date of her marriage was December 14, 1985, 1 and, in response to a question concerning her marital status at the time of her daughter's birth, she wrote "not married." Regarding the change of her name on her credit cards, driver's license, and Social Security card, Linda admitted that Theodore was not required to sign anything to authorize the change, nor did he do so, but stated that "he requested that I do so." Theodore's attorney then attempted to impeach Linda with questions concerning when she first asserted the existence of a common law marriage, suggesting that she did not raise the issue post-separation until after Theodore claimed that the structured tort settlement was not marital property. Although Theodore's attorney did not directly ask Linda why she had a civil marriage ceremony in 1984 if she believed she was already married, Linda testified on redirect examination as follows:
Q. Mrs. Staudenmayer, you referred to the ceremonial date in 1984 as the legal date.
A. Okay.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. I don't know, the date for legal purposes, I suppose.
Q. But that date has no more significance to you than any date prior to when you and Mr. Staudenmayer lived together?
A. No.
In an Opinion and Order filed on February 28, 1996, the trial court declared the structured tort settlement to be non-marital property. The court concluded that Linda, as the one alleging a common law marriage, failed to prove "clearly and convincingly" that she and Theodore had exchanged verba in praesenti, the present exchange of words uttered for the purpose of establishing the relationship of husband and wife. The court also found that Linda failed to establish, clearly and convincingly, that she and Theodore had a reputation of marriage which is broad and general, and specifically cited Linda's admission that she had not told her immediate family that she and Theodore were married during the time of her purported common law marriage. Accordingly, the court held that the Staudenmayers were not married until their ceremonial marriage in 1984, and that the structured tort settlement, which accrued to Theodore prior to that time, was not part of the marital estate.
The Superior Court reversed the trial court with respect to the structured tort settlement. 2 Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Superior Court concluded that Linda had established by clear and convincing evidence that she and Theodore were married sometime before the structured tort settlement, and the trial court abused its discretion in holding otherwise. Although noting the inconsistencies in Linda's testimony, the Superior Court found these not "fatal" to Linda's burden, in light of the "numerous, objective indicia of marriage." Slip Opinion, p. 5. We granted allocatur to clarify the burden for proving a common law marriage.
Marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil contract by which a man and a woman take each other for husband and wife. In re Estate of Manfredi, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960). There are two kinds of marriage: (1) ceremonial; and (2) common law. Id. A ceremonial marriage is a wedding or marriage performed by a religious or civil authority with the usual or customary ceremony or formalities. Id. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 1501, et seq.
Because claims for the existence of a marriage in the absence of a certified ceremonial marriage present a "fruitful source of perjury and fraud," Pennsylvania courts have long viewed such claims with hostility. See In re Estate of Wagner, 398 Pa. 531, 533, 159 A.2d 495, 497 (1960). Common law marriages are tolerated, but not encouraged. Id. While we do not today abolish common law marriages in Pennsylvania, 3 we reaffirm that claims for this type of marriage are disfavored. 4
A common law marriage 5 can only be created by an exchange of words in the present tense, spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of husband and wife is created by that. Commonwealth v. Gorby, 527 Pa. 98, 110, 588 A.2d 902, 907 (1991). Regarding this requirement for an exchange of words in the present tense, this Court has noted:
[I]t is too often forgotten that a common law marriage is a marriage by the express agreement of the parties without ceremony, and almost invariably without a witness, by words--not in futuro or in postea, but--in praesenti, uttered with a view and for the purpose of establishing the relationship of husband and wife.
Estate of Manfredi, 399 Pa. at 291, 159 A.2d at 700 (citations omitted). The common law marriage contract does not require any specific form of words, and all that is essential is proof of an agreement to enter into the legal relationship of marriage at the present time. Estate of Gavula, 490 Pa. 535, 540, 417 A.2d 168, 171 (1980).
The burden to prove the marriage is on the party alleging a marriage, and we have described this as a "heavy" burden where there is an allegation of a common law marriage. Id. at 540, 417 A.2d at 171. When an attempt is made to establish a marriage without the usual formalities, the claim must be reviewed with "great scrutiny." Id. at 541, 417 A.2d at 171.
Generally, words in the present tense are required to prove common law marriage. Estate of Wagner, 398 Pa. at 535-36, 159 A.2d at 498. Because common law marriage cases arose most frequently because of claims for a putative surviving spouse's share of an estate, 6 however, we developed a rebuttable presumption in favor of a common law marriage where there is an absence of testimony 7 regarding the exchange of verba in praesenti. When applicable, the party claiming a common law marriage who proves: (1) constant cohabitation; and, (2) a reputation of marriage "which is not partial or divided but is broad and general," raises the rebuttable presumption of marriage. See Estate of Manfredi, 399 Pa. at 291, 159 A.2d at 700. Constant cohabitation, however, "even when conjoined with general reputation are not marriage, they are merely circumstances which give rise to a rebuttable presumption of marriage." Id.
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