Staup v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 05 January 1874
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Staup <I>versus</I> The Commonwealth.

Page 458

74 Pa. 458

Staup versus The Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 19, 1873.

January 5, 1874.

November 19th 1873.

Before READ, C. J., AGNEW, SHARSWOOD, WILLIAMS and MERCUR, JJ.

Error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Fayette county: No. 64, to October and November Term 1873.

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C. E. Boyle (with whom were W. H. Playford, T. B. Searight and Collins & Baily), for plaintiff in error.

A. D. Boyd, District Attorney (with whom were G. W. K. Minor and R. H. Lindsey), for the Commonwealth.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 5th 1874, by AGNEW, J.

We think there was error in the refusal of the court to sustain a number of the prisoner's challenges for cause. How far an opinion formed by a juror upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is sufficient to sustain a challenge is not well settled. A half a century ago, when jurors were easily obtained, who had heard nothing of the cause, or so little as to have no fixed opinions upon the guilt of the prisoners, the rule was held strictly to exclude all who had in any manner formed and expressed an opinion.

At the present day, when newspapers, railroads and telegraphs have made intercommunication easy, and where reporters are alive to every occurrence, and the daily press eager to serve up the details of crime, the difficulty of obtaining jurors free from these wide-spread influences, has made courts less ready to listen to this cause of challenge. In the contrariety of opinions prevailing, it is needless to look abroad for precedents, but rather to be guided by the reasons lying at the bottom of the right of challenge. The great purpose of this right is to secure a fair and impartial trial. Chief Justice Marshall said, in the trial of Aaron Burr for treason, that "the court has considered those who have deliberately formed and delivered an opinion on the guilt of the prisoner, as not being in a frame of mind to weigh the testimony, and, therefore, as being disqualified to sit as jurors in the case:" 1 Burr's Trial 367. Chief Justice Taney laid down the following test, says Mr. Wharton in his Crim. Law, § 2981: "If the juror has formed an opinion that the prisoners are guilty, and entertains that opinion now, without waiting to hear the testimony, then he is incompetent. But if from reading newspapers or hearing reports, he has impressions on his mind unfavorable to the prisoners, but has no opinion or prejudice which will prevent him from doing impartial justice when he hears the testimony, then he is competent." It is evident that in the view of these eminent jurists, the opinion which should exclude a juror must be one of a fixed and determined character, one that has been deliberately formed, and is still entertained, and, therefore, in an undue measure shuts out a different belief. This is a prejudgment of the case, and constitutes a bias too strong to make the juror a fair and impartial judge. "But pre-judgment and giving an opinion on the statement of certain facts are very different things." "The first (it was said in McCausland v. McCausland, 1 Yeates 378) implies a strong disposition to favor one side or the other — a determination to find in one way let the evidence be what it may. The last involves the truth of certain facts and...