Stead v. Swanner

• Decision Date: 16 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–CA–727.,12–CA–727.
• Citation: 119 So.3d 110
• Parties: Douglas STEAD and Charlotte Bremermann v. Susan SWANNER, Chandra Sekhar Korrapati, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Srinivas Korrapati a/k/a “Bobby” Korrapati, Kanaka Durga Korrapati, Srinivas Korrapati a/k/a “Bobby” Korrapati, and Sri Lakshmi Properties, LLC.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

119 So.3d 110

Douglas STEAD and Charlotte Bremermann

v.Susan SWANNER, Chandra Sekhar Korrapati, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Srinivas Korrapati a/k/a “Bobby” Korrapati, Kanaka Durga Korrapati, Srinivas Korrapati a/k/a “Bobby” Korrapati, and Sri Lakshmi Properties, LLC.

No. 12–CA–727.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

May 16, 2013.

Terry B. Loup, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Thomas G. Buck, Attorney at Law, Metairie, LA, W. Paul Andersson, Russell K. Jarrett, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants/Appellees.

Panel composed of Judges FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, JUDE G. GRAVOIS, and STEPHEN J. WINDHORST.

JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

[5 Cir. 3]Preston Stead, a seventeen-year-old high school student, drove while legally intoxicated and died after he crashed his SUV in a single-vehicle accident. His parents, plaintiffs Douglas Stead and Charlotte Bremermann, sued defendant Susan Swanner, the mother of Preston's friend, Chet Vaughn, at whose home Preston and other teens drank alcoholic beverages that evening. Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Swanner provided inadequate supervision to the teens that evening by failing to prevent Preston from drinking, despite the fact that Ms. Swanner did not purchase or otherwise furnish alcohol to the teens. Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Swanner breached her duty to the teens because she knew or should have known that they were drinking on her premises based on her knowledge of their past conduct in drinking at her and other teens' homes. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that under the particular facts of this case, Ms. Swanner owed no legal or statutory duty to Preston or plaintiffs, and accordingly dismissed plaintiffs' suit with prejudice.

[5 Cir. 4]On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed legal error in conducting its duty-risk analysis, and thus this Court should conduct a de novo review of the trial court's legal and factual conclusions, rather than applying the manifest error standard. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in its rulings on their pre-trial motion in limine. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in failing to award them damages on their survival and wrongful death claims.

Upon review, we find that the trial court did not commit legal error in its duty—risk analysis, and thus our appellate review of this matter will be conducted under the manifest error standard. Using this standard, we find no manifest error in the trial court's factual findings that Ms. Swanner had no actual or constructive knowledge that the teens were drinking alcoholic beverages that particular evening, and thus find no error in the trial court's conclusion that she owed no legal duty to Preston or plaintiffs under the particular facts of this case. We also find no error in the trial court's rulings on plaintiffs' motion in limine. Finally, because the trial court did not err in finding that Ms. Swanner owed no legal duty to Preston or plaintiffs, no survival and wrongful death damages are owed to plaintiffs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the night of January 27, 2007, Preston Stead, a high school student, ¹ was driving his 1999 Tahoe SUV eastbound on Vintage Drive in Kenner, Louisiana, when he failed to negotiate a right turn from Vintage Drive onto Power Boulevard and lost control of his vehicle.² Testimony revealed that immediately prior to the accident, Preston had sped up and passed another vehicle driven by a friend, Bobby Korrapati. The road was wet and Preston's SUV flipped over several times after striking a curb. Preston was not wearing a seat belt and was ejected from his [5 Cir. 5]vehicle. He died at the scene. His passenger, Maryclaire Manard,³ was wearing a seatbelt and escaped from the accident with only minor injuries.

Earlier that evening, Preston and a group of friends had converged at the home of another friend, Chester “Chet” Vaughn, who lived with his mother, Ms. Swanner, in Chateau Estates in Kenner. Present at the Swanner home that evening were Chet Vaughn (age 16), Srinivas “Bobby” Korrapati (age 16), Stephen Gieger (age 16), Donald Muller, Jr. (age 17), Preston Stead (age 17), Maryclaire Manard (age 16), Doug Collins (age 15), Taylor Michaels (age 16), and Sarahbeth Eumont (age 16). Korrapati, Gieger, and Manard testified at trial. The gathering took place in an apartment attached to Ms. Swanner's house, accessible by a separate door and through an adjacent garage. Korrapati brought at least two cases of beer and a couple of gallons of daiquiris to the Swanner home that evening, admittedly purchased by him with the teens' pooled money. The testimony was uncontradicted that Ms. Swanner neither purchased alcoholic beverages for the teens nor otherwise furnished it to the teens that evening.

Previously, Chet Vaughn had been “grounded” by Ms. Swanner for approximately six weeks because she had found him drinking alcohol at another party. The night of this accident was the first time since then that Chet was allowed to have friends over at the Swanner home. Some of Chet's friends present that evening had also been present at the earlier drinking party at the other house.

The record shows that Preston arrived first, around 6:00 p.m., with gumbo. Gieger and Collins arrived between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. Korrapati, Muller, Eumont, Manard, and Michaels arrived around 9:00 p.m. The teens hung out in the garage and in the apartment that was next to the garage.⁴ Ms. Swanner stayed mostly in the main part of the house that evening. She testified that she checked on [5 Cir. 6]the teens several times during the evening, entering the garage and an adjacent laundry room to do laundry, and also around 9:15 p.m. to ask if they wanted pizza or something else to eat. She testified that some of her visits to the laundry room were also under the pretext of checking on the teens. She ordered pizza for the teens and brought it to the apartment around 9:45 p.m. She specifically testified that she did not see any evidence of alcohol or alcohol consumption by the teens that evening. Her delivery of the pizza appears to have been the last time she entered the apartment or garage. A photograph taken that evening that was entered into evidence showed some beer cans stacked on a table in the garage. No testimony definitively established, however, exactly when during the evening this photograph had been taken.

Korrapati, Manard, and Gieger all testified that all of the teens actively concealed the presence of alcohol at the Swanner home that evening and evidence of their drinking from Ms. Swanner. They testified that they poured the beer into cups instead of drinking it straight from the cans. They said that they hid the beer in an ice chest instead of keeping it in a refrigerator in the apartment. They also testified that Ms. Swanner did not see the beer cans on the table in the garage. They took all of the empty beer cans and other evidence of their alcohol consumption with them when they left the Swanner home that evening.

Around 11:00 p.m. that evening, the teens decided to go to Sarahbeth Eumont's house. Right before they left, Preston went into the house and spoke briefly with Ms. Swanner, obtaining a cough drop from her for one of the girls. The teens then left in several vehicles. After stopping on the way at a gas station to purchase chewing tobacco for one of the boys, the vehicles proceeded down Vintage Drive towards Power Boulevard, at which time Preston began to “race” Korrapati's vehicle and proceeded to pass him. Preston then lost control of his [5 Cir. 7]vehicle when he arrived at Power Boulevard and hit a curb, causing his vehicle to flip over several times. Manard was able to crawl out of the vehicle. After the crash, the other teens stopped. One of them remained behind with Preston, while the others called 9–1–1 and went to the nearby home of one of the teens and alerted the parents.

Preston's blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) at the time of his autopsy was determined to be .119 grams percent. Dr. Gerald Liuzza, plaintiffs' expert forensic pathologist as to the effects of alcohol on the body, testified that the alcohol level in the vitreous fluid taken from Preston's eye measured .142 grams percent, which meant that Preston's BAC had been at least that high at some point earlier that evening. He also testified that Preston's alcohol consumption was a significant contributing factor to the accident.

Douglas Stead and Charlotte Bremermann, Preston's parents, filed this survival and wrongful death action against Ms. Swanner and her insurers.⁵ The suit alleged that Ms. Swanner hosted the party at which alcoholic beverages were served to and consumed by the minors, including Preston; that Korrapati brought the alcohol to the Swanner home and served it to the other minors with the implied, constructive, or actual knowledge, permission and/or consent of Ms. Swanner; and that Preston consumed enough alcohol at the party to become legally intoxicated, and that as a result thereof, died in the automobile accident. The petition stated the following bases of Ms. Swanner's liability: (1) allowing alcoholic beverages to be served to Preston at her home; (2) failing to exercise reasonable and proper adult supervision at a party which she hosted for minors to prevent, limit, or otherwise discourage the consumption of alcoholic beverages by the minors; (3) failing to observe the open and obvious consumption of alcoholic beverages by the minors at [5 Cir. 8]her home; and (4) other acts of non-specified negligence to be shown at the trial of the matter.

In response to the petition, defendants filed an exception of no cause of action, which was denied by the trial court. Defendants later reurged the same exception and arguments that Ms. Swanner had no duty to Preston or plaintiffs. Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging...