Steamship Buena Ventura v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 December 1899
• Docket Number: No. 106,106
• Citation: 175 U.S. 384,20 S.Ct. 148,44 L.Ed. 206
• Parties: STEAMSHIP BUENA VENTURA, Juan de Luzarraga, Claimant, Appt. , v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

175 U.S. 384

20 S.Ct. 148

44 L.Ed. 206

STEAMSHIP BUENA VENTURA, Juan de Luzarraga, Claimant, Appt.,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 106.

Argued November 1, 2, 1899.

Decided december 11, 1899.

[ During the late war between the United States and Spain, and on May 27, 1898, the district court of the United States for the southern district of Florida condemned the steamship Buena Ventura as lawful prize of war, on the ground 'that the said steamship Buena Ventura was enemy's property, and was upon the high seas and not in any port or place of the United States upon the outbreak of the war, and was liable to condemnation and seizure.' It was thereupon ordered that the vessel 'be condemned and forfeited to the United States as lawful prize of war; but, it appearing that the cargo of said steamer was the property of neutrals and not contraband and subject to condemnation and forfeiture, it is ordered that said cargo be released and restored to the claimant or the true and lawful owners thereof.'

The vessel was captured on April 22, 1898, 8 or 9 miles from Sand Key light, on the Florida coast, by the United States ship of war Nashville, under the command of a line officer of the United States Navy, was brought into the port of Key West for adjudication, and was condemned upon the answers, given by the master and mate of the steamship, to standing interrogatories in preparatorio, and upon the documents seized on board the ship by the captors. This evidence showed that the steamship was a Spanish vessel engaged exclusively in the carrying of cargoes, and that at the time of her capture she was making a voyage under a charter party which had been concluded in Liverpool on March 23, 1898, between the agents of the owners and the agents of the charterers. By this charter party the steamship was described as 'now ready to leave Cuba;' and it was agreed upon therein that the vessel should with all convenient speed proceed to Ship Island, Mississippi, and there take on a cargo of lumber, and proceed therewith, as customary, to Rotterdam. The vessel was to be at her loading place and ready for cargo on or before the 10th of April, and if she were not, the charterers had the option of canceling the charter. Pursuant to this charter party the ship left Cuba and arrived at Ship Island about the 31st of March, and between that time and the 19th of April she had taken on her cargo, and on the latter day had sailed from Ship Island bound for Norfolk, Virginia, to take in bunker coal, the charter party giving the vessel the liberty to stop at any port on the voyage for coal, then to proceed to Rotterdam. After leaving port at Ship Island she proceeded on her voyage to Norfolk, and about halfpast seven o'clock on the morning of April 22, while proceeding close to the Florida reefs, was captured as stated. She made no resistance at the time of her capture, there were no military or naval officers on board of her, and she carried no arms or munitions of war. The evidence is undisputed that the vessel, when captured, was proceeding on her voyage to Norfolk.

Previous to sailing from Ship Island she was furnishing with a bill of health, in which it was stated that she was now 'ready to depart from the port of Pascagoula, Mississippi [which is the customs port of Ship Island], for Norfolk, Virginia, and other places beyond the sea.' Her manifest showed that she was bound for Norfolk. It is headed 'Coast Manifest,' and after a description of the cargo it continues: 'Permission is hereby granted to said vessel to proceed from this port to Norfolk, in the district of Norfolk and state of Virginia, to lade bunker coal;' and it was signed and sealed by the deputy collector of Pascagoula, district of Pearl river, Mississippi, on April 14, 1898, and the fees therefor paid.

The ship's clearance was for Norfolk, and contained the same permission to proceed there to lade bunker coal.

There was no evidence which tended to throw any suspicion as to the destination of the vessel.

After obtaining all of her papers in the regular way, and having cleared at the custom house on April 14, 1898, whe was detained at Ship Island by low water until between 8 and 9 o'clock, A. M. of April 19, 1898, when she sailed over the bar and proceeded on her voyage.

In the test affidavit of the master he swore that at all times before the ship's seizure he and all of his officers were ignorant that war existed between Spain and the United States, and the vessel at the time of her capture was following the ordinary course of her voyage.

The various proceedings of Congress, proclamations of the President, letters of the Secretary of State, and other public documents connected with occurrences leading up to the breaking out of hostilities between this country and Spain are contained in this record, but are also set forth at sufficient length in the statement of facts contained in the report of the case of The Pedro, ante, p. 138, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to repeat them.

After a hearing the district court, on the 27th of May, 1898, condemned the vessel (87 Fed. Rep. 927), which was sold under the final decree of the court, and her proceeds deposited to abide the event of an appeal, which was then taken on the part of the claimant.

Mr. J. Parker Kirlin for appellant.

Messrs. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt, Joseph K. McCammon, James H. Hayden, George A. King, William B. King, and Solicitor General Richards, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

The Buena Ventura was a Spanish merchant vessel in the peaceful prosecution of her voyage to Norfolk, Virginia, from Ship Island, in the state of Mississippi, when, on the morning of April 22, 1898, she was captured as lawful prize of war, of the existence of which, up to the moment of capture, all her officers were ignorant. She was not violating any blockade, carried neither contraband of war nor any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, nor any despatch of or to the Spanish government, and attempted no resistance when captured.

The facts regarding this vessel place her within that class which this government has always desired to treat with great liberality. It is, as we think, historically accurate to say that this government has always been, in its views, among the most advanced of the governments of the world in favor of mitigating, as to all noncombatants, the hardships and horrors of war. To accomplish that object it has always advocated those rules which would in most cases do away with the right to capture the private property of an enemy on the high seas. 3 Wharton, Int. Law Dig. § 342. The refusal of this government to agree to the Declaration of Paris was founded in part upon the refusal of the other governments to agree to the proposition exempting private property, not contraband, from capture upon the sea.

It being plain that merchant vessels of the enemy carrying on innocent commercial enterprises at the time or just prior to the time when hostilities between the two countries broke out, would, in accordance with the later practice of civilized nations, be the subject of liberal treatment by the Executive, it is necessary when his proclamation has been issued, which lays down rules for treatment of merchant vessels, to put upon the words used therein the most liberal and extensive interpretation of which they are capable; and where there are two or more interpretations which possibly might be put upon the language, the one that will be most favorable to the belligerent party, in whose favor the proclamation is issued, ought to be adopted.

This is the doctrine of the English courts, as exemplified in The Phoenix, Spinks Prize Cases, 1, 5 Spinks, Eccl. & Adm. Rep. 306, and The Argo, Spinks Prize Cases, p. 52, 1 Spinks, Eccl. & Adm. Rep. 375. It is the doctrine which this court believes to be proper and correct.

To ascertain the intention of the Executive we must look to the words which he uses. If the language is plain and clear, and the meaning not open to discussion, there is an end of the matter. If, however, such is not the case, and interpretation or construction must be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the precise meaning of the text, it is our duty with reference to this public instrument to make it as broad in its exemptions as is reasonably possible. If inferences must be drawn therefrom in order to render certain the limitations intended, those inferences should be, so far as is possible, in favor of the claimant in behalf of the owners of the vessel.

The language to justify an exemption of the vessel must, it is true, be found in the proclamation; yet if such language fail to state with entire clearness the full extent and scope of such exemption, thereby making it necessary that some interpretation thereof should be given, it is proper to refer to the prior views of the Executive Department of the government as evidence of its policy regarding the subject. This is not for the purpose of enlarging the natural and ordinary meaning of the words...