Steamship Trade Ass'n of Baltimore, Inc. v. Davis

• Decision Date: 19 March 1948
• Docket Number: 116.
• Citation: 57 A.2d 818,190 Md. 215
• Parties: STEAMSHIP TRADE ASS'N OF BALTIMORE, Inc., et al. v. DAVIS et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

57 A.2d 818

190 Md. 215

STEAMSHIP TRADE ASS'N OF BALTIMORE, Inc., et al. v. DAVIS et al.

No. 116.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 19, 1948

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Herman M. Moser Judge.

Proceeding by Leroy Spencer, International Longshoremen's Association, and others for unemployment compensation opposed by Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc. and others.From an order affirming a decision of Russell S Davis and others constituting the Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board allowing compensation to the plaintiffs, the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc., and others appeal.

Affirmed.

Stevenson Masson and Edward M. Seidl, both of Baltimore (Carlyle Barton, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Everett L. Buckmaster and George L. Clarke, both of Baltimore (Weinberg & Green, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appelleeLeroy Spencer and International Longshoremen's Ass'n.

Hall Hammond, Atty.Gen., and Aaron A. Baer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appelleeMaryland Unemployment Compensation Board.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON, and MARKELL, JJ.

COLLINS JUDGE.

This is an appeal by Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc., Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc., The Rukert Terminals Corporation and The Lone Star Stevedoring Company, Inc., appellants, against The Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, Leroy Spencer and International Longshoremen's Association, appellees, from an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City affirming the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board that for the period after September 13, 1946, the claimants, appellees, were not within the disqualifying provisions of Section 5(d)(1) of Article 95A, Unemployment Compensation Law, of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1943 Supplement.

The Seamen's Union of the Pacific and the Seafarer's International Union, both organizations of unlicensed crew personnel, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) aboard American vessels, went on strike on September 6, 1946.The claimants in this case being longshoremen and members of the International Longshoremen's Association, affiliated with the A.F.L., ceased performing their normal activities at the Port of Baltimore.This strike was settled on September 13, 1946.

On September 14, 1946, the National Maritime Union (N.M.U.), affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), also representing unlicensed personnel of crews, aboard American vessels, began a strike which was not settled until September 26, 1946.

On October 1, 1946, the Masters, Mates, and Pilots Association(M.M. & P.A.), licensed deck officers affiliated with the A.F.L., and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association(M.E.B.A.), licensed engine room officers affiliated with the C.I.O., and all aboard American vessels, went on a strike which was not settled until October 25, 1946.

During the entire period of these strikes by ship personnel from September 6, 1946, to October 25, 1946, the claimants here failed to carry out their normal work of loading ships at the Port of Baltimore.

The Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board(the Board), on January 30, 1947, found that for the period between September 6, 1946, and September 13, 1946, the unemployment of the longshoremen was due to a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute in which the longshoremen, as claimants, were sympathetic participants, and the claimants were denied compensation during that period from September 6, 1946, to September 13, 1946.No appeal was taken from that part of the Board's finding.

Section 5 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Article 95A of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1943 Supplement, provides in part that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits----

'(d) For any week with respect to which the Board finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this sub-section shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Board that:'(1).He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work * * *.'(Italics supplied here.)

The Board further found in its order of January 30, 1947, that between the periods of September 14, 1946, to September 26, 1946, and October 1, 1946, to October 25, 1946, respectively, the longshoremen, the claimants here, attempted to cross the picket lines established by the strikers and withdrew after the threatening attitude of the strikers made it evident that there might be considerable trouble, and the reason the appellees did not cross the picket lines at the place where they were to work, was because of fear of physical violence.Therefore, the Board found that for the period from September 14, 1946, to October 26, 1946, the unemployment of the claimants was not due to a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute in which the claimants were participating or financing or directly interested, and compensation was allowed.

From the order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City affirming this allowance of compensation to the claimants here for the periods from September 14, 1946, to September 26, 1946, and from October 1, 1946, to October 25, 1946, the appellants appeal here.

By the provisions of Article 95A, supra, Section 6(h), the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence in the absence of fraud are conclusive.The jurisdiction of the courts is confined to questions of law.If the finding of facts by the Board is supported by substantial evidence, that finding of fact is conclusive on the courts.The review of the facts is confined to whether there is evidence to support the finding of the Board.In the absence of fraud that finding is conclusive.Article 95A, sec. 14(c);Wiley v. School Commissioners,51 Md. 401;Walter v. Montgomery County,180 Md. 498, 25 A.2d 682;Heaps v. Cobb,185 Md. 372, 380, 45 A.2d 73, 76;Lewis v. Cumberland, Md.,54 A.2d 319, 324;Tucker et al. v. American Smelting & Refining Co., Md.,55 A.2d 692;Mahoney et al. v. Byers, Md.,48 A.2d 600;Brown v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, Md.,55 A.2d 696.In stating the material facts, therefore, we must state as facts evidence most favorable to the findings of the Board.Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co., Md.,55 A.2d 692, supra.

The basic question before this Court is whether there were material facts to support the findings of the Board that the appellees did not participate in the strike of the N.M.U from September...