Stearns v. Kean, No. 65052

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: Considered by REYNOLDSON; UHLENHOPP
• Citation: 303 N.W.2d 408
• Parties: Debra L. STEARNS and County of Los Angeles, State of California, Appellants, v. Michael L. KEAN, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 18 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 65052

Page 408

303 N.W.2d 408 Debra L. STEARNS and County of Los Angeles, State of California, Appellants,
v.
Michael L. KEAN, Appellee. No. 65052. Supreme Court of Iowa. March 18, 1981.

Page 409

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., John G. Black, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Linda T. Lowe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

William J. Trout of Coppola, Trout, Taha & Gazzo, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK and McGIVERIN, JJ.

UHLENHOPP, Justice.

This appeal poses a time limitation question in a paternity and support action under chapter 252A, The Code 1979. That chapter is the Iowa version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).

Plaintiff Debra L. Stearns conceived a child in September or October 1972. Within that time period she had sexual relations with defendant Michael L. Kean. A child, Rebecca Lenore Kean, was born July 26, 1973. Kean denies paternity of Rebecca.

Stearns received financial assistance from Los Angeles County, California, by way of aid to dependent children. On July 18, 1978, she and the county brought an action in the superior court in Los Angeles County to establish that Kean is Rebecca's father and to obtain child support from him of $225 per month.

The superior court found that Kean resides in Polk County, Iowa. The court therefore transferred the action pursuant to URESA to the district court in Polk County.

On June 13, 1979, Kean filed a motion to dismiss the action in Polk County. He asserted the statute of limitations. On August 10, 1979, the district court overruled the motion on the ground that chapter 252A contains no time limitation for bringing an action.

On November 1, 1979, Kean filed a motion to adjudicate law points, again raising the issue of limitations. On November 9, 1979, Stearns filed a resistance. The district court, by order dated February 6, 1980, set the motion for hearing on February 25, 1980. Kean received a copy of the order promptly, but Stearns' attorney did not receive it until March 3, 1980; it was postmarked February 28, 1980. He therefore did not appear at the hearing on February 25. On February 26, 1980, the district court ordered the action dismissed as barred by section 614.1(4) of the Code. Stearns' attorney received that order on February 29.

On March 5, 1980, Stearns filed a motion for rehearing on the ground that no notice of the hearing was received until after the hearing was held and the order for dismissal was entered. By agreement of the parties, the district court granted Stearns' motion, but upon second hearing orally stated

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that the original order for dismissal would stand. The court entered a written order for dismissal on April 10, 1980.

Stearns filed a notice of appeal to this court on April 22, 1980. Kean thereupon filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal as untimely.

I. Timeliness of appeal. Stearns had thirty days to appeal. Iowa R.App.P. 5(a). She filed her notice of appeal fifty-six days after the first order for dismissal but twelve days after the second one. Which of those two time periods applies? The first order for dismissal would clearly have been appealable if the second one had not been entered. Andersen Construction Co. v. National Bank, 262 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Iowa 1978). Does this mean that Stearns had to appeal within thirty days of the first order?

This court has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a ruling that is not a final judgment, except on leave of this court. In re Marriage of McCreary, 276 N.W.2d 399, 400 (Iowa 1979). "A final judgment or decision is one that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties. It must put it beyond the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their original position." Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 810, 812, 134 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1965); see Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 1973); Crowe v. De Soto Consolidated School District, 246 Iowa 38, 40, 66 N.W.2d 859, 860 (1954). A final judgment need not be a judgment entered on a verdict after trial; it may exist in other forms such as a dismissal or a summary judgment in some situations. Orr v. Iowa Public Service Co., 277 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Iowa 1979); In re Estate of Campbell, 253 N.W.2d 906, 908 (Iowa 1977).

Stearns claims that her attorney's absence at the first hearing on the motion to adjudicate law points was excusable because he was not notified of the hearing. A preliminary question is whether the court could rule on the motion anyway because of rule 117(a ) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Although a motion to adjudicate law points comes within the definition of a "motion" in rule 117(d ), see Iowa State Department of Health v. Hertko, 282 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Iowa 1979); Bass v. Iowa Public Service Co., 184 N.W.2d 691, 692 (Iowa 1971), we need not decide whether rule 117(a ) governs the submission of motions to adjudicate law points in chapter 252A proceedings. Neither the parties nor the district court proceeded under rule 117. The application was filed on November 1, 1979, but did not come on for ruling at the next motion day that occurred at least ten days later. Instead, on February 6, 1980, the court set it for hearing. See rule 115. We thus lay rule 117 aside.

The question then is whether the district court, having heard one side on February 25 and entered an order for dismissal on February 26, could, on the absent party's subsequent request and the agreement of the parties, legally hold another hearing on the motion to adjudicate law points and enter an order on it. We have held that a motion to amend findings and judgment under rule 179 is not appropriate when a summary judgment has been entered, for the reason that no trial was held in the first place, City of Eldridge v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 270 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 1978); but see present Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c ), and we have said that the same is true of orders on motions to adjudicate law points. Orr, 277 N.W.2d at 901 (motions for new trial under rule 244 also inappropriate for same reason). In the present case, therefore, if both parties had on February 25 submitted the motion for adjudication of law points for decision, either by appearing or by not appearing although notified of the hearing, the loser could not effectively have filed a rule-179 or rule-244 motion.

But that is not what happened. Stearns did not purport to file her motion under rule 179 or 244. She called her motion a motion for rehearing, but motions are governed by their substance rather than their labels. Union Trust & Savings Bank v. Stanwood Feed & Grain, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1968). Her actual complaint was that the original order for dismissal was not

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binding for lack of notification. Though she captioned her motion as one for "rehearing," she was not really asking for a rehearing but for a first hearing. Her request came eight days after the order for dismissal, and the problem is whether the district court, under the circumstances disclosed, could validly hold a second hearing.

Had Stearns appealed from the original dismissal order before filing her motion for rehearing, the district court would have lost jurisdiction and Stearns could not have successfully asserted a "motion for rehearing." Weaver v. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796,...