Steber v. Kohn, 8683.
Decision Date | 04 June 1945 |
Docket Number | No. 8683.,8683. |
Citation | 149 F.2d 4 |
Parties | STEBER v. KOHN et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Earl J. Walker, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Maurice S. Cayne and Bernard W. Vinissky, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellees.
Before EVANS, SPARKS, and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants on a directed verdict entered at the close of her evidence. The action was brought to recover for damages for serious and permanent illness alleged to have resulted from poisoning caused by wearing a pair of shoes which had been dyed with a product alleged to have been manufactured and sold by defendants.
Appellees have moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that it was filed too late to confer jurisdiction on this court to hear it. The facts as to this are that the judgment was entered on February 1, 1944. Motion for new trial was seasonably filed, and thereafter, on March 2, overruled. On April 28, appellant filed a second motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, with supporting affidavits. Leave to file this motion was duly granted; the court took it under advisement, and, on June 9, overruled it. Notice of appeal was filed on August 11. Appellees contend that the filing of the motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence did not operate to extend time for taking the appeal which started running with the denial of the first motion for new trial, citing Gersing v. Chafitz, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 133 F.2d 384; Dante v. Bagby, 39 App. D.C. 516; Jusino v. Morales & Tio, 1 Cir., 139 F.2d 946. We do not agree. It is clear that the motion for new trial for newly discovered evidence was properly filed under the provision of Rule 59(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, which permits the filing of such motion at any time before expiration of the time for appeal, with leave of court obtained on notice and hearing and on a showing of due diligence. We see no reason for differentiating between the effect of this motion and the one involved in Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co., 318 U.S. 203, 63 S.Ct. 543, 544, 87 L.Ed. 714. There the Court held that a motion under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend and supplement the findings in a patent infringement suit "deprived the judgment of that finality which is essential to appealability." It stated the general rule that "where a petition for rehearing, a motion for a new trial, or a motion to vacate, amend or modify a judgment is seasonably made and entertained, the time for appeal does not begin to run until the disposition of the motion." We think this rule is equally applicable here. The court granted leave to file the motion for new trial for newly discovered evidence, and took it under advisement. Granting of the motion would have required vacating the judgment, hence until disposition of it, the judgment which it sought to set aside could not become final and appealable. Time for the appeal did not, therefore, begin to run until denial of the motion, and the appeal was timely taken.
The motion for directed verdict did not state grounds therefor, as required by Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in granting it, the court made the following statement:
We have set forth in full the statement of the court explaining its action in order that we may have it as a background for our examination of the evidence introduced by plaintiff, and in determining whether or not the court erred in holding as a matter of law that there was no substantial evidence to support the plaintiff's action. It is, of course, axiomatic that the court, in ruling on a motion for directed verdict, must give full credence to all the evidence offered by the party against whom the verdict is sought. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458. In Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 50 S.Ct. 231, 233, 74 L.Ed. 720, the Court said,
Plaintiff herself testified that on October 21, 1940, she took a pair of white leather shoes to a cobbler, Fred Pannucci, to have them dyed black. She got the shoes back on October 23, and wore them for the first time after they were dyed, on October 26, for about three hours. When she took them off she noticed a red mark on her left foot and also that her stockings were discolored. Two days later large spots started to form around the spot on her foot, and from that the rash spread until it covered her entire body. She consulted a physician on November 3, and after seeing him three times, and taking the medicine he prescribed for her, she consulted a second physician who also prescribed for her and then referred her to Dr. Coombs under whose direction she entered a hospital on November 28. Prior to October 1940, her health had been very good.
Dr. Coombs attended plaintiff from November 28, 1940, until he entered military service in September 1942. The record shows that he was exceptionally well qualified in his specialty, biochemistry, and had had experience in treating several cases of shoe dye poisoning. He testified to the serious and permanent nature of her illness which he diagnosed as purpura which later developed into Bright's disease or nephritis, and secondary anemia. He also stated that she would require medical treatment for the rest of her life, but that it would be a losing process and that her prognosis was guarded or bad. He also testified as to the poisonous effects of the benzene products on the human body, naming various benzene derivatives which are easily absorbed in the body through the skin, including orthodichlorobenzene, a highly poisonous compound, one part in 100,000 being enough to be poisonous. He stated that the cause of her condition was the absorption of poison in her body. He also stated that in his opinion, she had been poisoned by shoe dye, but that answer was stricken. He was allowed to say that the poison was typical of benzene or one of its compounds and that in his opinion a shoe dye containing orthodichlorobenzene as a...
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