Stec v. Oak Park Police Pension Bd.

• Decision Date: 28 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1-89-2578,1-89-2578
• Citation: 561 N.E.2d 1234,204 Ill.App.3d 556,149 Ill.Dec. 538
• Parties: , 149 Ill.Dec. 538 Thomas STEC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OAK PARK POLICE PENSION BOARD, Walter Woitovich, President, Anthony Ambrose, Raymond Le Fevour, Peter Von Dreele, and Charles Willet, All Members of the Board of Trustees of the Oak Park Police Pension Board, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1234

561 N.E.2d 1234

204 Ill.App.3d 556, 149 Ill.Dec. 538

Thomas STEC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OAK PARK POLICE PENSION BOARD, Walter Woitovich, President Anthony Ambrose, Raymond Le Fevour, Peter Von Dreele, and Charles Willet, All Members of the Board of Trustees of the Oak Park Police Pension Board, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-89-2578.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Sixth Division.

Sept. 28, 1990.

Stanley H. Jakala, Berwyn, for plaintiff-appellant.

Doss, Puchalski & Keenan, Ltd., Chicago (Richard J. Puchalski, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Justice EGAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue before us is whether a police officer who resigns after applying for a disability pension is barred from that pension because of his resignation. The defendant, Oak Park Police Pension Board (the Board), held that he is so barred, and the circuit court agreed.

The plaintiff, Thomas Stec, was hired by the Oak Park Police Department (the Department) as a patrol officer for the Village of Oak Park on May 2, 1977. He served in various capacities as a patrol officer and assumed increasing responsibility over the years.

On March 17, 1988, William Kohnke, the Chief of Police for the Village of Oak Park, filed three disciplinary charges against the plaintiff with the Fire and Police Commission, seeking the plaintiff's removal from the Department. The plaintiff was charged with having violated state law regarding perjury and department rules and regulations regarding truthfulness in that, in applying for promotion to sergeant, the plaintiff made false statements under oath which asserted that he had earned a B.A. degree from Northwestern University and a J.D. degree from DePaul University and that he had failed to correct such representations which appeared in three of his performance appraisals.

On April 25, 1988, the plaintiff applied for a duty-related disability pension pursuant to article 3, section 3-114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-114.1). The plaintiff alternatively sought a non-duty-related disability pension pursuant to article 3, section 3-114.2 of the Illinois Pension Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-114.2). On April 26, 1988, the plaintiff tendered his resignation from the Department, specifically reserving his right to pursue a disability pension; the plaintiff's resignation was to take effect on April 28, 1988.

The Board conducted a hearing to determine the disability claim of the plaintiff on December 12, 1988. The plaintiff testified that he was sworn-in as a police officer on May 2, 1977 and that he served as a patrol officer until his resignation on April 28, 1988. He had served as a plainclothes officer, a youth officer and a detective. Although his rank and pay remained that of a patrol officer, the plaintiff began to assume increasing responsibility in 1982 when he was placed in a supervisory position as the Department's first training officer. By 1987, the plaintiff simultaneously served as the Department's training, budget and planning officer as well as then Chief Bergstrom's administrative aide. He also handled the documentation for the lawsuits which were filed against the Department and responded to the more sensitive complaints regarding police brutality and use of deadly force. As a patrol officer in a supervisory position, the plaintiff found that each new assignment brought additional pressure, stress, criticism and hostility. Chief Bergstrom and then later Chief Kohnke both denied his requests for transfers.

As a result of his duties, the plaintiff worked 48 to 60 hours a week; he also worked at times as a security guard during his off-duty hours. The plaintiff's problems began when, as a patrol officer, he was given a supervisory role on the chief's administrative staff. As his responsibilities increased, so too did his problems. Specifically, he encountered marital problems as well as various medical and psychological problems, including high blood pressure, an ulcer, depression, lack of concentration, nervousness, thoughts of suicide and alcohol abuse. The plaintiff sought both medical and psychiatric help for his various problems. Although the plaintiff became a member of Alcoholics Anonymous, he never entered a detoxification center.

As a member of the administrative staff, the plaintiff was not required to carry a gun except for a couple of months during the winter of 1987 when, in addition to his other duties, he was required to patrol the streets for two hours each day during Christmastime. By the end of December, the plaintiff realized that he could no longer trust his judgment in carrying a weapon, and he turned over his weapons to other officers. He worried that his lack of good judgment would endanger both the safety of others as well as himself. He finally realized that he could endanger lives by carrying a weapon after a couple of incidents occurred in the fall of 1987 during his job as a part-time security guard. In one incident, he felt that he could have rashly and needlessly shot an unarmed teenager.

By March 1988 the plaintiff concluded that he was no longer fit to do his duties. His judgment was definitely affected by his alcoholic problems. Although he first began to drink after the midnight shift as a patrolman, he did not feel that he had an alcohol problem until after he became a training officer.

The plaintiff explained that his decision to resign from the police force was a process which happened over time. He actually decided to leave the Department three or four months before he tendered his resignation; the realization that he had to leave actually came to the forefront in December 1987 when he was hospitalized. He was on sick leave for most of March and all of April 1988. He did not continue sick leave because he knew that he was not going to remain an officer; he recognized that he could not do the job; and he did not want to be an officer.

Several factors contributed to the plaintiff's decision to resign. Primarily, the plaintiff did not feel that he could do the job any longer; he could not wear a gun; he could not trust his judgment; he had no confidence in his ability. The plaintiff suffered from a quick temper and became easily enraged. He also had problems with Chief Kohnke, who let him know that he wanted to fire him as part of his plan to get rid of everyone who had been assigned to the administrative staff by the previous chief. He had marital problems that caused him to stay away from his Oak Park home which led to an investigation into whether he was abiding by the residency requirements of the Department which greatly upset him. His problems kept building until he finally decided to leave the Department sometime in January or February.

Certain medical documentation was also admitted as part of the administrative record. On March 29, 1988, Chun C. Tsai, M.D., conducted a psychiatric evaluation of the plaintiff about which he reported on March 31. Dr. Tsai diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from major depression, alcohol dependence and marital discord. Dr. Tsai prescribed daily medication and weekly counseling for anxiety and depression. He also prescribed medication to deter his drinking. Dr. Tsai concluded that the plaintiff was not presently fit to function as a police officer and recommended that he take a sick leave or leave of absence.

On September 8, 1988, Anthony M. D'Agostino, M.D., reported that the plaintiff was still suffering from alcoholism and major depression. The doctor found the plaintiff unfit for duty as a police officer. Although Dr. D'Agostino admitted that the plaintiff's history came exclusively from the plaintiff, appearances led him to conclude that the plaintiff's situation was at least, in part, a direct outgrowth of his service in the police department.

In August, 1988, at the request of the Pension Board, Erick Ostrov, J.D., Ph.D., conducted a clinical psychological evaluation of the plaintiff to determine his ability to function as a police officer about which he reported on October 4, 1988. Dr. Ostrov concluded that, although the plaintiff's alcohol dependence was reportedly in remission, he still suffered from significant depression and was unable to function as a police officer. He suggested that the plaintiff's poor concentration and impaired judgment would preclude him from meeting the responsibilities of his position. Although the plaintiff contended that he could never go back to being an officer, Dr. Ostrov suggested that the plaintiff may have meant that he may never want to function as an officer again. Dr. Ostrov recommended reevaluation in six months.

Clifton Rhead, M.D., conducted a psychiatric examination of the plaintiff on August 18, 1988, about which he reported on September 8, 1988. Dr. Rhead believed that the plaintiff's deterioration resulted from his sense of inadequacy following his promotion and reassignment to administrative duties within the police department. Increasing alcohol dependence compounded his deterioration. The plaintiff was neither malingering nor consciously exaggerating his symptoms. Although Dr. Rhead believed that the plaintiff would have responded similarly to stresses in other vocations if they had been as severe, he concluded that the immediate precipitant of his illnesses was the stress which he encountered in attempting to carry out his police duties.

Without expressing any analysis of the evidence, the Board found that "the more detailed and credible medical evidence" led it to conclude that the plaintiff's emotional and mental states were not duty-related. However, the Pension Board explicitly held that it was not required to base its decision on the evidence and did not do so. Instead, the Pension Board concluded that the plaintiff had "voluntarily resigned" from the Department "in lieu of disciplinary proceedings." Since he had resigned from the police...