Stecher v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2001
• Citation: 779 A.2d 491
• Parties: Sharon R. STECHER and Joseph Stecher, Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Reed, Inc., d/b/a Reed Chevrolet Pontiac Oldsmobile and John Doe, Inc. or John or Jane Roe, Appellants. (At 461) Sharon R. Stecher and Joseph Stecher, h/w, Appellants, (At 1667) v. Ford Motor Company and Reed, Inc., d/b/a Reed Chevrolet Pontiac Oldsmobile, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

779 A.2d 491

Sharon R. STECHER and Joseph Stecher, Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Reed, Inc., d/b/a Reed Chevrolet Pontiac Oldsmobile and John Doe, Inc. or John or Jane Roe, Appellants. (At 461)

Sharon R. Stecher and Joseph Stecher, h/w, Appellants, (At 1667) v. Ford Motor Company and Reed, Inc., d/b/a Reed Chevrolet Pontiac Oldsmobile, Appellees.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued September 13, 2000.

Filed May 8, 2001.

Reargument Denied July 16, 2001.

William A. Atlee, Lancaster, for Stecher.

Joseph V. Pinto, Philadelphia, for Ford Motor Co.

Before JOHNSON, TODD, and TAMILIA, JJ.

TODD, J.:

¶ 1 In this products liability action, we are called upon to decide whether a plaintiff in an enhanced injury case bears the burden of proving the precise extent of injuries arising from a defect when the injury suffered is indivisible by nature. Sharon R. Stecher, Joseph Stecher and Ford Motor Company ("Ford") have cross-appealed the judgment¹ entered in favor of Ford. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter for a new trial consistent with this Opinion.

¶ 2 This action arises from a traffic accident in February 1992. Sharon Stecher was driving a 1983 Ford LTD westbound on a snow and ice covered road when the vehicle spun as she approached a curve. Mrs. Stecher's vehicle crossed the centerline of the road and its front end struck an embankment on the opposite side of the road. The vehicle then spun back onto the roadway and continued to move westbound, with the driver's side of the vehicle leading, but in the eastbound travel lane. The LTD then collided with an eastbound pickup truck. The point of impact on the LTD was approximately at the "B" pillar, the post that runs vertically from the floor to the roof of the vehicle, behind the driver's left shoulder. Mrs. Stecher suffered a serious brain injury and a pelvic fracture as a result of the collision.

¶ 3 The Stechers brought this products liability action in 1994. Although they pursued several theories of liability during the pretrial phase of the litigation, at trial they withdrew all claims except for liability based on a manufacturing defect.² The Stechers' sole theory of liability at trial was that the vehicle's B pillar was unreasonably dangerous because its base welds failed, causing it to detach at the base and strike Mrs. Stecher's head.

¶ 4 Prior to trial both sides filed motions in limine. The Stechers sought to preclude Ford from introducing video tapes of crash tests that had been produced for this case and from introducing any testimony based on statistics about similar incidents. Ford sought to preclude the Stechers from introducing a "Dynaman" animation that had been produced for this case and was designed to depict Mrs. Stecher's movements within the vehicle during and after the impact. The trial court excluded both the Ford video of the crash tests and the Stechers' Dynaman animation. The trial court refused to exclude all testimony based on statistics, but directed the Stechers to provide specific objections to any such proposed testimony.

¶ 5 This matter was tried before a jury in April 1999. The jury returned a verdict finding that the Ford LTD driven by Mrs. Stecher was defective, but that the defect was not a substantial factor in causing Mrs. Stecher's injuries. This timely cross appeal followed the denial of the parties' post-trial motions.

¶ 6 On appeal, the Stechers raise four issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that plaintiffs were required to prove an enhanced injury attributable to the manufacturing defect.

2. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on concurring causes based on the rationale that this case is a products liability action rather than a negligence action.

3. Whether the trial court erred by permitting [Ford's] experts to testify about statistical analysis and accident frequency/severity studies where [Ford's] own experts acknowledge such information had no relevance to the specific issues in this case.

4. Whether the trial court erred in precluding [the Stechers'] expert's testimony without an evidentiary hearing.

(Stecher Brief, at 3.)

¶ 7 In its cross appeal, Ford presents two issues:³

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ford's motions for a compulsory nonsuit and directed verdict when the Stechers failed to present evidence that Mrs. Stecher suffered enhanced injuries above and beyond those she would have sustained as a result of the initial collision?

2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding Ford from introducing the videotapes of the crash tests to illustrate "general physical principles" and not as a purported reconstruction of the accident?

(Ford Brief, at 7.)

¶ 8 We begin with the central issue—the propriety of the trial court's instructions regarding a plaintiff's burden of proof under the enhanced injury doctrine, also known as the crashworthiness or second collision doctrine.⁴ In reviewing the trial court's refusal to grant post-trial motions for a new trial on the basis of alleged errors in the jury instructions, we will reverse only if the trial court "committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case." Dickens v. Barnhart, 711 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.Super.1998) (citation omitted). Moreover, we examine "the charge in its entirety against the background of evidence in the case to determine whether error was made and whether it was prejudicial. [This Court] will not consider only portions taken out of context, nor will it reverse for isolated inaccuracies." Id. ¶ 9 The enhanced injury doctrine is "a subset of a products liability action" and "provides that a manufacturer/seller is liable in `situations in which the defect did not cause the accident or initial impact, but rather increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred absent the ... defect.'"⁵Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 435 Pa.Super. 16, 644 A.2d 1213, 1218 (1994) (citations omitted). In this case, the issue is whether a plaintiff in such an action must quantify precisely the extent of the enhanced injuries arising from the defect or whether the plaintiff need only prove that the defect increased the harm.⁶

¶ 10 In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury that, in addition to proving the vehicle was defective and the defect was the proximate cause of Sharon Stecher's injuries, the Stechers had the burden to "show some method of establishing the extent of the ... enhanced injuries attributable to the defect." (N.T. Trial, 4/21/99, at 1905.) The trial court then elaborated: "It is the plaintiffs' burden to establish the extent of the enhanced injuries. If the defect increased the severity of the injury over what would have occurred without that defect, the manufacturer is liable for the increased injuries suffered by the plaintiff." (Id. at 1907-08, 644 A.2d 1213.)

¶ 11 In its opinion, the trial court stated that Kupetz, supra, compelled this instruction. We disagree. In Kupetz, this Court endorsed the enhanced injury doctrine as a "permissible theory of recovery in this Commonwealth." Kupetz, 644 A.2d at 1219. In so doing, we quoted the elements necessary to recover under this doctrine from two decisions from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania⁷ that followed the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir.1976). Id. at 1218. In Kupetz, however, this Court affirmed the judgment in a case where a jury trial resulted in a defense verdict. Thus, this Court did not have the occasion in Kupetz to consider the burden of proof regarding allocation of damages.

¶ 12 Similarly, we disagree with Ford's contention that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "defined the elements of a crashworthiness claim" in Schroeder v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp., 551 Pa. 243, 710 A.2d 23 (1998). (Ford's Brief, at 19.) While the Court in Schroeder did cite to Kupetz in a footnote for the elements of an enhanced injury claim, the specific issue of the allocation of the burden of proof was not before the Court. Thus, we find that this specific question is an issue of first impression in the appellate courts of Pennsylvania.

¶ 13 The jurisdictions that have grappled with this issue previously have developed two contrary approaches. The Fox/Mitchell⁸ approach requires a plaintiff to prove only that a defect "was a substantial factor in producing damages over and above those which were probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision."⁹ Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1206. If the plaintiff does so, "the burden of proof shifts to the tortfeasors to apportion the damages between them." Trull, 761 A.2d at 481. However, if the defect "is found to be a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury such as paraplegia, death, etc., then absent a reasonable basis to determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm, the defendants should be treated as joint and several tortfeasors." Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1206.

¶ 14 The Fox/Mitchell approach has been adopted in the majority of jurisdictions to consider this issue¹⁰ and by the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Specifically, Section 16 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides:

§ 16. Increased Harm Due to Product Defect

(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial sale or other distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the Plaintiff's harm beyond that which would have resulted from other causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the increased harm.

(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes in the absence of the product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the increased harm attributable solely to the product defect.

(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm that would have...